HARĀNANDALAHARĪ

Volume in Honour of Professor Minoru Hara
on his Seventieth Birthday

edited by
Ryutaro Tsuchida and Albrecht Wezler

Dr. Inge Wezler
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I Harāya Namaḥ

The first fruit of Minoru Hara's life-task-project to clarify the early history of the Śaiva religion appeared in the Indo-Iranian Journal of 1958 under the title *Nakulīśa-Pāśupata-Darśanam* (HARA 1958). This was followed by the submission of his dissertation, *Materials for the study of Pāśupata Śaivism*, to the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies of Harvard University in 1966 (HARA 1967). Ever since, Hara has contributed to the research into the history of the Pāśupata religion by a continuous series of meticulous studies.[1] Thanks to these studies our knowledge of this enigmatic but fascinating branch of early Hinduism has significantly increased. Paucity of sources, however, has inevitably hampered our understanding of the process of origin and spread of this religious movement. Hara, like other scholars before him, duly recognized that the Puranic text corpus contains numerous references to the Pāśupata religion. Yet, due to inconsistencies of all sorts and uncertainty as to their exact date, he considered, rightly, the use of these texts for historic purposes a hazardous affair and consequently assigned them to the periphery of historical research. That is to say, for the time being, since,

> Some day in the future, when all Purāṇic texts are critically edited and the inter-relationships among them established, they may help us in tracing the history of Pāśupata Śaivism (HARA 1967, 12f.).

* For Studies in the *Skandapurāṇa* I and II see BAKKER 1996 and YOKOCHI 1999. My sincere thanks are due to Drs Dominic GOODALL and Harunaga ISAACSON for commenting on a draft of this paper. I am also much obliged to Prof Alexis SANDERSON who presented me at an earlier stage with much valuable information, on which I drew for this article.

[1] The latest in this series is Hara's contribution to the Conference on 'Sāṃkhya and Yoga' held in Lausanne in 1998 (HARA 1999).

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 1-19

This day is, after thirty-four years, still far off. Critical editions of some Purāṇa texts have indeed been prepared since, by the All-India Kashiraj Trust in Ramnagar in particular, but they have not really brought the progress in Purāṇa studies that one should wish. Partly this is due to the unwieldiness of the Puranic text corpus, partly to the fact that no old manuscript material has been used for these editions. How valuable ancient manuscripts are for gaining insight in the Puranic text tradition itself and for the assessment of these texts as historical sources may be shown by the original *Skandapurāṇa* (SP), the edition of which is a long-term project of the Institute of Indian Studies in Groningen. Because the oldest manuscript of this text is dated AD 810, we can be certain that the information it contains dates from the eighth century or earlier. But even in this particular case the use of the Purāṇa text as a source of historical information remains a venturesome undertaking. Its historical value is greatly enhanced, however, when it proves possible to relate its data to other historical sources such as inscriptions. It is a matter of good fortune that this turns out to be the case in chapter 167 of the original *Skandapurāṇa*, a chapter — transmitted in two old Nepalese manuscripts, among which the one dated in AD 810 — which deals with the traditional history and holy places of the Pāśupata and which is, as we will show, partly in agreement with epigraphical evidence of the seventh century. In this tribute to Hara I intend to make a modest contribution to the objective envisaged by the great Japanese scholar, viz. 'tracing the history of Pāśupata Śaivism.'

II Śaiva Cosmology

The cosmology developed in mainstream early tantric Śaivism distinguishes between the Pure (*śuddhādhvan*) and the Impure Universe (*aśuddhādhvan*). Both universes are hierarchically structured; the different levels of reality or domains are called *tattva*. A standard hierarchy counts 31 domains in the Impure Universe and five domains in the Pure one.[2] The domain that forms the trait d'union between both universes is the Māyātattva. According to the *Svacchandatantra*, this reality can be divided into two layers (*puṭa*), which are separated by a knot or barrier (*granthi*).[3] Each layer com-

[2] See e.g. DAVIS 1991, 45. The canonical list of 36 *tattvas* is, as has been demonstrated by GOODALL 1998, LI-LV, in fact a consensus only reached 'in the post-scriptural Śaiva Siddhānta of the commentators' (ibid. LII).

[3] The *Svacchanda* is a Bhairava (Mantrapīṭha) tantra and does not belong to the tradition of the Śaiva Siddhānta, though it seems to be quite close to this tradition (SANDERSON 1988, 669f.).

prises six 'worlds' (*bhuvana*) that are reigned over by altogether twelve Rudras. The barrier or *granthi* seems actually to be the border between both universes and may be considered a layer or *madhyapuṭa* by itself (SvT 10.1122-1131).

The first Rudra on our side of the barrier is Gopati and the Rudra reigning the lowest 'world' of the sub-barrier layer of the Māyātattva is Gahana.[4] Directly underneath him spreads the 'net of bonds' (*pāśajāla*),[5] the created world that emerges from the Māyā Reality, assuming material form through the *tattvas* including those known from the Sāṃkhya system. The first Rudra on yonder side of the barrier is Kṣemeśa, followed by Brahmasvāmin; the principal Rudra of the Māyā Reality is Ananta.[6] The *Svacchanda* and its commentator seem to be confused as to whether the supra-barrier layer of the Māyā Reality still pertains to the Impure or to the Pure Universe (SvT 10.1129-31); the *Niśvāsamukha*, however, considers it still all part of the *aśuddhādhvan* (4.151-155).[7] In the middle, according to the *Svacchanda*, that is on the barrier itself, at the very top of the Impure Universe, reigns the bountiful lord Ananta, the Master of the World (*bhagavān ananteśo jagatpatiḥ*), who creates at will, is omniscient, maker of all, and dedicated to meting out confinement and grace (SvT 10.1127-8). Commenting on this passage Kṣemarāja observes that the *Mataṅgaśāstra* situates Vigraheśāna in this *madhyapuṭa*, who is surrounded by eight Rudras: Śarva, Bhava, Ugra, Bhīma, Bhasman, Antaka, Dundubhi, and Śrīvatsa.[8] The *Niśvāsamukha*

The *granthi* is not a universally shared feature of the Śaiva cosmos (no mention of it is made in the *Mṛgendratantra*, for instance).

[4] SvT 10.1124. Cf. *Mataṅga* 1.8.86-89.

[5] *Niśvāsamukha* 4.149-151. For this text see below n. 7.

[6] SvT 10.1125-6. Cf. *Mataṅga* 1.8.79-81.

[7] The *Niśvāsamukha* is an unpublished early Śaiva Siddhānta text, which in Paṭala 4 deals with the Atimārga. In a letter to the author (21-7-97), an edition of a portion of this text (4.146-158) with an elaborate apparatus of testimonia was generously placed at my disposal by Professor SANDERSON (Oxford). The text is known from a MS in the National Archives in Kathmandu (*Nepal Catalogue* I p. 137, MS No. 277) and a MS in the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine (London), Sanskrit MS I 33; the latter MS is, according to SANDERSON, an apograph of the Nepalese MS. The same scholar informed me that this text serves as an introduction to the four Sūtras of the *Niśvāsa*, i.e. the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā*, which is contained in the same codex. On this manuscript see also GOODALL 1998, XLI n. 95. GOODALL (ibid. n. 96) argues that the *Niśvāsakārikā* and the *Dīkṣottara* may also be connected to this text. Dominic GOODALL informed me that there is one more apograph of this early manuscript in the National Archives, Kathmandu (MS No. 5-2406).

[8] Kṣemarāja *ad* SvT 10.1127ab. Kṣemarāja adds that the Śrīpūrvaśāstra (i.e. *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* 5.28-29) speaks of only eight deities (*īśvarāṣṭa*) in the Māyātattva that form a *maṇḍala* of the size of a thumb, the first one of them being Mahādeva. *Mataṅga* 1.8.83-85: *etebhyo 'dhaḥ*

places Vigraheśa immediately above Gahana.[9]

In the Pure Universe, above the reality (*tattva*) of Śuddhavidyā (Vāgīśvarī) are, according to the *Svacchanda*, the worlds of the eight Rudras who are incarnated in the eight Pramāṇa texts of the Pāśupata: Pañcārtha etc.[10] Though none of these texts has come to light so far, we have a glimpse of the *Pañcārthapramāṇa*, as this text is quoted by Kṣemarāja *ad Svacchanda* 1.41-43. This fragment establishes that also the prime Pramāṇa of the Lākula division of the Pāśupata (see below) — in contrast with the system known from the *Pāśupatasūtra* and its commentary — acknowledges the ascending hierarchy of Rudra worlds; these are classified into three categories, namely *aghora, ghora*, and *ghoraghoratara.* Here we meet the very same Rudras again: 'Those Rudras who have been mentioned, beginning with Gopati and ending with Gahana, they, however, are designated 'terrible' (*ghora*); they live in various worlds.'[11]

With regard to the fourth of these Pramāṇa texts, the *Hṛdaya*, Kṣemarāja makes an interesting remark. From this text six other Pramāṇa texts have been extracted that deal with ritual acts (*kriyā*) and in this respect differ from the other eight Pramāṇas, which deal with knowledge (*jñāna*).[12] These ritual Pramāṇas are said to have been revealed by a pupil of Laku(leśa), Musulendra.[13]

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saṃsthito granthir durbhedyaś cātivistṛtaḥ / yatrāsau vigraheśānaḥ sthitaḥ paramadurjayaḥ //83// vṛto rudrair mahābhāgaiḥ svaśaktibalaśālibhiḥ / bhuvanaṃ bhuvaneśasya vinodaśatasaṃkulam //84// yatra śarvo bhavaś caiva hy ugro bhīmaś ca vīryavān / bhasmāntako dundubhiś ca śrīvatsaś ca mahābalaḥ // 85 //.

[9] *Niśvāsmukha* 4.151cd: *gahanaṃ ca tatordhvaṃ tu, vigraheśaṃ tatordhvataḥ.*

[10] The eight Pramāṇa texts are *Pañcārtha, Guhya, Rudrāṅkuśa, Hṛdaya, Lakṣaṇa, Vyūha, Ākarṣa, Ādarśa*. Kṣemarāja *ad* SvT 10.1134: *ete rudrā etannāmakapāśupataśāstrāvatārakāḥ* (SvT II, 275).

[11] *Pañcārthapramāṇa*: *proktā gopatipūrvā ye rudrās tu gahanāntagāḥ / te tu ghorāḥ samākhyātā nānābhuvanavāsinaḥ //* (SvT I, 16).

[12] One wonders whether these ritual acts are subsumed under the six forms of worship specified in the *Pāśupatasūtra* (PS) 1.8: laughter, song, dance, drumming on the mouth, salutations, and silent meditation on the five *brahmamantras* (PS 1.8: *hasitagītanṛttaḍuṃḍuṃkāranamaskārajapyopahāreṇopatiṣṭhet /*).

[13] The names of these texts are given as (SvT II, 275): *Purakalpa, Kanaka, Śālā, Niruttara, Viśva, Prapañca*. They are no longer extant.

This brings Kṣemarāja to the difference between two divisions within the Pāśupata movement (referred to as 'Tantra'), namely between the Pāśupata proper, founded by Lakuleśa, and hence designated 'Lākula,' and the Mausula, founded by the eponymous pupil of Lakuleśa, Musula or Musulendra. These Mausulas, though Pāśupatas in the wider sense — after all they too stem from Lakuleśa — are put on a lower scale by the *Svacchanda* and its commentator. Whereas the observance of the Mausulas leads them finally to the Māyā Reality (SvT 11.71cd), the Pāśupatas who base themselves on the eight Pramāṇas and belong to the Lākula division reach the Īśvara Reality in the Pure Universe (SvT 10.1169cd-70ab, 11.71ab).

III The Pāśupata Movement

The differences between the various traditions that form the Pāśupata movement become more clear from the treatment (in *Svacchanda* Paṭala 11) of the ascending hierarchy of highest stations (*para(ma)ṃ padam*) that can be reached by the followers of the various sects.[14] The Mausula is here grouped together with the Kāruka,[15] of which Kṣemarāja only notes that it has been founded by someone else, descended in the place Kārohaṇa.[16] The followers of both sects, whose observances (*vrata*) deal with a multitude of rituals, reach the worlds of the Rudras Kṣemeśa and Brahmasvāmin, whom the *Svacchanda* (10.1125) had situated on yonder side of the barrier (*granthi*), though still in the Māyā Reality.[17]

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[14] A similar hierarchy, though unfortunately without the allocation of the Pāśupata sects by name, is given by Rāmakaṇṭha in his sub-commentary (*upanyāsa*) of the (lost) partial commentary on the *Raurava* by Sadyojyotis, the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*, reconstructed by GOODALL 1998, XXII-XXV.

[15] SvT 11.71cd; quoted by Jayaratha *ad Tantrāloka* 1.34 (I, 70): *mausule kāruke caiva māyā-tattvaṃ prakīrtitam*.

[16] Who this other incarnation is does not become clear. He might be 'Karuka' whose name evidently connects him, in the view of Kṣemarāja, with the place of his descent, Kārohaṇa. Bhandarkar 1913. 121 identifies this sect with the Kālāmukha (Kālānana) and conjectures that 'the word Kāruka is probably a corruption of Kauruṣya, the name of the third of the four (according to the Purāṇas) pupils of Lakulīśa, or this last name may be the Sanskritised form of the original Kāruka.' Cf. PATHAK 1960, 10. LORENZEN 1991, 84, on good grounds, rejects this identification.

[17] Kṣemarāja *ad* SvT 11.71cd: *śrīlakuleśaśiṣyeṇa musulendreṇa kārohaṇasthānāvatīrṇena cāpareṇa māyātattvagatakṣemeśabrahmasvāmiprāptihetukriyābahulāḥ sve sve śāstre vrataviśeṣā uktā iti māyātattvam eva tatra paramaṃ padam*. Cf. above n. 15.

Within the Lākula division the *Svacchanda* seems to distinguish between the Vaimalas and those who follow the Pramāṇa, more specifically the *Pañcārthapramāṇa*, according to Kṣemarāja; both reach the Īśvara Reality, but the former's highest station is the world of the Rudra Tejeśa, while of the latter it is that of Dhruveśa.[18] The *Mathurā Pilaster Inscription of Chandragupta II: the Year 61* (i.e. AD 380) reports that a tradition of preceptors (*guru*) whose names end in *vimala* and who may have hence belonged to the Vaimala division, were affiliated to a lineage of teachers (*ācārya*) that traced its origin back to Kuśika, supposedly the first disciple of Lakulīśa. The sacred memory of these *gurus* was kept alive in a 'preceptor's shrine' (*gurvāyatana*), where cult objects were installed bearing their names (Upamiteśvara and Kapileśvara), objects which were to be worshipped by the Māheśvaras.[19] The Vaimalas may therefore have adhered to the Pāśupata school that followed the Pañcārtha doctrine as laid down in the *Pāśupatasūtra* (see below p. 14). Finally, the *Svacchanda* specifies a group within the Lākula division that practises the observance of the skull (*kapālavrata*). This group seems to coincide with or to encompass the Vaimala, though Kṣemarāja's commentary does not make this very clear.[20] So far as

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[18] SvT 11.72. Kṣemarāja (II, 328): *ye 'pi vaimalākhyāḥ pāśupatabhedāḥ, tathā pañcārthapramāṇāṣṭakoktopāsāparāḥ pare, teṣām īśvaratattvagatatejeśadhruveśau paraṃ padam ity āha,* **tejeśo vaimalānāṃ ca pramāṇe ca dhruvaṃ padam** //72//. Cf. SvT 10.1174ab, where Tejeśa and Dhruveśa are both said to be the highest station for the followers of the Pramāṇas (see below n. 20).

[19] SIRCAR 1942 (= Sel. Ins. I), 277-279. BAKKER 1997, 68.

[20] Kṣemarāja *ad Svacchanda* 11.73-74ab: *vaimalapramāṇaśāstraniṣṭho hi* **dīkṣājñānaviśuddhātma dehāntaṃ yāva caryayā / kapālavratam āsthāya svaṃ svaṃ gacchati tat padam** //11.73//. *dīkṣājñānaviśuddhātmeti pādena proktakriyāpradhānavratamātraniṣṭhamausulakārukebhyo 'tra viśeṣo darśitaḥ / svaṃ svaṃ proktatejeśadhruveśarūpam / yad uktaṃ purastād — 'tejeśaś ca dhruveśaś ca pramāṇānāṃ paraṃ padam'* (SvT 10.1174) *iti /73/ ye tu kapālādyasthivratadhāriṇaḥ pūrvoktalākulāmnāyāt — 'bhasmani śayīta'* (PS 1.3) *ityādipāśupataśāstracodanātaḥ* **japabhasmakriyāniṣṭhās te vrajanty aiśvaraṃ padam** //11.74ab //

'For, he who follows the Pramāṇa Śāstra and the Vaimala,

> "His soul is purified by initiation and knowledge, by (keeping to) the prescribed praxis until death, while abiding by the Kapāla observance — he goes to that station that is his own." (SvT 11.73)

The quarter-verse 'His soul is purified by initiation and knowledge' indicates the difference here from the afore-mentioned Mausulas and Kārukas, who are devoted only to observances that are chiefly ritualistic. 'His own (station),' that is to say the afore-mentioned Tejeśa or Dhruveśa; this has been stated above: "Tejeśa and Dhruveśa are the highest station (for those who follow) the Pramāṇas." (SvT 10.1174) But those, (issuing) from the afore-mentioned Lākula stream, who practise the observances of bones like the skull (*kapāla*), on account of injunctions in the Pāśupata Śāstra such as "One should lie in ashes"(*Pāśupatasūtra* 1.3),

to the Lākula division.

The question now arises: who is this disciple of Lakuleśa, Musulendra or Musula, who initiated a sect designated 'Mausula'? Evidently we are here concerned with a group within the Pāśupata movement that was chiefly engaged in ritual (worship) activity, forsaking the more rigorous portion of the Pāśupata praxis. As such it might be a group that stood between the lay Māheśvaras (*laukikas*) and the tough ascetics with their transgressive practices. Unfortunately, none of the Pramāṇa texts ascribed by Kṣemarāja to this school has survived and little more information about the sect is known from the later Śaiva Siddhānta, which, in view of its ritualistic orientation, in a way may be conceived of as its successor (see below p. 15). However, the alleged dependence of the Mausula text corpus on the Lākula Pramāṇas seems to allow the inference that this sect also ackowledged the hierarchy of Rudra worlds and as such deviated from the Pañcārtha school.

IV The Epigraphical Evidence from Malhar

The antiquity of a tradition that traced its origin back to a certain Mugalisa who was intiated by Lakulīśa is secured by an inscription, of which the text has recently become available. I refer to the Malhar Plates of Mahāśivagupta, Year 57 (c. AD 650),[21] which were published first by G. L. RAYAKWAR and Rahul Kumar SINGH in *Purātan* (Vol. 9 (1994), 146f.); a draft of a new edition was kindly put at my disposal by Professor Dr Ajay Mitra SHASTRI (Nagpur).[22] I take 'Mugalisa' to be a corruption/Prakritism of Mudgalīśa or Musalīśa, both names meaning 'Club-bearing Lord.' Musalīśa again may be a variant of Musaleśa/Musuleśa and, having the same meaning, it might not seem too far-fetched to identify the 'Musulendra' of Kṣemarāja with the 'Mugalisa' of the inscription.[23]

"They, devoted to japa, ashes, and ritual, proceed to the station of Īśvara."' (SvT 11.74ab)

[21] For the early chronology of Dakṣiṇa Kosala, the Pāṇḍuvaṃśa dynasty of Śrīpura and the reign of Mahāśivagupta (c. AD 590-650) see BAKKER 1994.

[22] SHASTRI *forthcoming*.

[23] I consider *musula/mausula* to be a variant of *musala/mausala*. Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha's introduction to *Mataṅga* 1.1.1 (p. 2) reading: *lākulamausalādibhyaḥ*.

I have dealt with this inscription in another article (BAKKER *forthcoming*), but at that time no edition was available to me; instead I based myself on oral information kindly provided by Rahul Kumar SINGH and a summary of its contents by A. M. SHASTRI in his monumental *Inscriptions of the Śarabhapurīyas, Pāṇḍuvaṁśins and Somavaṁśins*.[24] To date, photographs of the plates have not yet been published, nor have I seen the plates, in real life or in photographs.[25] Yet, I think that on the basis of the first edition and the draft of the new edition we can arrive at the correct Sanskrit text that was probably intended. Before discussing this inscription any further, I give the edited text of that portion of it that is relevant for the present study. This portion starts with the last word on the first plate (second side), line 8, and ends in line 23 on the second plate, second side.

Malhar Plates of Mahāśivagupta, Year 57, ll. 8-23[26]

[1.8] *viditam a*[1.9]stu bhavatāṃ yathāsmābhir ayaṃ grāmaḥ
sa-**kurapadrakaḥ**,
vājasaneyaca[1.10]*raṇād abhyarthya* **bhāṇḍāgāratulapadrakam***
oṇī-*bhogīyaṃ parivartena dattvā*,
[1.11] *saṃprati sanidhānaḥ sopanidhānaḥ sarvakarādānasametaḥ*
sarvapīḍā[1.12]*vivarjitas sadaśāparādhaḥ pratiṣiddhacāṭabhaṭapraveśaḥ*,
asyāṃ [1.13] *mā(gha?)**-paurṇamāsyām*,
atraivātmakāritaśrī-**bāleśvarabhaṭṭāraka**-*tapo*[1.14]*vanapratipālanārtham*
āropitebhyaḥ —
śivasya mūrtīnām aṣṭau vigraheśvarāṇāṃ,
ga[1.15]*haneśasya mūrtayo rudrāḥ ṣaṭṣaṣṭy anugrāhakā yuge yuge parivartamā-*
[1.16]*nā*,
adhunā kalikālam āsādya,

[24] SHASTRI 1995 II, 376-381. For technical details of this inscription see this publication and RAYAKWAR and SINGH 1994.

[25] SHASTRI in his draft reports that this set of three plates of copper is presently in the collection of Shri Raghunandan Prasad PANDEYA. SHASTRI, unlike RAYAKWAR and SINGH, worked from photographs. The text starts on the verso side of the first plate and comprises altogether 40 lines.

[26] Emended edition based on RAYAKWAR and SINGH 1994 and a draft of a new edition by A. M. SHASTRI (*forthcoming*).

śrīmal-**lakulīśanātho** *'vatīrya,*
somaśa[l.17]**rmâ**-*khyabrāhmaṇakule bhūtvā,*
*mahāvrate (te)na*** dīkṣito jagadindus,*
tenāpi [l.18] **mugalisas******,
tataḥ somādipāramparyakrameṇa sthāne,
guruśrī-**rudrasoma**-*pra*[l.19]*śiṣyaśrī*-**tejasoma**-*śiṣyebhyaḥ*
śrīmad-**bhīmasoma**-*pādebhyaḥ,*
śiṣyapraśiṣyāṇāṃ [l.20]*yāgadīkṣāvyākhyānavasatipravartanāya*
bhagnavidīrṇadevakula[l.21]*saṃskṛtaye ca /*
mātāpitror ātmanaś ca puṇyābhivṛddhaye,
samakālopa[l.22]*bhogārtham ācandratārakārkam,*
udakapūrvakaṃ tāmraśāsanena pratipādi[l.23]*ta ity* [...].

* SHASTRI takes this as the name of two villages: 'Bhāṇḍāgāra may have been Boḍor in the same tahsil (i.e. Mahāsamund tahsil of the Raipur District), and T(ū)lapadraka may have been a suburb of this locality.' Their names seem to indicate villages where cotton (*tūla*) was cultivated and stored.

** SHASTRI and SINGH read *māpu*.

*** SHASTRI and SINGH read *mahāvratena*. Emendation proposed by H. ISAACSON.

**** SHASTRI and SINGH read: '*mugalisas* (?)'. Mugalisa may be a corruption/ Prakritism of Mudgalīśa or Musalīśa.

Translation

Let it be known to you that — after we have earlier asked permission of the Vājasaneya branch (of the White Yajurveda) and have given a village Bhāṇḍāgāra-Tulapadraka in the district of Oṇī in return — this village (scil. Pāśipadraka) together with Kurapadraka, along with the rights to hidden treasures and deposits, the right to collect all taxes, immunity from all impositions, the right to impose fines for the ten offences, and the exemption from being entered by officials and constables, starting immediately, has been bestowed by us here and now, on the day of full moon of Māgha (?) with the offering of a libation and by means of (this) copper-plate charter, upon the feet of the illustrious Bhīmasoma, for the increase of merit of father, mother and ourselves and to be enjoyed as long as moon, stars and sun will last:

> There are eight embodiments of Śiva, the Vigraheśvaras; the embodiments of Gahaneśa are the sixty-six Rudras who bestow grace (initiation) and who roam about in each *yuga*; now the Kali age has come and Lakulīśanātha has descended; he was born in the family of a brahmin named Somaśarman; after having been initiated by him (i.e. Somaśarman) in the Great Vow he became a moon on earth; and he again (i.e. Lakulīśanātha) initiated Mugalisa; then, in due succession of the lineage that started with Soma, the afore-mentioned Bhīmasoma — the pupil of the illustrious Tejasoma and grand-pupil of the illustrious *guru* Rudrasoma — has been justly raised to the position responsible for the protection of the *tapovana* attached to the Bāleśvara-bhaṭṭāraka (Temple), which has been erected by ourselves. The donation is made to meet the expenses of ceremonies, initiations, teaching and housing of pupils and grand-pupils and to restore the shrines that have fallen into decay and are in need of repair.

The inscription is of paramount importance for more than one reason. One of them is that, in addition to the lineage of preceptors, it gives doctrinal arguments to legitimize the claims of the recipient Bhīmasoma. These doctrinal arguments should be compared with what we know of Pāśupata theology. In order to follow the *paramparā* of teachers back to Śiva himself, the text refers first to the latter's eight forms that are designated 'Vigraheśvaras.' As we have seen above, Vigraheśvara is, according to one tradition,[27] the name of the deity who stands at the apex of our cosmos, in the *granthi*, where it borders on the Pure Universe. There he is surrounded by eight Rudras, four of whom bear names that mark the Aṣṭamūrti since *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* 6.2-3. Just like Rudra, the (grand)son of Prajāpati, through his eight forms, is the actual manifestation of God in the created cosmos, sometimes represented as the divine child,[28] so, it seems, is Śiva in his eightfold form of Vigraheśvara ('the Lord of Form') considered the fountain-head of our universe in the theology underlying the inscription at issue. Then the inscription mentions Gahaneśa ('the Lord of the Abyss'), the Rudra who rules the lowest world of the Māyā Reality in the sub-barrier

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[27] This seems to be the tradition of the Śaiva Siddhānta as represented by the *Niśvāsamukha* and the *Mataṅga* (see above p. 3).

[28] See BAKKER 1996, 9ff. Cf. the *Śrīpūrvaśāstra* (5.28-29), referred to by Kṣemarāja (see above n. 8), which assigns eight deities (*īśvarāṣṭa*) to this reality, forming a *maṇḍala* of the size of a thumb and headed by Mahādeva, the first of the Aṣṭamūrti.

layer, directly above the 'abyss' or 'net of bonds,' the material world. He is said to roam about in sixty-six embodiments in successive *yugas* and Lakulīśa is just the last of these incarnations in the present Kaliyuga.

In a letter already mentioned (see above n. 7) Professor Alexis SANDERSON brought an unpublished text to my notice, the *Jayadrathayāmala* (JRY), which belongs to the (later) Bhairava scriptures of Agamic Saivism. SANDERSON kindly placed at my disposal a portion of the edition he made of this text (4.449-460), based on a MS in the National Archives in Kathmandu.[29] He drew my attention to the fact that this text describes the sixty-six embodiments as 'the Bhavas who reside in the sixty-six Māna (i.e. Pramāṇa) [worlds].'[30] These embodiments or manifestations are divided into two lines of gurus (*gurupaṅktis*), a set of twenty-eight Śivas and one of thirty-eight Rudras, which are associated with different levels of Śaiva teaching. The first set, which begins with Śveta and of which the last two gurus are Someśa and Lakulīśa, is said to bestow both exegesis of the scriptures and, occasionally, initiation, following the division of the Pramāṇajñāna.[31] The second line of thirty-eight Rudras, which begins with Vareśvara and ends with Vaṣaṭkāra, is said to be authorized to granting initiation and is described as propounding the teachings of Bhairava.[32]

There can be little doubt that the inscription at issue in mentioning the sixty-six Rudra manifestations descending from Gahaneśa, 'who roam about in every *yuga* to favour with initiation,' refers to the doctrine mentioned in the *Jayadrathayāmala*. This is again reinforced by the fact that the last two of the twenty-eight Śiva manifestations, Someśa and Lakulīśa also figure prominently in the inscription.[33] To

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[29] *Catalogue* Vol. 5, MS No. 4650.

[30] JRY 4.449: *adhunā gūḍhanirgūḍhān paṅktiyugmagatāñ śṛṇu / śvetādivaṣatkārāntān bhavān ṣaṭṣaṣṭimānagān* //449// Edition A. SANDERSON.

[31] JRY 4.453-454ab: *someśo lakulīśaś ca hy aṣṭāviṃśaty amī śivāḥ / vyākhyānānugrahakarāḥ pramāṇajñānabhedataḥ* //4.453// *prāsaṅgikī tv asau teṣāṃ sadyo 'nugrahakāritā* /. Edition A. SANDERSON. This list of twenty-eight manifestations of Śiva conforms by and large with similar lists of *avatāras* known from several other texts dealing with the Pāśupata system as founded by Lakulīśa; see e.g. DVIVEDA 1982 for a summary and comparison of these lists.

[32] JRY 4. 454cd-455ab, 459: *dvitīyā gurupaṅktir yā vareśādyaṣṭatriṃśikā //4.454// sadyonugrahakartṛtve tasyā devy adhikāritā* / [...] *vauṣaṭkāro vaṣaṭkāraḥ kathitās tu gurūttamāḥ / bhairavāptapravaktāraḥ svādhaḥsthānagatāṇuśaḥ* //4.459// Edition A. SANDERSON.

[33] From this evidence we may infer that a distinct Bhairava tradition within Saivism was acknowledged by the middle of the 7th century; it would seem, however, that Bhīmasoma did not

Someśa or Somaśarman, as he is called in the inscription, who is said to have initiated Lakulīśa in the Mahāvrata, we will return below. Lakulīśanātha, unlike Somaśarman, is explicitly said in the inscription to be an *avatāra* and through him the lineage of the donee Bhīmasoma is directly connected with the divine (Rudra) *paramparā*: Gahaneśa, Vigraheśvara, Śiva. Bhīmasoma's lineage, namely, is said to stem from Lakulīśa through the latter's pupil Mugalisa, who was initiated by the Moon on Earth, Lakulīśa, and whom we have identified with Musula or Musulendra, the founder of the Mausula sect. If this identification is right, the conclusion would be natural that the lineage of Bhīmasoma belonged to the sect of the Mausulas, who, as we have seen, probably acknowledged the theology of an hierarchy of Rudra worlds, which plays such an important role in the inscription.

V Somaśarman and the Somasiddhānta

Here, however, we encounter a difficulty. Though Bhīmasoma and his predecessors no doubt belonged to the Pāśupata fold, the designation 'Mausula' does not occur in the inscription. With the Mausulas these *ācāryas* may have in common, it would seem, that they were engaged with ceremonies (*kriyā*) and worship rather than with ascetic practices, though they were in charge of the *tapovana* attached to the Bāleśvara-bhaṭṭāraka Temple in Śrīpura. But how do we explain that their names end in *soma*? On account of these names I have argued (BAKKER *forthcoming*) that these *ācāryas* probably belonged to the Pāśupata sect known as Somasiddhānta, a sect that hardly, if at all, features in Agamic literature where it is concerned with the Atimārga, but which in later sources is often equated with the Kāpālikas.[34] Pāśupata ascetics whose names end in *soma* are known from several inscriptions in which they are said to be engaged in the Mahāvrata, the observance in which, according to the Malhar inscription, Lakulīśa was initiated by Somaśarman.[35] Consequently, another

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himself belong to this tradition, since he affiliates himself to the first lineage of 'Śivas.'

[34] In the play *Prabodhacandrodaya* by Kṛṣṇamiśra (c. AD 1050-1100), the doctrine of the Somasiddhānta is identified with that of the Kāpālikas (Handiqui 1965, 640-645). Further see LORENZEN 1991, 82ff., 215ff.; PATHAK 1960, 25. Prof SANDERSON pointed out to me that the Kapālin Satyasoma and his companion Devasomā feature in the *Mattavilāsaprahasana* of the Pallava king Mahendravikramavarman (cf. LORENZEN 1991, 53).

[35] Prof.A. SANDERSON kindly provided me with the following information. The Indargarh Pāśupata stone inscription of AD 710-11 was engraved by a Mahāvratin with the name Cāmuṇḍasoma (Journal of the Bihar Research Society 1955, 249--261). A Mahāvratin Somibhaṭṭāraka/Sobadeva of

question arises: who was this Somaśarman?

The name Somaśarman was already known from the *Vāyu*° and *Liṅgapurāṇas* and he is evidently the same as the Someśa named in the *Jayadrathayāmala* as Lakulīśa's predecessor (see above p. 11) These Purāṇas describe him as the 27th incarnation of Śiva, born in Prabhāsatīrtha, a holy place in Saurashtra near the Arabian Sea, famous for its Somanātha temple, an assignment that makes the impression of being secondary.[36] The legend told in the Malhar Plates, however, is apparently somewhat different. It says that Lakulīśanātha was born in the brahmin family of Somaśarman, who therefore may have been a senior contemporary of his. Moreover, Lakulīśa is said to have been initiated by this Somaśarman in the Mahāvrata and so became the 'Moon on Earth.' Somaśarman or his family (*kula*) thus appears, in the religious imagination of the believer, to have been the House (*śarman*) from which the Moon (*soma*) rose over the world (*jagadindu*). The play of words may allude to 'Soma' as a name of Śiva and the transfiguration undergone by Lakulīśa in the initiation ritual, which, when he underwent the anointment with ashes, made him shine like the moon. The relationship between Somaśarman and Lakulīśa seems thus to be somewhat similar to the one conceived in Christian theology between John the Baptist and Jesus Christ.

VI The Evidence of the Skandapurāṇa

The theology underlying the inscription text seems also to have been known to the author(s) of the original *Skandapurāṇa* (SP). This text, too, places Somaśarman in the Kali age and though, admittedly, he is not credited with his initiation, he is said to have been the first one blessed with Lakulīśa's grace; the text apparently implies that the latter was born in Somaśarman's, i.e., Atri's House. The spot where the incarna-

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the Kolanupākā inscription of AD 1050 is described as proficient in expounding the Somasiddhānta (*Select Epigraphs of Andhra Padesh No.4*). Two inscriptions of the time of the Cola king Rājādhirāja II (Nos. 403 of 1896 and 206 of 1912 of the Madras Epigraphical Collection), mention a Somasiddhāntin, though 'soma' is not affixed to his name: Vāgīśabhaṭṭa (Epigraphia Indica (EI) XXVII (1947-48), 297f.). The predecessors of this and other priests associated with the Tiruvorriyur Temple, 'five hundred Brâhmaṇa *Mahâvratins*,' were, according to the account of the Sthalapurāṇa, 'brought from the banks of the Ganges' (EI XXVII, 300 n. 1).

[36] VāP 23.214-217; LiP 1.24.120-124. Another feature that makes the impression of being secondary is that Akṣapāda (=Gautama?), Kumāra (or Kaṇāda), Ulūka and Vatsa are mentioned as his pupils. DVIVEDA 1982 remarks about him: 'Prabhāsatīrtham āsādya somaśarmā prādurbhūtaḥ / nāsti pāṭhāntaram atra /.'

tion took place is called Kārohaṇa.[37] The relevant passage reads:

> And God, the Lord of the gods, who is possessed of supreme sovereignty, after having assumed a white-bodied form (i.e. a body like that of the moon), went to the auspicious House of Atri, (that is to say, he went to the house of a man) named Somaśarman, who was born in the lineage of Atri. That lord, i.e. Śaṃkara, blessed/initiated that *brahman*-knowing brahmin belonging to Atri's lineage together with his (whole) family by bestowing upon him perfection in yoga. Thereupon, after he had initiated this excellent brahmin and his family, O Vyāsa, God went to Ujjayanī (Ujjain) and entered the cremation ground. There the bull-bannered God took a bath in ashes, took a torch in his left hand and sat down (in meditation).[38]

In Ujjain Lakulīśa accepted Kauśika as his first disciple,[39] and then this 'white-bodied' or moon-like incarnation went to Jambūmārga, Mathurā and Kānyakubja, where he initiated Gārgya, Mitra and a fourth person who is only said to have been born in a good *gotra* in the country of the Kurus, but whose name may have been Kauruṣ(y)a (SP 167.122-123); Lākulin taught them his own doctrine (*svasiddhānta*), known as 'Pañcārtha,' which, as the *Skandapurāṇa* strongly suggests, was different from the doctrine of his senior, the blessed Somaśarman.[40] I take this as an indication that the author(s) of the *Skandapurāṇa* belonged to circles that were closer to the Lākula than to the Mausula division. This, again, would explain that, in contrast to the inscription, this text does not proclaim that Lakulīśa had been initiated by Somaśarman, a tenet essential to Bhīmasoma and his predecessors.

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[37] Cf. Kauṇḍinya *ad Pāśupatasūtra* 1.1 (p. 3); Hara 1967, 157 n. 1.

[38] SP 167.124-127: *bhagavān api deveśaḥ paramaiśvaryasaṃyutaḥ / atrivaṃśaprasūtasya nāmnā vai* **somaśarmaṇaḥ** *rūpaṃ kṛtvā sitāṅgaṃ tu jagāmātrigṛhaṃ śubham //124// sa taṃ brahmavidaṃ vipram ātreyaṃ sakulaṃ vibhuḥ / yogasiddhipradānena anujagrāha śaṃkaraḥ //125// anugṛhya tadā vyāsa sakulaṃ dvijasattamam / jagāmojjayanīṃ devaḥ śmaśānaṃ ca viveśa ha //126// sa tatra bhasmanātmānam avaguṇṭhya vṛṣadhvajaḥ / ulmukaṃ vāmahastena gṛhītvā samupāviśat //127 //* This edition of the text was prepared by my student P. BISSCHOP (cf. SP_{Bh} 167.134-138).

[39] Cf. Kauṇḍinya *ad Pāśupatasūtra* 1.1 (p. 3f.).

[40] SP 167.128-130: *tatra prathamam ādāya śiṣyaṃ kauśikam īśvaraḥ / jambūmārge dvitīyaṃ ca mathurāyāṃ tato 'param //128// kānyakubje tataś cānyam anugṛhya jagatpatiḥ / svasiddhāntaṃ dadau yogam uvācedaṃ ca* ***lākulī*** *//129// rahasyaṃ paramaṃ hīdaṃ pañcārtha iti saṃjñitam / viprān mocayituṃ datto yuṣmabhyaṃ martyabandhanāt / anayā dīkṣayā viprān prāpayadhvaṃ paraṃ padam //130//* Edition P. BISSCHOP (cf. SP_{BH} 167.138cd-141).

VII Somaśarman, Somavaṃśa and Somasiddhānta

When we return to the Malhar inscription and combine its evidence with that of the *Skandapurāṇa*, we may say that there evidently was a tradition within the Pāśupata fold that recognized a, what we may call a 'Pāśupata milieu' before the appearance of Lakulīśa. Somaśarman belonged to this milieu. In the Pāñcārthika-Pāśupata context he was mostly either ignored, or relegated to a previous *yuga* by being promoted to an *avatāra* of Śiva himself. Both our sources, however, the inscription and the *Skandapurāṇa*, emphasize that, though they recognize Somaśarman as the fountainhead, Somaśarman is not an incarnation, and he or his tradition derived legitimacy from the fact that Lakulīśa was born in his House. According to the *Skandapurāṇa*, Somaśarman himself was favoured with initiation by Lakulīśa, according to the inscription it was the other way round, but, the inscription adds, the lineage of Bhīmasoma, received its 'certificate of divinity' through Mugalisa, who was initiated by the incarnated Śiva himself.

The combined evidence of both sources thus seems to suggest that there existed an early Śaiva tradition that, on the one hand, recognized the uniqueness of Lakulīśa's incarnation, but that, on the other hand, distanced itself from the Pāñcārthika and Lākula divisions. In its initial stage this tradition, or one strand of it, may have been named after its putative preceptor 'Mausula'; in the course of time other groups may have been assimilated, and gradually a distinct theology and praxis may have been developed, which became known as the Somasiddhānta, thus preserving a reference to a distant saint who was hallowed as its founder, Somaśarman. Part of this tradition, again, may eventually have merged with groups that produced the Bhairava texts such as the *Jayadrathayāmala*, that is to say, became indistinguishable from the Kāpālikas.[41] Others may have joined the Śaiva Siddhānta, of which a *maṭhikā* was attached to the very same temple complex of Bāleśvara-bhaṭṭāraka in Śrīpura.[42]

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[41] SANDERSON 1988, 668.

[42] A hoard of nine copper-plate grants of Mahāśivagupta Bālārjuna was found in Sirpur (SHASTRI 1995 II, 376-379). In an article in JESI 18 (1992) A. M. SHASTRI discusses the contents of these charters in more detail (see also SHASTRI *forthcoming*). It appears that in this Sirpur hoard there are altogether seven charters that record grants made to Śaiva *ācāryas* said to issue from Nandapura, but who were living in this *maṭhikā* in Śrīpura. The lineage of these *ācāryas* should therefore been seen as a subbranch of the Nandapur one; it can be reconstructed from these grants: 1) *śaivācārya* Aghoraśiva, 2) *bhagavatpāda* Dīrghaśiva, 3) *bhagavatpāda* Vyāpaśiva, and 4) *sthānaguru* Astraśiva. All the donations were made to meet the expenses on repairs, daily worship and musical concerts.

The *Skandapurāṇa* goes still one step further in its mystification of the origins by affiliating Somaśarman to the lineage of Atri, the father of the Moon, that is to the Lunar Race, the Somavaṃśa.[43] There are signs that this powerful symbolism was not lost on the rulers of Dakṣiṇa Kosala. It can hardly be coincidence that the Malhar inscription is a charter issued by a king who proclaims to belong to the Somavaṃśa.[44] After the theological and legendary superstructure, the actual *paraṃparā* of Bhīmasoma is said to begin with Soma, thus creating, possibly intentionally, a profound ambiguity: Soma who? Soma that is Śiva, Soma that is the son of Atri, the Moon, Soma that is Somaśarman, or just a preceptor named Soma who lived long after the times of Lakulīśa and Mugalisa, but who happened to start a tradition of ascetic teachers within the Pāśupata fold?

The intimate relationship of the royal Soma dynasty with this particular branch of the Pāśupatas may thus have been endorsed by an ideology according to which both claimed descent from Soma — the dynastic one from Soma, the son of Atri, the sectarian one from the 'Moon on Earth' that appeared in the family of Somaśarman, that is in the House of the Moon. This House may therefore have been conceived by the mythmakers of the time as the joint cradle of two lineages: a worldly one culminating in Mahāśivagupta, the Somavaṃśin king of Kosala, and a religious one headed by Bhīmasoma, an *ācārya* living in the temple complex founded and patronized by his royal counterpart.

From these inscriptions and the names of the Śaiva *ācāryas* ending in *śiva* it becomes clear that the Śaiva Siddhānta was firmly established in Dakṣiṇa Kosala, at least from the second half of the 6th century onwards. The original headquarters may have been in Nandapura, a place not properly identified.

[43] That this tradition was not completely obliterated in later centuries, but locally survived well into the second millennium is proved by the *Kāravaṇamāhātmya*. This late text sings the greatness of the Kārohaṇa *tīrtha*, which is unanimously identified with the village Karvan c. 30 km north of Baroda (D.R. Bhandarkar 1906-7; LORENZEN 1991, 177). We encounter the following pedigree of Lakulīśa in the fourth *adhyāya* of this far from homogeneous text: *kāyāvarohaṇe puṇye tīrthe tīrthavarottame / bhṛgukṣetrapavitrārtham avatīrṇo yuge yuge // ādikalpāvasāne tu brahmakalpe purātane / brahmaṇo manasaḥ putro atrināmā ca viśrutaḥ // atris tu janayāmāsa ātreyaṃ nāma nāmataḥ / ātreyād agniśarmo 'pi agniśarmasutaḥ śuciḥ // somaśarmeti vikhyāto dharmaśīlo jitendriyaḥ / somaśarmasuto jāto viśvarūpo dvijottamaḥ // viśvarūpād ahaṃ jāto bālarūpadharo haraḥ / yena vyāptaṃ jagat sarvaṃ trailokyaṃ sacarācaram //* (DALAL 1920, 51).

[44] ll. 4-5: *somavaṃśasaṃbhavaḥ paramamāheśvaro mātāpitṛpādānudhyātaḥ śrī mahāśivaguptarājadevaḥ*. The likelihood of such a connection was first suggested to me by Rahul Kumar SINGH.

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A Note on *viṣama upanyāsaḥ*

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA, Bonn

I came to know the name of Minoru Hara more than forty years ago. He had just published his excellent annotated translation of the "Nakulīśa-pāśupata-darśanam" chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* in the *Indo-Iranian Journal*. Shortly before, I had published a study of the Pāśupatas in ancient Cambodia, which he kindly quoted. My Pāśupata studies were but an episode in the Cambodian studies in which I was engaged in those days. Our interests have often been wide apart. However, an intellectual sympathy grew up between us, which later developed into a deep friendship, thanks to our common friend, the late lamented Yutaka OJIHARA.

It would have been a great pleasure and a great honour for me to associate myself with the well-merited homage that is being rendered him today, in a dignified manner. But I have not been able to do so, being currently engaged in an unusual work. Nonetheless, I hope that the little note that follows will not leave entirely indifferent a scholar who has done so much to enlighten us on Sanskrit words and concepts.[1]

Viṣama upanyāsaḥ is a favourite remark of Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. It is often found in later philosophical literature too, beginning with Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, where it is used in *vṛtti* on *kārikā* 3 and in *kārikā* and *vṛtti* 34. Later on, it will be found in such texts as Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Śābarabhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (= *Praśastapādabhāṣya*), Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* and *Sphoṭasiddhi*, and Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

So far as I aware, no ancient commentator on the *Mahābhāṣya* took the trouble, or judged it necessary, to explain the term *upanyāsa* in this context; and this is also the case, generally, with the commentators on the later texts. The modern interpreters variously render the expression *viṣama upanyāsaḥ*. P. THIEME, however, pointed out in 1960:

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[1] For library and technical assistance I wish to thank, respectively, Mr. Peter Wyzlic, M. A., and Dr. Karl-Heinz Golzio (Indologisches Seminar Bonn).

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 33-37

Das Sätzchen *viṣama upanyāsaḥ* begegnet 30mal im Mahābhāṣya. In jedem Fall handelt es sich darum, eine 'Analogie' - wörtlich: 'ein [vergleichendes] daneben (*upa*)-hin (*ni*)-Setzen (√*as* 'werfen')', - aus der man einen Schluß ziehen möchte, zu leugnen. Sinngemäß könnten wir sagen: 'Der Vergleich hinkt'. Nicht ausreichend sind die Übertragungen: 'Falsch bemerkt' (STRAUSS, Festgabe Garbe S. 87) oder 'La proposition est défectueuse' (RENOU, Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit S. 105)[2].

THIEME, on the basis of KIELHORN's edition and, perhaps, PATHAK and CHITRAO's *Word Index*, did not take into account one instance in the *Mahābhāṣya* in which the expression does not occur in the context of an example - an instance of which I shall speak later. But, supposing that his interpretation was not inspired by an ancient interpretation (to be mentioned below), it must be regarded as genial.

In the later literature, the expression *always* occurs - so far as I am aware - in the context of examples. Although the majority of the ancient commentators leave it unexplained, there are at least some who do explain it; and two of them, at least, show their embarrassment at the fact that the expression is used in this context, since they propose different interpretations. Thus Vyomaśivācārya, the author of the *Vyomavatī* commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, first takes the word *upanyāsa* in the sense of "proposition", but then proposes to interpret it in the sense of "example" (*dṛṣṭānta*), "where the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) betweeen the object to be established and the means of establishment is set forth (*upanyasyate*)"[3].

Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara, the author of the *Gopālikā* commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Sphoṭasiddhi*, also interprets first *upanyāsa* in *viṣama upanyāsaḥ* in the sense of "proposition", "enunciation". The dissimilarity (*vaiṣamya*) of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), he says, is transferred to the statement that is made of it; or the expression means that the example being dissimilar, a statement is made with respect to it. But then he interprets *upanyāsa* itself as *dṛṣṭānta*, and thus the two words *viṣama* and *upanyāsa* become co-referential (*samānādhikaraṇa*). His interpretation of *upanyāsa* in the meaning of *dṛṣṭānta* curiously recalls that of P. THIEME:

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[2] THIEME 1960: 139 (378), n. 8.

[3] *yo 'yaṃ laiṅgikajñānavad dve dravye iti bhaviṣyatīty upanyāsaḥ sa viṣamaḥ samo na bhavatīti / tathā hi viśeṣyajñāne viśeṣaṇānurāga iti laiṅgike tu anurāgābhāva iti vaiṣamyam /*

yad vā viṣamo 'yam upanyāsaḥ, upanyasyate sādhyasādhanayor asmin vyāptir ity upanyāsaḥ / laiṅgikavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / sa ca viṣamaḥ, liṅgānurāgaśūnyatayā tasya aviśeṣyajñānatvād iti / Vyomavatī II, p. 47.

upanyāsa upavarṇanā dṛṣṭāntavacanam ity arthaḥ / dṛṣṭāntasya vaiṣamyam upanyāsa evopacaritam / atha vā viṣame dṛṣṭānte tam adhikṛtya tavāyam upanyāsaḥ vākprārambhaḥ[4] / *atha vā - upanyāso dṛṣṭāntaḥ; dārṣṭāntikasamīpe hi sarvatra nyasyate iti viṣamopanyāsaśabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*[5] /

In Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* (III, p. 75.12), Ānandapūrṇa only gives the following explanation of *upanyāsa*, in the sense of *dṛṣṭānta*, in *viṣama upanyāsaḥ*:

upanyasyata ity upanyāsaḥ, dṛṣṭāntaḥ.[6]

While commenting upon Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya* I, 42: *viṣamo 'yam upanyāsaḥ*, Vādirājasūri glosses *upanyāsa* by *dṛṣṭānta* without further clarification.

Sometimes *upanyāsa* alone occurs in connection with examples; and Śālikanātha, commenting upon Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* I, 1, 5 (p. 182): *tac ca Pāṇini-Piṅgalopanyāsena prakaṭitam*, glosses *upanyāsa* by *dṛṣṭānta*[7].

According to these authors, therefore, *viṣama upanyāsaḥ* is simply equivalent to *viṣamo* (*asamo, visadṛśo*, *vilakṣaṇo*) *dṛṣṭāntaḥ* "the example is dissimilar" - an expression that is also met with.

However, there is one passage in the *Paspaśāhnika* of the *Mahābhāṣya* where the expression *viṣama upanyāsaḥ* occurs without any reference to an example. It is true that in the passage in question KIELHORN's edition omits it; but it seems necessary for the clarity of the passage[8]. The passage is too well known to be quoted in full; only the relevant portion, therefore, is quoted below:

... *atha yo 'vāgyogavit. ajñānaṃ tasya śaraṇam.* [*viṣama upanyāsaḥ.*] *nātyantāyājñānaṃ śaraṇaṃ bhavitum arhati...*

... Then what about the man who does not know the propriety of words? Ignorance is his refuge. [It is a defective proposition.] Ignorance cannot wholly serve as a refuge ...

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[4] cf. *Amarakośa* I, 6, 9: *upanyāsas tu vāṅmukham*.

[5] *Gopālikā*, p. 38.

[6] *Bhāvaśuddhi*, p. 286.

[7] I owe this reference to my friend Gerdi Gerschheimer. See also Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika*, *Ākṛtivāda* 20: *vanopanyāsatulyo 'yam upanyāsaḥ kṛtas tvayā*.

[8] See Nirṇaya-Sāgar Press edition, p. 32.

In the light of this passage, one should hesitate, it seems, to render *upanyāsa* by "example". Udayana, in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, seems to be right in considering *upanyāsa* in *viṣamo 'yam upanyāsaḥ* as an abbreviation of *dṛṣṭāntopanyāsa*: *viṣamo 'yam upanyāsaḥ* = *ayaṃ dṛṣṭāntopanyāso visadṛśaḥ*[9].

Appayadīkṣita, in the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā*, which is a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*, uses the expression *dṛṣṭāntaviṣama upanyāsaḥ*[10], which I understand as: *dṛṣṭāntena viṣama upanyāsaḥ*.

Finally, modern Indian authorities render *upanyāsa*, when used in the context of examples, by *dṛṣṭāntakathana* or similar expressions. Thus the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, in his Bengali translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, renders it by *dṛṣṭāntavākya* in *viṣamaś cāyam upanyāsaḥ* (III, 2, 63).

In view of all this, it seems preferable to translate *viṣama upanyāsaḥ*, in a general way, by "defective proposition".

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[9] *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 134.

[10] *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* I, p. 154.

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The last reason for *satkāryavāda*

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This modest contribution to the volume in honour of Professor Minoru HARA contains a supplementary observation to the lecture which, at his invitation, I had the pleasure of giving at the International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo in May 1996, and which became the basis for a series of lectures (Paris 1997) that have now been published under the title *Langage et réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne* (BRONKHORST, 1999). This note is not based on new independent research, but has been inspired by and draws upon Professor Phyllis GRANOFF's contribution to the conference on Sāṃkhya and Yoga (Lausanne 1998) which too has now been published (GRANOFF, 1999).

The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* justifies the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* in kārikā 9, which reads:

> *asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt /*
> *śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //9//*

This kārikā contains five arguments, the last of which concerns us at present. It reads, in Sanskrit: *kāraṇabhāvāt sat kāryam*. This is ambiguous, and allows of at least three different interpretations:

(1) "Because [the cause] is a cause, the product exists."
(2) "Because [the product] is [identical with] the cause, the product exists."
(3) "Because of the existence of the cause, the product exists."

Only the *Jayamaṅgalā* appears to opt for interpretation (3), in the following obscure passage:

> *kāraṇabhāvāc ceti: kāraṇasya sattvād ity arthaḥ. yady asat kāryam utpadyate kim iti? kāraṇād eva na kāryasya bhāvo bhavati, bhavati ca. tasmāc chaktirūpeṇāvasthitam iti gamyate.*

> "*Kāraṇabhāvāc ca* means: because of the existence of the cause. If it is asked: 'the product, [though] non-existent, comes into being, what [is the conse-

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quence]?' [then the answer is:] 'The product does not exist as a result of the cause only, and yet it exists. It is therefore understood that [the product] is present [in the cause] in the form of a potency.'"[1]

The logic of this argument is not fully clear to me. It may be something like this: The very fact that there can be a cause implies that there must be a product. Understood in this way interpretation (3) is not very different from interpretation (1).[2]

Most of the surviving commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* prefer interpretation (2). They all seem to agree that the product is identical with the cause. The *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, for example, states:

kāraṇaṃ yallakṣaṇaṃ tallakṣaṇam eva kāryam api

"Whatever is the nature of the cause, the same is the nature of the effect" (tr. Mainkar).[3]

The *Māṭharavṛtti* and the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* use practically the same words.[4] The *Jayamaṅgalā*, having first presented interpretation (3), then gives, as an alternative, interpretation (2): *yatsvabhāvaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatsvabhāvaṃ kāryam.*[5] Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī* formulates the same position in the following words: *'kāraṇabhāvāc ca': kāryasya kāraṇātmakatvāt. na hi kāraṇād bhinnaṃ kāryam, kāraṇaṃ ca sat iti kathaṃ tadabhinnaṃ kāryam asat bhavet.*[6] The commentary translated by Paramārtha into Chinese appears to have adopted the same position.[7] The *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* edited under the name V_2 by Esther A. SOLOMON seems to accept a variant of this interpretation. If we accept the corrections proposed by its editor, it reads: *kāraṇabhāvād iti: kāraṇeṣu prāg utpatteḥ sat kāryam iti.* This suggest the interpretation: "Because [the product] is in the causes [before it comes into being], the product exists."

[1] I thank Professor Wezler for help in interpreting this passage.

[2] Mainkar, 1964: 25-26.

[3] Mainkar, 1964: 25-26.

[4] Sarma, 1922: 17: *iha loke yallakṣaṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ syāt*; Solomon, 1973: 18: *iha loke yallakṣaṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ kāryam api bhavati.*

[5] Satkāriśarmā Vaṅgīya, 1970:74.

[6] JHA, SHARMA and PATKAR , 1965: 47; SRINIVASAN, 1967: 98-101.

[7] Cp. Takakusu, 1904: 991: "L'effet est de la même espèce que la cause."

The similarity between these commentaries is great, and it is not surprising that SOLOMON in her comparative study of the commentaries remarks (SOLOMON, 1974: 27): "*kāraṇabhāvāt* is similarly explained by all." This is not however fully correct. The *Yuktidīpikā*, the "most significant commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*", comments in a manner which allows us to conclude that it accepts interpretation (1). It states:

> *'kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam': ihāsati kārye kāraṇabhāvo nāsti tadyathā vandhyāyāḥ. asti ceha kāraṇabhāvas tantupaṭayoḥ. tasmāt sat kāryam.*[8]

The explanation can be translated:

> "On the one hand (*iha*), something or somebody — as for example a barren woman — is not a cause in case there is no product. On the other hand (*iha*), from among the thread and the cloth [one of the two, viz. the thread] is a cause [because there is a product, viz. the cloth]. For this reason the product exists [while the cause is there]."

In other words, without a product being there, a cause is not a cause; or, the other way round, because a cause is a cause, there must be a product. This is interpretation (1).

It is surprising that interpretation (2) is so strongly represented in the surviving literature of Sāṃkhya, and interpretation (1) so weakly. Interpretation (1) is of a type that is wide-spread in Indian philosophical literature, as we shall see below; this is not true of interpretation (2).

Let us now turn to the material presented in GRANOFF's article mentioned above. GRANOFF draws attention to a Buddhist text — Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its commentary *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla — and to a number of Jaina texts which all cite and discuss *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9, i.e. the Sāṃkhya arguments in defence of *satkāryavāda*. She argues convincingly that the Jaina texts follow here the lead of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. All these texts offer an interpretation of *kāraṇabhāvāt* which is close to what is offered in the *Yuktidīpikā*. The *Tattvasaṃgraha*, for example, gives the following explanation:

[8] Wezler and Motegi, 1998: 124 l. 6-8.

kāryasyaivam ayogāc ca kiṃ kurvat kāraṇaṃ bhavet / tataḥ kāraṇabhāvo 'pi bījāder nāvakalpate //[9]

"And because the product would in this way be impossible, what is it that the cause would produce? As a result the seed etc. cannot even be cause."

The *Pañjikā* comments:

asatkāryavāde sarvathāpi kāryasyāyogāt kiṃ kurvat bījādi kāraṇaṃ bhavet. tataś caivaṃ śakyate vaktum: na kāraṇaṃ bījādiḥ, avidyamānakāryatvād, gaganābjavad iti. na caivaṃ bhavati, tasmād viparyaya iti siddham: prāg utpatteḥ sat kāryam iti.

The logical proof contained in this passage can be translated as follows:

"The seed etc. are no cause, because no product is present, like a lotus in the sky [which, being totally non-existent, is not accompanied by a product, and is therefore no cause]. However, it is not like this (i.e., seed **is** a cause); therefore the reverse [must be true], and thus it is established that the product is present before it comes into being."

Abhayadeva's *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* cites the above verse from the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and explains the last argument in exactly the same terms as the *Pañjikā*.[10] But also Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* is clearly influenced by these two Buddhist texts when it states: *bījādeḥ kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryaṃ kāryāsattve tadayogāt. tathā hi: na kāraṇabhāvo bījādeḥ avidyamānakāryatvāt kharaviṣāṇavat. tat siddham utpatteḥ prāk kāraṇe kāryam.*[11] In his *Kumudacandra* Prabhācandra explains the logic behind the argument: *'kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam'. kāraṇabhāvo hi kāraṇatvam, tac ca nityasambandhitvāt kāryasambandham apekṣate, na ca asatā gaganāmbhojaprakhyeṇa kāraṇasya kaścit sambandhaḥ, ataḥ kāraṇe kāryaṃ tādātmyena vartate.*[12]

GRANOFF sums up the arguments as follows (p. 583): "The Jain texts (and the Buddhist *Tattvasaṃgraha* ...) agree that the argument is something like this: The product must exist, since we speak of a cause and causality is a relationship. A non-existent entity cannot be one term of a relationship. We do not see hare's horns

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[9] Tattvasaṃgraha 13; Dwarikadas Shastri, 1981: I: 26.

[10] Saṃghavi & Dośi, 1924-1931: I: 283 l. 22-27.

[11] Kumar, 1990: 288 l. 9-11.

[12] Kumar, 1991: 353 l. 5-7.

entering into any kind of relationship with anything. Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of something being a 'cause' at all." That is, they all follow interpretation (1) of the sentence *kāraṇabhāvāt sat kāryam* "Because [the cause] is a cause, the product exists."

Does this mean that these Jaina texts and the *Tattvasaṃgraha* from which they borrowed have all undergone the influence, direct or indirect, of the *Yuktidīpikā*? GRANOFF emphatically denies this: "the Jain texts show little or no awareness of the often unique arguments of the *Yuktidīpikā*, which might lead to the further speculation that the *Yuktidīpikā* was not a text whose theories were hotly debated outside Sāṃkhya circles" (p. 582). With regard to the first four arguments presented in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9 she observes: "The *Yuktidīpikā* ... deviates from the other interpretations [offered in the other commentaries on this text] considerably, but the Jain texts I have examined show absolutely no awareness of its arguments for much of the verse" (p. 583).

All this means that the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the Jaina texts that borrow from it share the fifth argument in favour of *satkāryavāda* with the *Yuktidīpikā* and with no other Sāṃkhya commentaries, but are totally ignorant of the first four arguments presented in that same *Yuktidīpikā*. How is this to be explained? GRANOFF offers the following solution (p. 583): "It seems ... likely that [these Jaina texts and the *Tattvasaṃgraha*] derive their interpretation from some text that we no longer have at our disposal today." She adds (p. 584): "There remains, then, considerable detective work to be done on this question."

Such detective work cannot be carried out here and now. It is however interesting to conclude that the *Yuktidīpikā* appears not to have been the only text that followed interpretation (1). This is reassuring, because there are good reasons to believe that interpretation (1) was the original interpretation of the sentence *kāraṇabhāvāt sat kāryam*.

How can one know the original interpretation of an ambiguous sentence that allows of at least three interpretations? Several factors support interpretation (1), all of them based on other texts than the Sāṃkhyakārikā and its commentaries.[13] One is that Āryadeva's **Śataka*, which is older than the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, appears to contain the same argument, apparently in the same ambiguous form. Its commentator Vasu,

[13] For details, see Bronkhorst, 1999.

by stating "If the pot does not pre-exist in earth, then earth could not become the cause of the pot", shows that he opted for interpretation (1).

More important is that the kind of argument embodied in interpretation (1) was widely used in Indian philosophy at the time when Sāṃkhya as a system was being created. For details I have to refer to my book *Langage et réalité*. Here I will merely cite a verse from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, which uses this argument:

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate/ asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim //[14]

"Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent object is a cause possible. Of which non-existent [object] is there a cause? And what is the use of an existent [object]?"

We recognize the assumption which also underlies interpretation (1): for something to be a cause, there has to be a product, there and then. Once one accepts this assumption, one may be induced to drawing various counterintuitive conclusions: Nāgārjuna that no cause can exist, the Sāṃkhyas their no less extraordinary position that the product is there before it has been produced.

Is it possible to say more about the assumption underlying these and other arguments? GRANOFF formulates it as follows, as we have seen: "The product must exist, since we speak of a cause and causality is a relationship. A non-existent entity cannot be one term of a relationship. We do not see hare's horns entering into any kind of relationship with anything. Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of something being a 'cause' at all." This formulation takes care of the fifth argument in the *Yuktidīpikā* which we also find in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the Jaina texts considered, and also of Nāgārjuna's above argument, and no doubt of many other arguments found in Indian philosophical texts of that period. However, there are textual passages which allow us to conclude that a formulation has to be accepted in which the parellelism between what we say and the situation described finds expression. An example is the following passage from Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, which argues precisely in defense of the *satkāryavāda*:

prāg utpatteś ca kāryasyāsattve utpattir akartṛkā nirātmikā ca syāt / utpattiś ca nāma kriyā, sā sakartṛkaiva bhavitum arhati gatyādivat / kriyā ca nāma syād akartṛkā ceti vipratiṣidhyeta / ghaṭasya cotpattir ucyamānā na ghaṭakartṛkā,

[14] MadhK(deJ) 1.6.

kiṃ tarhy anyakartṛkā iti kalpyā syāt / ... / tathā ca sati ghaṭa utpadyate ity ukte kulālādīni kāraṇāni utpadyante ity uktaṃ syāt / na ca loke ghaṭotpattir ity ukte kulālādīnām apy utpadyamānatā pratīyate / utpannatāpratīteḥ /

"If the effect did not exist prior to its coming into being, the coming into being would be without agent and empty. For coming into being is an activity, and must therefore have an agent, like [such activities] as going etc. It would be contradictory to say that something is an activity, but has no agent. It could be thought that the coming into being of a jar, [though] mentioned, would not have the jar as agent, but rather something else. ... If that were true, one would say "the potter and other causes come into being" instead of "the jar comes into being". In the world however, when one says "the jar comes into being" no one understands that also the potter etc. come into being; for [these] are understood to have already come into being."[15]

In other words, the situation described has to correspond to the way we describe it. This is also clear from the following verse that occurs in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*:

gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamanadvayam / yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac cātra gamanaṃ punaḥ //

"If there is a going of [a road] that is being gone, there would be two goings: that by which the [road] is being gone, and again the going on it."[16]

The only possible reason for thinking that there should be two goings is that the sentence describing the situation — something like "[the road] which is being gone, is being gone" (*gamyamānaṃ gamyate*) — has the verb 'going' twice over.

In the light of these and similar reflections I have proposed to formulate the more or less hidden assumption behind all these arguments as follows: "the words of a sentence must correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the situation described by that sentence";[17] I call this the correspondence principle. It takes for granted that there is, at some particular time, a situation in which all the things that constitute it occur together, and this forced many Indian thinkers — among them

[15] Śaṅkara ad Brahmasūtra 2.1.18; cited and discussed in Bronkhorst, 1996: 2.

[16] MadhK(deJ) 2.5; cited and discussed in Bronkhorst, 1997: 34.

[17] Bronkhorst, 1996: 1; 1997: 32; 1999: § I.1.

Nāgārjuna and the Sāṃkhyas — to draw counterintuitive conclusions.

We cannot conclude this discussion without addressing the question as to why most of the commentaries of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* have given an interpretation to the fifth argument different from the one originally intended. One answer may well be that the first and the fifth argument would otherwise be almost identical. The first argument, it may be recalled, reads:

> *asadakaraṇāt [sat kāryam]*
>
> "The product exists because one does not produce something that does not exist."

One might elucidate the logic underlying this argument with the following variant of GRANOFF's above explanation: "The product must exist, since we speak of producing and producing something is a relationship (between the maker and the product, or between the making and the product). A non-existent entity cannot be one term of a relationship. Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of producing something at all." Or, using the correspondence principle, one might say that there must be something corresponding to the word 'pot' in the situation described by the statement "He produces a pot". Either way the argument presented is close to the the fifth argument in interpretation (1).

However, more may have been involved in the preference for interpretation (2). The commentaries that offer this interpretation in this way take position in an altogether different debate, which may have been initiated by the Vaiśeṣikas. One of the fundamental positions of this school of thought — one of its "axioms" — is that composite objects are different from their constituent parts.[18] It may have arrived at this position as a result of opposing the Buddhist point of view according to which no composite objects but only their constituent parts exist. However this may be, once these points of view had been articulated in Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhyas were more or less obliged to determine their own position in this controversy. They chose the position which maintains that composite objects and their constituent parts are not different from each other. Concretely speaking: a cloth is not different from the threads that constitute it.

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[18] Bronkhorst, 1992.

It will be clear that this position could easily be made to agree with the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*. The cloth is namely also the product of the threads, which are its cause. The doctrine of *satkāryavāda* states that the cloth is there, in the threads, at the time when it has not yet been made. The classical Sāṃkhya position regarding parts and wholes states that the cloth is not different from the threads that constitute it. Combined they state that the cloth is there, in the threads, because it is not really different from them. This is interpretation (2) of the Sanskrit phrase *kāraṇabhāvāt sat kāryam*.

It is doubtful whether this argument adds much in support of the *satkāryavāda*, but this may not have disturbed the Sāṃkhya commentators much. The main argument of this doctrine having been given already by the phrase *asadakaraṇāt* (see above), the new interpretation (2) of *kāraṇabhāvāt sat kāryam* made it possible to present supporting evidence from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* for the position that parts and wholes are identical.

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Goals of Life: Observations on the Concept of Puruṣārtha

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The doctrine that there are certain fundamental modes of human orientation, or "goals of man" (*puruṣārtha*), is among the most familiar and significant premises of traditional Hinduism, and it continues to be mentioned in modern Hindu self-presentations. The older tripartite group (*trivarga*) comprises the notions of *kāma* (pleasure), *artha* (possession and success) and *dharma* (religious and ethical merit). This *trivarga* was subsequently expanded into a fourfold group (*caturvarga*), which added *mokṣa* (final release) to the list. Although the significance of the doctrine is widely recognized, and although it has been the topic of some perceptive scholarly contributions[1], a comprehensive conceptual and historical analysis has not yet been undertaken. More specifically, its role in Indian philosophical reflection and its anthropological potential have not yet been sufficiently clarified.

The historical origin of the *puruṣārtha* doctrine remains uncertain. In any case, there can be no doubt that its age extends well into the first millenium B.C.E. In a variety of older texts, most of them dating back to the pre-Christian era, the doctrine already appears as well-established and commonly known, for instance in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, which preserves an even older statement from Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* (probably 3rd century B.C.E.)[2], in the *Gaṇapāṭha*,[3] in some older ritual texts, such as the *Hiraṇyakeśi Gṛhyasūtra*,[4] as well as Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*,[5] various *Dharmaśāstra* texts, specifically Manu and Viṣṇu[6] and, above all, in the *Mahābhārata*. The threefold group (*trivarga*) is clearly predominant in the older sources, and it can obviously claim historical priority. The *Mahābhārata* offers mythical accounts of the ori-

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[1] See in particular Ch. MALAMOUD, "On the Rhetoric and Semantics of *puruṣārtha*". In: *Way of Life. King, Householder, Renouncer* (Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont). Ed. by T. N. Madan. New Delhi 1982, pp. 33-54.

[2] *Mahābhāṣya* II,2,3,4 (on *Vārttika* 9): *dharmārthau, arthakāmau.*

[3] *Gaṇapāṭha* 194 (*rājadantādayaḥ*, BÖHTLINGK, *Pāṇinis Grammatik*. Leipzig, 1887, p. 133).

[4] *Hiraṇyakeśi Gṛhyasūtra* II,19,6.

[5] See especially *Arthaśāstra* I,7,3-7.

[6] See, for instance, *Manu* II,224; *Viṣṇu* 59,30.

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gin of the *puruṣārtha* doctrine and of the literature dealing with it;[7] and it discusses the relationship of various aims of life to one another in different contexts and from different perspectives. We hear of conflicts, various forms of subordination, and the ideal of harmony and concordance among the goals of life.[8] The fourth *puruṣārtha, mokṣa* or final release, emerges clearly in the *Śāntiparvan* and is added explicitly as the fourth element to the *trivarga*: *trivarga iti vikhyāto gaṇa eṣa ... caturtho mokṣa iti.*[9] *Dharma, artha* and *kāma* texts tend to claim special significance for the *puruṣārtha* which they represent.[10] Manu II,224 may be considered the *locus classicus* among those passages which proclaim the harmony of the *puruṣārtha*s and identify their balanced totality as the true and proper good (*śreyas*).[11] Here it is obvious that *dharma* forms the framework for such harmony and concordance and is thus superior to the other aims of life.

We can pass over further references to classical and later literature. In general, we can say that the expansion of the *puruṣārtha* doctrine was quite far-reaching. It has its place in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Purāṇas*[12] and the *Māhātmya* literature, in poetry and in popular consciousness,[13] but also in theoretical literature, particularly in poetics, where we find connections with the *rasa* theory and significant associations between *śṛṅgāra* and *kāma*, and in medical literature.[14]

The doctrine of the goals of life and its manifestations in Indian thought pose a variety of historical and systematic questions. What were the exact circumstances

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7 See, for instance, *Mahābhārata* (critical edition) XII,59,29ff.

8 Cf. M. JAUHARI, *Politics and Ethics in Ancient India*. Benares 1968, pp. 50-59.

9 *Mahābhārata* XII,59,30.

10 See, for instance, *Arthaśāstra* I,7,6: *artha eva pradhāna iti kauṭilyaḥ.*

11 *Manu* II,224: *dharmārthāv ucyate śreyaḥ, kāmārthau, dharma eva ca / artha eva-iha vā śreyas, trivarga iti tu sthitiḥ.* Kullūka's commentary states: *dharmārthakāmātmakaḥ parasparāviruddhas trivargaḥ puruṣārthatayā śreya iti viniścayaḥ.*

12 Two extensive works which have the words *puruṣārtha* and, respectively, *caturvarga* in their titles, are based on Purāṇic materials: Sāyaṇa, *Puruṣārthasudhānidhi*. Ed. T. Chandrasekharan. Madras 1955; Hemādri, *Caturvargacintāmaṇi*. Ed. Bharatacandra Siromani et al., Calcutta 1873-1911.

13 See D. ECK, *Banaras, City of Light*. Princeton 1982, pp. 306 ff.; 310 ff.

14 See, for instance, Caraka, *Sūtrasthāna* I,15 f.; for poetics, cf., for instance, Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa* I,15 (*caturvarga*). On *śṛṅgāra* and *kāma* in Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, see Ch. MALAMOUD (as cited above, n. 1), pp. 146 ff.

leading to the inclusion of *mokṣa*? How did this inclusion alter the structure and meaning of the older tripartite group? How and when did *dharma* attain its priority in the *trivarga* and subsequently in the *caturvarga*? To what degree was there an actual rivalry between the aims of life? To what degree are they separable from one another, or assigned to different groups of human beings and stages of life? How does this scheme relate to other common paradigms of the Indian tradition, such as the three *guṇas*?[15] Are we dealing with a comprehensive list of all basic goals of life, or with an attempt to classify the ways of human orientation and motivation in general? Are there special relations to particular castes (*varṇa*) or stages of life (*āśrama*)?[16] Is the list essentially factual and descriptive, or is it a normative one? What problems and consequences result from the fact that the terms appearing in the list are more or less ambiguous, insofar as they have broad and general as well narrow and specialized meanings? As thematized in the *Arthaśāstra, artha* is political and economic success, but in its broader usage it signifies purposes and goals in general. In the *Kāmaśāstra, kāma* is sexual drive and pleasure, but in a broader sense it is every desire and striving, including that which relates to life after death, and even to final liberation and the transcendence of all wordly attachment.[17] What is the exact meaning of both *puruṣa* and *artha* in the compound *puruṣārtha*? What kind of understanding of human existence and motivation is involved here?

We do not xet have a thorough clarification of such questions. There are, however, a number of interpretive suggestions and perspectives, for instance, K. H. POTTER's suggestion that the *puruṣārthas* constitute "areas of concern".[18] Several modern Indian scholars have taken up this theme, especially M. HIRIYANNA.[19] L. DUMONT interprets the scheme of the aims of life as a "classification of types of action".[20] Ch.

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[15] See, for instance, *Manu* XII,38; here, *tamas* is correlated with *kāma, rajas* with *artha*, and *sattva* with *dharma*.

[16] See Ch. MALAMOUD, pp. 49-52. In the introduction to his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Udayana associates the variety of the aims of life with the variability of the conceptions of God.

[17] See MALAMOUD, pp. 45 ff. (referring to Yaśodhara's commentary *Jayamaṅgalā* on the *Kāmasūtra*). On the ambiguity of *kāma*, see also Vācaspati, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* I,1,1 (in: *Nyāyadarśana*. Ed. A. Thakur. Darbhanga 1967, p. 48).

[18] K. H. POTTER, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*. Englewood Cliffs 1963, pp. 5-10.

[19] See A. SHARMA. *The Puruṣārthas. A Study in Hindu Axiology*. East Lansing, 1982, pp. 4 ff.; 7 f.; 26 ff.

[20] L. DUMONT, *Homo Hierarchicus. The Caste System and Its Implications*. Chicago 1980, pp. 303 f.

MALAMOUD has submitted the most careful analysis to date, dealing specifically with the ambiguity of the sometimes narrow, sometimes broad meanings mentioned above, and with pertinent structural problems and historical developments.[21] However, MALAMOUD does not investigate further the anthropological implications of the concept of *puruṣārtha*, nor its role as a theme of Indian philosophical reflection.

We have asked about the meaning of the word *puruṣa* in the compound *puruṣārtha*. The answer has to be that it is the concrete, temporal and worldly human being, not the abstract "self" of the philosopher. This is quite clear from the texts themselves, and it is also taken for granted by most modern interpreters. The person in time and space, the person in his or her world has goals, values and projects. The pure, released, absolutely free self has no plans or projects. It does not need them, has no use for them. It is what it is. But who or what is the person (*puruṣa*) who does have goals (*artha*)? How does the possession of goals, intentions or projects contribute to the very being or essence of a human being or person? How does such possession distinguish human identity from that of other creatures, such as the animals? Are the *puruṣārthas* something specifically or exclusively human?

In traditional Indian thought, *dharma* and *mokṣa* have, indeed, a special affinity with human existence. They appear, above all, as human forms of orientation and may even be presented as defining characteristics of being human. Commitment to *mokṣa* is often invoked to distinguish humans from divine or superhuman beings; and without *dharma*, so we are told, the human being would be a mere animal among other animals.[22] The commitment to *dharma* (and, beyond that, to *mokṣa*) requires a capability to set more distant goals, beyond the satisfaction of immediate desires, which the animals do not possess; this is emphasized in classical Mīmāṃsā and may even be found in such an ancient text as the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*.[23] But wouldn't the opposite be the case with respect to *kāma*? Isn't the entire sexual dimension something common to and shared by animals and humans? The *kāma* texts themselves refer occasionally to the specifically human character of their subject matter.[24] In

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[21] See above, n. 1.

[22] Cf. W. HALBFASS, *Tradition and Reflection. Explorations in Indian Thought*. Albany 1991, pp. 265-289 (esp. the references to the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*, pp. 285 f.; notes. 26-29).

[23] See, in particular, Śabara's *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* VI,1,5 ff.; cf. also *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* II,3,2.

[24] See *Kāmasūtra* I,2,22; also MALAMOUD, pp. 43 f.

MALAMOUD's words, *kāma* "can be the object of a *śāstra* because it is at once freer and less free than animal sexuality". That is to say, *kāma* is not restricted to biologically determined mating periods, but is, instead, regulated through social and ethical norms.[25] As a goal of human existence (*puruṣārtha*), *kāma* does not coincide with *rāga* or *tṛṣṇā*. The deliberate pursuit of the erotic, as treated in the *Kāmasūtra*, is not merely natural instinct or drive, but something associated with culture and education, with norms, values and conscious manners of orientation. In general, we may say that the *puruṣārthas* have to do with reflection, examination and rationality. And this does not simply mean that the achievement of goals requires the application of instrumental reason. Udayana, the great Naiyāyika, goes so far as to postulate that the very nature of a *puruṣārtha* entails and presupposes the employment of a means of knowledge;[26] this seems to imply that the truly human life is, or ought to be, an examined life.

Without being unfolded into an explicit philosophical anthropology, the doctrine of the *puruṣārthas* contains some basic assumptions, or at least perspectives, concerning the nature of man. The *puruṣārthas*, as human goals, values and modes of orientation, are simultaneously fundamental characteristics and constituents of being human. Being an *arthin*, having consciously established and recognized goals and needs, is part of human nature.[27] This is in accordance with such texts as the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, which invoke man's essential openness for the world and the future, and his capacity for long-term planning.[28] In order to make such observations, we must go beyond the explicit statements of the Indian texts. Nonetheless, reflections of this kind remain committed to the texts and the tradition to which they belong, and follow their inherent directions. Clearly, the *puruṣārtha* doctrine calls for an understanding which goes beyond the explicit words, a response which paraphrases and extrapolates what is said in the texts, which recognizes in these texts challenges to our own self-understanding, which leads from philology to philosophical reflection on questions of human identity and orientation which remain with us to this day.[29]

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[25] MALAMOUD, loc. cit.

[26] See Udayana, *Pariśuddhi* I,1,1 (in: *Nyāyadarśana*. Ed. A. Thakur. Darbhanga 1967, p. 146): *na hy asti, puruṣārthaś ca-apramāṇahetukaś ca-iti.*

[27] One of the oldest meanings of *artha* (which is commonly used aas a neuter in the ṚGVEDA) seems to be "destination (of a journey)".

[28] See *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* II,3,2.

[29] See W. HALBFASS, *India and Europe. An Essay in Understanding*. Albany 1988, pp. 323 f.

But how do the Indian philosophers themselves, the reflective theoreticians of the Indian tradition and the chief advocates of the pure "self" and the abstract sense of *puruṣa*, express themselves with regard to the *puruṣārtha* doctrine?

Some early reference to the *puruṣārtha* doctrine, as well as occurrences of the term *puruṣārtha*, are found in the philosophical *sūtra* texts, specifically in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the *Vedānta-* or *Brahmasūtra*.[30] The philosophical literature confirms in its own way the wide diffusion of and the general familiarity with the doctrine of the goals of life, even though explicit statements about it are relatively rare. There is no need at this point to discuss other and clearly different usages of the term *puruṣārtha*, as they are found in Sāmkhya and Yoga.[31]

Representatives of various philosophical systems (*darśana*) defend their own respective traditions, and by implication the systematic pursuit of knowledge and its validation as such, against the view that they are irrelevant and not conducive to the attainment of any goal of life. The underlying premise in this context is that theoretical knowledge for its own sake cannot count as a legitimate purpose or goal. In this sense and against this background, Śrīdhara defends the Vaiśeṣika system against the charge of soteriological irrelevance, which was raised by other traditions. The doctrine of categories and the comprehensive classification of the constituents of the world are, in his view, indeed motivated by and committed to a *puruṣārtha*, i.e., final liberation (*mokṣa*).[32] Very pronounced claims concerning the concept of *puruṣārtha* are presented by Śaṅkara, the great Advaita Vedāntin. Vedānta, as he understands it, means the fullest possible commitment to the ultimate goal of life (*paramaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*), namely to the knowledge of *brahman*, and thus to the realization of one's true identity, to radical transcendence and ultimate liberation.[33]

The postulate that philosophical thought ought to be in the service of final liberation, and that philosophy itself is, in the end, *mokṣaśāstra*, is, of course, generally

[30] See *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* IV,1,1 f.; *Brahmasūtra* III,4,1; cf. Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* III,4,8. For the special role and meaning of *puruṣārtha* in Mīmāṃsā, see below, n. 39.

[31] Here, *puruṣārtha* (used as *bahuvrīhi*, but also as *tatpuruṣa*), has to do with the pure, absolute subject, which is radically opposed to the objective and dynamic realm of *prakṛti*; see, for instance, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 31; 42; 53; 69.

[32] See the expression *puruṣārthaphalatā* in the introduction to Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī* (in: *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. Ed. V. P. Dvivedin. Benares 1895, p. 3).

[33] Numerous references can be found in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; see specifically I,1,1 and I,1,4; but also II,3,40; III.1.1; 10; III,4,1 ff.

taken for granted in the Indian tradition.[34] There are, however, a few exceptions. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, as advocate of *dharma*, does not agree, or when it does, only half-heartedly. The tradition of the materialistic Cārvākas, at least as we know it from the reports about it, totally rejects *dharma* as well as *mokṣa* and posits *kāma* as the central or even the only value of life (*kāma eva ekaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*).[35] The role of *artha* is ultimately an instrumental one: It is a means of attaining sensual pleasure. On their part, the soteriologically oriented philosophers are not satisfied with simply proclaiming *mokṣa* (*mukti, apavarga, kaivalya, niḥśreyasa, nirvāṇa*) as their ultimate goal. They are also concerned with reflections on the nature of human striving and motivation and on those horizons of worldly, practical motivation which, in the end, they try to overcome and transcend.

According to *Nyāyasūtra* I,1,24, the goal or purpose (*prayojana*) is that object or phenomenon, whose representation or projection motivates one to action (*yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate, tat prayojanam*). The basic rule for such motivation is the attempt to attain happiness or pleasure (*sukha*) and to avoid pain or displeasure (*duḥkha*). Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* reduces all human striving, as it relates to the four aims of life, to the motivating power of *sukha* and *duḥkha*.[36] The phenomena which thus motivate us toward action are represented or projected as its results (*phala*); insofar, they are final causes rather than psychological or physiological efficient causes. Such finality is, indeed, basically presupposed in the notion of *puruṣārtha*. The purpose or goal (*prayojana*) can function as such in a direct manner (*mukhya*), or it can be attractive in an instrumental, i.e. indirect and secondary sense (*gauṇa*). This terminology, which is used by Nyāya authors such as Jayanta,[37] is also found in the works of Kumārila and other Mīmāṃsakas.[38] The contributions of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school to the discussion of human goals and motivations are very rich

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[34] For a critical perspective, cf. Daya KRISHNA, *Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective*. Delhi 1991, pp. 6 ff.; 35-59.

[35] Śrīdharasvāmin and Nīlakaṇṭha cite this as a statement of Bṛhaspati (see their commentaries on *Bhagavadgītā* XVI,11); commenting on the same verse, Śaṅkara says: *ayam eva paramaḥ puruṣārtho yaḥ kāmopabhogaḥ*.

[36] *Nyāyavārttika* I,1,1 (in: *Nyāyadarśana*. Ed. A. Thakur. Darbhanga 1967, p. 14).

[37] See *Nyāyamañjarī*. Ed. S. N. Śukla. Benares 1934-1936, vol. 2,, p. 126: *tac ca gauṇamukhyabhedena dvividham, mukhyaṃ sukhaprāptir duḥkhaparihāraś ca, tatsādhanaṃ gauṇam*.

[38] See *Tantravārttika* I,4,3 (in: *Mīmāṃsādarśana*. Ed. K. V. Abhyaṅkar and K. S. Jośi, vol. 1. Poona, second ed., 1970, p. 282: *gauṇī ... kāmyatā*).

and complex. Their significance is by no means limited to the context of analyzing ritual acts, out of which they originally grew. This is also true for the important and symptomatic distinction between what serves the purpose of the ritual act (*kratvartha*) and what is good for the human being, the subject and beneficiary of the ritual act (*puruṣārtha*). We cannot investigate here the peculiar historical and systematic implications which connect and differentiate this specialized usage of the term *puruṣārtha* and the doctrine of the aims of life.[39]

It is hardly surprising that the representatives of the philosophical schools are not merely content to adopt or appropriate the traditional conceptions of the *trivarga* or *caturvarga*. They also provide various kinds of philosophical reinterpretations and try to include and explain the aims of life in the context of their own systematic premises and perspectives. In particular, the fourfold scheme is often reduced to more fundamental conceptual structures, primarily dichotomies, or redefined in other ways.

We find such dichotomies in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as well as in Advaita Vedānta, although with different connotations and reflecting different systematic premises. In accordance with earlier authors of the Nyāya and Pūrvamīmāṃsā schools, the Naiyāyika Jayanta states that the "path of *puruṣārtha*" is twofold, insofar as it relates to what is "visible" and empirically accessible on the one hand, and what is "invisible", empirically inaccessible on the other.[40] Here the "visible" (*dṛṣṭa*) is obviously the realm of *kāma* and *artha* (i.e., the goals to be attained in this life), and the "invisible" (*adṛṣṭa*) the realm of *dharma* and *mokṣa* (the goals which transcend the present life). Other authors distinguish, in a related sense, the "worldly" (*laukika*) sphere from the Vedic and transempirical (*vaidika*) or transcendent (*pāralaukika*) realm.[41]

A more radical kind of dichotomy is found in some other traditions, above all in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta. Here, the decisive antithesis is that between final liberation (*mokṣa*) and the other three aims of life. This has precedents and (usually less radical) parallels in the old dichotomy of *preyas* and *śreyas*, i.e., the pleasant and the genuinely good, and the confrontation between *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*, or goal-oriented

[39] On *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* in Mīmāṃsā ritualism, see G. JHA, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in Its sources*. Benares 1964, pp. 258 ff.; F. X. CLOONEY, *Thinking Ritually*. Vienna 1990, pp. 139-149; 163-166.

[40] *Nyāyamañjarī* (see above, n. 37), vol. 1, p. 2: *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭabhedena ca {tad} dvividhaḥ puruṣārthasya panthāḥ*.

[41] See, for instance, Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, chapter 1 (Cārvāka).

activity and the cessation of such activity.[42] Śaṅkara's conception of liberation through knowledge alone implies a far-reaching devaluation of the *trivarga* and the modes of planning and goal-orientation which are at its core. The sphere of the *trivarga* is the realm of *saṃsāra*, of cosmic illusion, nescience and self-alienation (*māyā* and *avidyā*). It is the domain of causality and of the network of means and ends, and of ways of thought and action guided by them; in it, an essentially instrumental and ultimately vain rationality has its habitat. The definition of man, or rather, the search for his true identity, within this context and framework, would be ultimately irrelevant; it would, according to Śaṅkara, completely miss the meaning of the self (*ātman*).[43] The original connotations of the terms *puruṣa* as well as *artha* are obviously superseded in Śaṅkara's radical usage of the concept of *puruṣārtha*. *Mokṣa*, the highest, absolute goal (*paramaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*), is no goal to be attained through the use of means. It is simply there, as the timeless presence of the *ātman*, which is the ultimate meaning of the word *puruṣa*.

Of course, Śaṅkara does not represent the whole spectrum of Advaita Vedānta. There are certainly less radical conceptions of the highest goal or good and various ways of reconciling *dharma* and *mokṣa*.[44] In the older Advaita Vedānta, Maṇḍana, perhaps Śaṅkara's contemporary, represents a somewhat different, less inflexible approach. In his *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana treats the *puruṣārtha* conception rather explicitly and with a certain unconventionality, especially with regard to the idea of the highest good.

He deals specifically with the relations between the aims of life and the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the relationship between *puruṣārtha* and praxis, and the relevance of Vedic injunctions (*vidhi*) for the realization of the highest good and the meaning of self-knowledge.[45] We find here the claim, rarely expressed in Indian philosophical literature, that the production of purely theoretical knowledge can, indeed,

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[42] See, for instance, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II,1; *Manusmṛti* XII,88 f.

[43] Cf. W. HALBFASS, *Tradition and Reflection* (see above, n. 22), pp. 279 ff.; also Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I,1,4: *Gītābhāṣya* IV,21.

[44] On the relationship between *dharma* and *mokṣa*, see the articles by D. H. H. INGALLS and J. A. B. VAN BUITENEN in: *Philosophy East and West* 2 (1957).

[45] See *Brahmasiddhi*. Ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. Madras 1937, pp. 77 ff.; 157 ff.

be a human goal. especially for people troubled by curiosity (*kutūhalākulita*).[46] Other variations on our theme are found in some non-Advaitic (particularly Vaiṣṇava) Vedānta traditions; there is no need to discuss them here.

Daya KRISHNA, a modern Indian thinker who has often demonstrated his independent attitude, has criticized the "myth of the *puruṣārthas*". He maintains that the traditional lists of the *trivarga* and *caturvarga* are incomplete, and that they don't recognize the proper place and value of the "independent life of reason".[47] This may in fact be the case. But how significant, how pertinent to the status of the *puruṣāthas* would it be? Certainly, other classifications of goals of life, other axiologies are not only possible, but are actually documented outside the Indian tradition. It may suffice to recall Aristotele's typology of aims of life or forms of human orientation, i,e,, his conceptions of "political life", "theoretical life" (bíos politikás, bíos theoretikós), and so forth. We cannot and need not compare at this point the various classifications and paradigms, as they are found in different cultural traditions. And it would hardly be worthwhile or appropriate to assess them with regar to their respective empirical or axiological "completeness". In any case, it is clear that the Indian doctrine of the goals of life, or of the various horizons of human orientation and motivation, is not merely a phenomenon of great cultural and historical relevance, which provides us with valuable, even indispensable clues concerning the structure of the Indian tradition and the nature of Indian, specifically Hindu self-understanding. Beyond this, it also has a more universal significance. It is and remains an exemplary expression and one of the most powerful paradigms of human self-understanding. As such, it is and remains a living challenge for our philosophical reflection.[48]

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[46] *Brahmasiddhi*, pp. 158 f.: *dṛṣṭā ca jñānotpatter eva puruṣārthatā kvacit kutūhalākulitānām ajñāte 'rthe. na hi tajjñānāt param anyad arthyate.*

[47] See "The Myth of the Puruṣārthas"; in: Daya KRISHNA, *Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective*. Delhi 1991, pp. 189-205; see especially p. 205.

[48] Further discussions are found in: R. PRASAD, *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*. New Delhi 1989, pp. 275-306; V. SHEKHAWAR, "Origin and Structure of Puruṣārtha Theory." *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 8 (1991), pp. 63-73; A. DANIÉLOU, *Virtue, Success, Pleasure, Liberation*. Rochester (Vermont) 1993; G. FLOOD, "The Meaning and Context of the Puruṣārthas". In: *The Fruits of Our Desiring*. Ed, J. Lipner, Calgary 1997, pp. 11-27.

The opening verses of Ratnākaraśānti's Muktāvalī*

(Studies in Ratnākaraśānti's tantric works II)

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In his book *Enlightenment by a Single Means* — a book which deserves attention not only from Tibetologists but from all those interested in Buddhism — David JACKSON has drawn attention to, along with other important textual materials, a passage from a work by the celebrated Tibetan scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita (AD 1182-1251; henceforward 'Sa-paṇ'), the *Phyogs bcu'i saṅs rgyas daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams la źu ba'i phrin yig.*[1] Sa-paṇ quotes in it, with approval, a verse by the famous eleventh-century Indian authority Ratnākaraśānti[2] which JACKSON (1994, 96) translates thus:

* One of three palm-leaf manuscripts of Ratnākaraśānti's *Muktāvalī* known to me (MS C) I was able to identify, and acquire a microfilm copy of, thanks to the generous help, almost nine years ago, of Prof. Dr. Minoru HARA. It may therefore be not inappropriate that this small contribution on the opening verses of this commentary, including an edition of them, should be offered in honour to this Japanese scholar who has helped and furthered the studies of so many Sanskritists all over the world. For help in acquiring copies of the other palm-leaf manuscripts of the *Muktāvalī* and of a number of other manuscripts of Buddhist tantric works preserved in Nepal I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Albrecht WEZLER (Universität Hamburg). To him, and to Prof. Alexis SANDERSON (All Souls College, Oxford), I am grateful also for stimulating discussions of some of the problems I encountered in Ratnākaraśānti's verses. I am much indebted to Mr. Csaba DEZSŐ (Balliol College, Oxford, Dr. Dominic GOODALL (École française d'Extrême-Orient, Pondicherry), Prof. Dr. David Jackson (Universität Hamburg), Mr. Kei KATAOKA (Tokyo University), Dr. Jan-Ulrich SOBISCH (Universität Hamburg), and Dr. Michael ZIMMERMANN (Universität Hamburg), who very kindly read through a draft of this article at short notice, and made several valuable comments and suggestions for improvements.

[1] This work, the *Epistle to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the Ten Directions*, as JACKSON translates the title, is brief but evidently indeed 'very important', since in it Sa-paṇ 'explains and justifies the background and principles of his critical work, as he himself understood them' (JACKSON 1994, 95).

[2] Without attempting bibliographical completeness here, let me refer for useful discussion of Ratnākaraśānti's non-tantric writings and extensive further bibliography to MIMAKI 1992 (with remarks on the problem of Ratnākaraśānti's date in n. 1 on p. 297), and KAJIYAMA 1999. For an annotated critical edition of one of his tantric works, a small *sādhana* of *utpannakrama* practice in the Hevajra-tradition, see ISAACSON *forthcoming* (with an appendix listing Ratnākaraśānti's tantric works preserved in Sanskrit).

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 121-134

'A lack of faith is the chief of enemies; an excess of faith is an occasion for great delay. That is because the omniscience[of a Buddha] is understood through correct cognition (*pramāṇa*); through devotion there will not come about omniscience'.[3]

JACKSON has added a footnote (n. 236 on pp. 96-97) on this verse, which begins with the words: 'I have not yet identified the source, but here Ratnākaraśānti was speaking in a non-Tantric context'. And at a later point in the book, while referring to the same passage of Sa-paṇ's work, JACKSON also writes: 'It was indeed Ratnākaraśānti who wrote one of the strongest explicit statements of the danger of excessive faith (within the general Mahāyāna), and the necessity for using the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for gaining the omniscience of Buddhahood — a statement that Sa-paṇ quoted when arguing for the importance of a critical approach within the general Mahāyāna' (p. 143).

The assumption that the verse by Ratnākaraśānti that Sa-paṇ quotes must have belonged to a 'non-Tantric context' may seem at first sight a reasonable one. It is based, it would appear, on another assumption, namely that in a tantric context Ratnākaraśānti would not have warned against *atiśraddhā*, overly-great faith. Indeed, in support of his assertion that the context was not a tantric one, JACKSON refers to the beginning of Ratnākaraśānti's *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, where our author 'contrasts the Tantric and non-Tantric Mahāyāna, specifying that the former is easier, quicker, and for those whose minds are "increased" (made strong) through faith (*dad pas rnam par 'phel ba'i blo can rnams*)' (p. 96 n. 236).

Nonetheless, the context of Ratnākaraśānti's verse is a tantric and not a non-tantric one. In fact it occurs in a prominent position, as the third of a set of six opening verses, in one of this author's most substantial and significant tantric works: his commentary (extant in Sanskrit manuscripts and a Tibetan translation but as yet unpublished), called *Muktāvalī*,[4] on the *Hevajratantra* (a *tantra* which we can be con

[3] The Tibetan text is given by JACKSON (1994, 96 n. 233) thus: *dad pa med pa gtso bo'i sgra* (= *dgra*?) // *lhag dad shin tu gol ba'i gnas* // *gang phyir kun mkhyen tshad mas grub* // *gus pas kun mkhyen 'gyur ba min* // (The note in parentheses is JACKSON's, and I have not altered his 'Wylie' transliteration, although elsewhere in this article I use the transliteration conventions of the Library of Congress.) For the variants found in the canonical Tibetan translation of the same verse, and for a discussion of some points in JACKSON's translation, see footnote 19 below.

[4] A very brief article with some information on the *Muktāvalī* (written on the basis of its Tibetan translation alone) is ISODA 1974. Several extracts from the Sanskrit text are quoted in ISAACSON *forthcoming*. I am preparing a critical edition of the entire commentary. Another edition

fident was regarded as of the greatest authority and importance by both Ratnākaraśānti and Sa-paṇ). The introductory section of this commentary is as a whole quite striking, and could be called to some extent programmatic. To make it possible to consider the verse that Sa-paṇ quoted in its context, and in the language that it was written in, I present here an edition of the complete set of opening verses. That is followed by an attempt at an English translation, with a few notes which, though they do not come close to forming a comprehensive commentary on the problems of the verses, are intended to clarify my understanding of them on a number of points.

Critical edition

The verses are edited here on the basis of the two available palm-leaf manuscripts; they are found in MS A on f.1v1-6, and in MS B on f.1v1-5. There is some loss of text (reported in the apparatus which is given after each verse) in both manuscripts, for in both the first folio has, as is not uncommon, suffered some damage. For the Tibetan translation I have consulted two editions of the *bstan 'gyur*: the Peking (I have used the Ōtani reprint), where the verses can be found in *rgyud 'grel* vol. *tsa* f.262r3-262v1 (Ōtani 2319), and the Derge (I have used the Delhi 'Karmapa' reprint), where they can be found in *rgyud* vol. *ga* f.221r1-5 (Tōhoku 1189).

pādanyāsaiḥ pṛthivyā vihitavighaṭanaṃ bhūbhṛtām aṭṭahāsair
dṛktejaḥketughaṇṭādhvanibhir api nayan nāśasṛṣṭīr jaganti //
bibhrāṇasyāvaliptapraśamanavidhaye bhīṣaṇān abhyupāyān
pāyād vo jainaguhyatrayahṛdayahṛdas tāṇḍavaṃ herukasya // (1)

°*ṇṭā … jaganti /* B, lost in A

darśitasūtrānugamā pramāṇavṛttaprasādhitā viśadā /
muktāvalīva hṛdyā hevajre pañjikā kriyate // (2)

°*mā … vṛttapra*°] B, lost in A *viśadā*] em., *visadā* A, *sadā* B (unmetrical)

aśraddhā mūlaripuḥ praṇāśapadam ekam iyam atiśraddhā /
nanu sarvavit pramāṇaṃ na gauravāt sarvavid bhavati // (3)

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is being prepared, so I learn from a recently published article (LAL 1999, 33 n. 4), by Rāmaśaṃkara TRIPĀTHĪ and Thākursen NEGI, and will be published 'swiftly' (*śīghra*) by the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. It may be worth pointing out that one of the MSS reported in that article as being of the *Muktāvalī* (NAK 5-99 = NGMPP B 112/1, labelled *kha* in LAL 1999, 33 n. 5), is in fact a manuscript of another commentary on the *Hevajratantra*, Kamalanātha's *Ratnāvalī*.

°padam] B, *°yadam* A *°t pramāṇaṃ na gaura°*] B, lost in A

kṛtam apy akṛtaṃ jinena yas tadanuktaṃ ca taduktam āha yaḥ //
kṣipataḥ samam eva tāv ubhau paramāptaṃ jagatas tathāgatam // (4)

hitam uktam anekadhā jinaiḥ pratigṛhṇanti yathāśayaṃ janāḥ /
tad ihāpi ruciḥ pravartanī vivṛṇoty artham iyaṃ tu pañjikā // (5)

hitam ukta°] B, lost in A *°hṇanti...pra°*] A, lost in B *°vartanī*] B, *°vṛttanī* A

śrutam asati na bodhe nāśrute cāsti cintā
dvayavipadi na yogo yogahānau na siddhiḥ //
iti ciram iha tantre tāpam utkaṇṭhitānāṃ
haratu hṛdi nibaddhā hanta muktāvalīyam // (6)[5]

iti ... °tkaṇṭhitānāṃ] A, lost B

Translation[6]

May the wild dance (*tāṇḍavam*) of Heruka[7] (*herukasya*), who is the heart/essence of the heart/essence of the three secrets [of the body,

[5] In the Tibetan translation this verse is rendered with eight seven-syllable lines, so that without the Sanskrit available one would have assumed that the original was probably two (*anuṣṭubh*) verses, and would certainly not have guessed that it is a single one in Mālinī metre.

[6] This translation aims chiefly at allowing the reader to see roughly how I construe and interpret the Sanskrit text. The addition of each Sanskrit word of the verse in parentheses (a practice in which I have striven, without great success, to emulate the translations prepared by Alexis SANDERSON of some of the set texts for the MPhil course in Classical Indian Religion in Oxford) is intended to make this easier also in cases where I have allowed myself a considerable degree of freedom. It is a device which cannot however be applied with absolute consistency; thus in the translation of the first verse the first word, 'May', can be said to be a part of the rendering of *pāyāt*, but that Sanskrit word has been placed in brackets only later, after 'protect'. A relatively large amount has been added within square brackets; I certainly do not claim that everything contained within those brackets **must** be added in order to complete the sense, nor that every element that is not within them corresponds 'literally' to some part of the Sanskrit.

[7] I.e., here, Hevajra, in what is for Ratnākaraśānti his principal and basic form, with eight heads, sixteen arms, and four legs, in union with his consort Nairātmyā. The wild dance (*tāṇḍava*) of the same sixteen-armed Hevajra is the subject also of the opening verse of the *Bhramahara*, Ratnākaraśānti's detailed *sādhana* of *utpattikrama*-practice.

speech and mind] of [all] the Buddhas (*jainaguhyatrayahṛdayahṛdaḥ*)[8] and who bears [in his sixteen hands] (*bibhrāṇasya*) dreadful (*bhīṣaṇān*) 'means' (*abhyupāyān*)[9] in order to quell the proud (*avaliptapraśamana-vidhaye*),[10] protect (*pāyāt*) you (*vaḥ*) — [the wild dance] in which the earth (*pṛthivyāḥ*) is shattered (*vihitavighaṭanam*)[11] by the [force of] the stampings of his [four] feet (*pādanyāsaiḥ*), and the mountains (*bhū-bhṛtām*) [are shattered][12] by the boisterous laughs [emitted from the mouths of his eight heads] (*aṭṭahāsaiḥ*), and (*api*) which destroys and [re-]creates (*nayan nāśasṛṣṭīḥ*)[13] the worlds (*jaganti*) with [respectively] the fiery energy of his eyes and the sounds of 'banner' and 'bell' [, that is to say of his copulation with his consort Nairātmyā] (*dṛktejaḥketu-ghaṇṭādhvanibhiḥ*).[14]

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[8] This adjective is an important one. For it conveys a point which Ratnākaraśānti stresses repeatedly in his commentary on the opening chapter of the *Hevajratantra*. The question is that of the relationship between Hevajra and Vajradhara, which Ratnākaraśānti maintains to be that the former is the supreme form (*paraṃ rūpam*), or in other words the heart (*hṛdaya*) or essence (*sāra*) of the latter (who is himself the heart or essence of the body, speech and mind of all the Buddhas). A doubt about this point is the second of three doubts that Ratnākaraśānti tells us arose in the minds of the Buddha's audience after they had heard his initial statement *sarvatathāgatakāyavākcittahṛdayaṃ bhaṭṭārakaṃ guhyātiguhyataram* (HeTa I.i.2). The most relevant passages are to be found in the MuĀv at MS A f. 4r3-4 (the doubt) and MS A f. 4v6-5r2 (the answer to the doubt). This emphasis on what Ratnākaraśānti perceives to be the true relationship between Hevajra and Vajradhara no doubt is at least partly motivated by the awareness that the point is one on which not all other Tantric authorities, not all other commentators on the *Hevajratantra*, agree. This controversy is an interesting one, and deserves further discussion (one of the targets of Ratnākaraśānti's criticism is probably the important commentary by Kamalanātha), but I must postpone that at the present.

[9] The 'means' I presume here to refer to the sixteen skull-bowls (with their varied contents) that this form of Hevajra is taught to carry in his hands (for which see HeTa II.v.24-25)

[10] *avalipta* can also mean simply 'stained' or 'defiled', and in itself it might be possible to understand the compound as meaning 'in order to bring to peace those defiled [by the *kleśas*]'. The fact that the 'means' are described as *bhīṣaṇa*, 'dreadful, terrifying,' however, may suggest that this was not what Ratnākaraśānti had in mind.

[11] *vihitavighaṭanam* is an instrumental or locative bahuvrīhi compound (*sāpekṣa*, requiring *pṛthivyāḥ* to complete the sense); literally '[the dance] in/by which a breaking/shattering is done'.

[12] This genitive too should be connected with *vihitavighaṭanam*.

[13] I do not emend the plural accusative to a dual (*nāśasṛṣṭī*), because it seems likely to me that the plural is deliberately used to convey that the destruction and creation that are meant here should be understood not as acts performed once, at a single moment, but repeated.

[14] Here *ketu* is a synonym for *vajra*, in the sense of the penis, and *ghaṇṭā* refers to the female sex-organ. Compare from Ratnākaraśānti's commentary on the *Mahāmāyātantra* (commenting on 1.6cd, which should read *trailokyaṃ saṃharaty eṣā trailokyaṃ sṛjate punaḥ*, rather than *saiṣā*

[I now] set out to make (*kriyate*) a commentary (*pañjikā*) on the *Hevajra*-[*tantra*] (*hevajre*) which shows the accordance [of the tantra] with the sūtra[s, i.e. with non-tantric Mahāyāna] (*darśitasūtrānugamā*), which is well-established [, i.e. contains interpretations and doctrinal explanations that are demonstrated to be correct,][15] by the operation of means of valid knowledge [, in this case, reason and scripture] (*pramāṇavṛttaprasādhitā*), and which is clear (*viśadā*) and lovely (*hṛdyā*) [and thus is] like a necklace of pearls (*muktāvalīva*)[16] [which follows the string on which it is strung (*darśitasūtrānugamā*), is made with large (?) and round [pearls][17] (*pramāṇavṛttaprasādhitā*), and is bright (*viśadā*) and lovely (*hṛdyā*)].[18] (2)

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saṃharate viśvaṃ sṛjate sā punaḥ punaḥ as reconstructed by the editors): *saṃharate trailokyam iti dṛṣṭipātena maheśvarādīnāṃ duṣṭānāṃ bhasmīkaraṇāt. punaḥ paścāt sṛjate tad eva nirdoṣīkṛtya mahādhvajaghaṇṭādhvanibhiḥ pratyujjīvanāt* (GuMaMāTaṬī p. 6 ll. 10-13). This parallel, as it appears to me to be, suggests that with *jaganti* Ratnākaraśānti may have in mind primarily *duṣṭas*, evil beings, such as the deities Maheśvara and so on, who are subjugated by the Buddhist deities such as Heruka. This brief allusion by Ratnākaraśānti, in the commentary on the *Mahāmāyātantra*, appears not to have been referred to in recent publications on the Buddhist tantric myth/motif of the taming of Rudra/Maheśvara such as MAYER 1998 (to which article I may refer for further bibliography of the secondary literature on this theme).

[15] I think that this comes close to capturing Ratnākaraśānti's intentions here, at least as regards the first meaning of *prasādhita* (qualifying the commentary rather than the pearl-necklace to which it is compared). Note his uses of the word later in the commentary, for instance: *evam ekam upāyatantram utpattikramam āśritya nirdiṣṭaṃ prasādhitaṃ ca* (MS A f. 12v3-4, MS C f. 9v3; this follows after a long and important justification of the soteriological value of the *utpattikrama* means), or *iyatā yuktaiva dehabhāvaneti prasādhitam* (MS A f. 86r2). In his commentary on the *Mahāmāyātantra* too we find Ratnākaraśānti using the word in a similar context, concluding an argued exposition: *etena vīrasya mudrārūpaṃ prasādhitam* (GuMaMāTaṬī p. 34 l. 7).

[16] Punning on, and providing a playful explanation of, the name of the commentary. Each attribute that qualifies the commentary in the verse can also be applied to a necklace of pearls. The Tibetan translation makes no attempt to render the double meanings.

[17] This is not a very satisfactory interpretation of the second, punning, usage of this word. Other interpretations are no doubt possible, but I must confess that none has occurred to me which seemed convincing or clearly superior to that for which I have chosen here. The meaning for *pramāṇa* that lends itself most naturally for a connection with pearls or a pearl-necklace is 'size'. But since I cannot see how to analyse the compound if the first member is a noun, I am tentatively assuming that it is here an adjective meaning 'possessing [large] size', formed by adding to the noun *pramāṇa* the suffix *ac*, by the rule *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.2.127.

[18] If it is felt unsatisfactory that the last attribute is here given exactly the sense that it bore when it qualified the commentary, one could perhaps consider rendering 'which is worn on the breast.' I have not seen such a sense recorded for the word *hṛdya* in lexical works; note however the *hṛdi nibaddhā* of verse 6 (cf. footnote 21 below).

Lack of faith (*aśraddhā*) is the root-enemy (*mūlaripuḥ*); [but on the other hand] excessive faith (*atiśraddhā*)is the one (*ekam*) [principal] cause of ruin (*praṇāśapadam*). Surely (*nanu*) the omniscient [Buddha] (*sarvavit*) is a reliable authority (*pramāṇam*) [, so one should not lack faith]; [on the other hand] one cannot (*na*) become (*bhavati*) [oneself] an omniscient [Buddha] (*sarvavit*) [just] out of reverence [, i.e. excessive faith, towards what are or are claimed to be the Buddha's teachings] (*gauravāt*).[19] (3)

He who (*yaḥ*) claims (*āha*) that the Buddha (*jinena*) did not do (*akṛtam*) [something] though (*api*) he [in fact] did do it (*kṛtam*), and (*ca*) he who

[19] The differences between this translation of this verse and the translation by JACKSON that is quoted at the opening of this article, have partly to do with the fact that mine is based on the Sanskrit, while his was, for lack of that, based on the Tibetan translation as quoted by Sa-paṇ (for which see footnote 3 above). The canonical Tibetan translation differs from the text quoted by Sa-paṇ only by reading *yin* instead of *grub* at the end of the third quarter-verse (the Peking block-print, though not the Derge, also confirms JACKSON's emendation/interpretation of *sgra* at the end of the first quarter-verse as *dgra*). Note that JACKSON's 'delay' seems to take *gol ba* as equivalent to *'gor ba*; more accurate would perhaps be 'error, going astray'. Though *gol ba* is not the most literal way to render the *praṇāśa* ('destruction, ruin') that we find in the Sanskrit, 'error, going astray' seems somewhat closer to the force of the Sanskrit than 'delay' would be. And although I can adduce at present no other place where *gol ba* can be shown to be a translation of *nāśa* or *praṇāśa*, it is perhaps conceivable that it is the translators' free rendering of what they understood to be behind the rhetorical expression used by Ratnākaraśānti. As for the rendering of *kun mkhyen* by JACKSON as 'omniscience', this possibility, which in any case does not seem to me to give fully satisfactory sense, can be ruled out now that the Sanskrit is available, for, unlike the Tibetan translation, *sarvavit* quite unambiguously refers to the omniscient one (the Buddha) and not to his knowledge. A point in which the Tibetan may based on a different Sanskrit reading from that in the text as edited above, or corrupt, is that in the second half the translators seem to have read not *nanu sarvavit pramāṇaṃ na gauravāt sarvavid bhavati* but, perhaps, *nanu* (? the translation *gaṅ phyir* would normally suggest *yasmāt*, which would be unmetrical in the Sanskrit verse, or something similar) *sarvavit pramāṇān na gauravāt sarvavid bhavati*, with an ablative *pramāṇāt* instead of a nominative. This would require only a very small emendation of what MS B reads (MS A is unfortunately damaged at the crucial place), all the more since, although I have normalized the orthography in the edition above, the scribe actually has written *pramāṇan* (with the homorganic nasal) rather than *pramāṇaṃ*. Nonetheless, the nominative seems to me to be not only interpretable but to yield (much) better sense. And since the *tshad mas yin* of the canonical translation seems highly awkward, if it is possible at all, and no reason occurs to me why *grub* should have been corrupted to *yin*, it cannot be excluded that *tshad mas* is a transmissional error for *tshad ma*, in which case Sa-paṇ's *tshad mas grub* might be an attempted emendation. A comprehensive appraisal of the Tibetan translation of Ratnākaraśānti's commentary, comparing it closely with the Sanskrit, is something that I cannot give in this paper, although I hope to do so elsewhere. My assessment would be, however, that the quality of the translation (and of the readings of the Sanskrit text that underlie it) is not extremely high, and this particular case is one in which the translators have, I think, erred either by misreading the Sanskrit text they had before them or by failing to correct a small corruption in it.

(*yaḥ*) [claims] that what was not taught (*anuktam*) [by the Buddha] was [in fact] taught [by him] (*uktam*): both (*ubhau*) these (*tau*) equally (*samam eva*) malign (*kṣipataḥ*) the Tathāgata (*tathāgatam*), [who is in truth to be regarded as] the supreme reliable person (*paramāptam*) for the [whole] world (*jagataḥ*). (4)

The Buddhas (*jinaiḥ*) have taught (*uktam*) that which is good [for living beings] (*hitam*) [and how to attain it] in many ways [according to people's different inclinations and dispositions] (*anekadhā*), and according to [those different] inclinations (*yathāśayam*) people (*janāḥ*) take [those teachings to heart] (*pratigṛhṇanti*). Therefore (*tat*) here [in the case of the teachings of the *Hevajratantra*] (*iha*) too (*api*) it is [an individual living being's] liking [for those teachings] (*ruciḥ*) that causes [that being] to act [to study the *Hevajratantra* and to attempt to apply its teachings] (*pravartanī*). This (*iyam*) commentary (*pañjikā*) however (*tu*) [is necessary because it] explains (*vivṛṇoti*) the meaning [of the profound, difficult to understand, Hevajratantra to those who have, because of being attracted in this way, decided to study it] (*artham*).[20] (5)

As long as there has been no (*asati*) understanding (*bodhe*) [there is] no (*na*) learning (*śrutaṃ*); and (*ca*) when there is no learning (*aśrute*) there is (*asti*) no (*na*) reflection (*cintā*). When both [learning and reflection] fail (*dvayavipadi*), [there can be] no (*na*) yoga (*yogaḥ*); [and] when yoga is lacking (*yogahānau*) [there can be] no (*na*) success (*siddhiḥ*). In view of this (*iti*), may this (*iyam*) [commentary, the] *Muktāvalī*, [having been read, its meaning understood and] firmly fixed in the heart,[21] remove (*haratu*) the suffering (*tāpam*) of those who were long (*ciram*)

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[20] This verse is similar to the second opening verse of Ratnākaraśānti's commentary on the *Mahāmāyātantra*:

vividhaḥ sugatena bodhimārgaḥ kathito bhinnarucim vilokya lokam /
rucito bahavaḥ svayaṃ pravṛttā vivṛtir me guṇavaty athātra yuktā // (GuMaMāTaṬī p. 1 ll. 17-20)

yuktā] conj. (cf. the Tibetan translation which has *'os pa yin*), *karma* ed. (following the reading of their MSS, which however does not yield satisfactory sense).

[21] Again, as in verse 2, though less elaborately, there is *śleṣa*, though I have this time not tried to render it in the translation of the verse. The words *hṛdi nibaddhā* can be taken punningly as describing not the commentary but an actual necklace of pearls (*muktāvalī*), 'tied (i.e. worn) on the breast'.

full of longing [for understanding etc.] (*utkaṇṭhitānām*) with regard to this (*iha*) tantra (*tantre*). (6)

As regards the third verse, the one quoted by Sa-paṇ, I would like to add the following to what has already been said in footnote 19 on its translation above. It is quite clear that Ratnākaraśānti is warning against the possible dangers of too great faith even in the context of tantric Buddhism, for which faith is essential. This fits well, I think, with the immediately following verse, which tells us that to call in question that the Buddha did do (and teach) what he did[22] is a serious offence, but that it is equally serious to attribute to the Buddha teachings that are notgenuinely his. To believe that the Buddha taught certain things (whether scriptures or practices or both)[23] which he did not, and to have reverence for such teachings as a result of this mistaken belief, would, I presume, be an example of how over-faith or over-credulity could be a 'cause for destruction'.

[22] E.g., I would suppose, to doubt that he in fact did teach tantric Buddhism, including the in many ways radical and extraordinary Buddhism taught in for instance the *Hevajratantra*. There is a hint here, I should say (and it can be added that there is more than a hint elsewhere in Ratnākaraśānti's tantric writings), of apologetic or defense, or at least the awareness that there may be some need of such defense of or justification of tantric vis-à-vis non-tantric Buddhism. A discussion of this interesting subject, too, must be postponed till a future occasion.

[23] The wording of verse 4 seems to allow the possibility, though I do not want to claim that it is more than that, that Ratnākaraśānti may have had in mind the attribution of entire scriptures (tantras) to the Buddha which he did not, in Ratnākaraśānti's opinion, teach. This is intriguing, in view of the fact that the evidence that we have suggests that throughout the eleventh century, during Ratnākaraśānti's period of activity, new tantras were indeed being composed and accepted as authoritative. One example is of course the *Laghukālacakratantra*, which according to NEWMAN (1998, 343) was 'completed between 1025 and ca. 1040 CE', during which time Ratnākaraśānti was probably alive and teaching. As I have remarked elsewhere (ISAACSON *forthcoming* n. 2), Ratnākaraśānti nowhere shows any awareness of the Kālacakra system, in contrast with his early twelfth-century counterpart Abhayākaragupta, for whom the *Laghukālacakratantra* and the principal associated literature (such as the commentary *Vimalaprabhā*) are important authoritative texts. One wonders if Ratnākaraśānti may have been aware of the rise of this system, and regarded it with some suspicion or disapproval. Note that NEWMAN (1987,109-110) has drawn attention to the fact that according to the Tibetan scholar mlhas grub rje (b. AD 1385) a reference by Abhayākaragupta to learned people who claimed that 'many things presented in the Kātacakra and the texts that follow it that contradict the three vehicles [of Buddhism]' is to Ratnākaraśānti 'and many other Indians'. On the other hand, the only explicit criticisms that I have found in the tantra-commentaries by Ratnākaraśānti that I have read so far are of interpretations, not of scriptures which he rejects as inauthentic (cf. the following paragraph). It is therefore certainly also possible that it is only the attribution to the Buddha of certain intentions wrongly read into his actual words that he intended here; if he had in mind also the misattribution to the Buddha of words/texts, his criticism is a subtle, inexplicit, one.

Furthermore, it should be noted that there are several places in Ratnākaraśānti's tantra-commentaries where others, unnamed, are taken to task for distorting the intentions of the Buddha. I shall mention only the most prominent one, which follows very shortly after the verses edited above. It is part of Ratnākaraśānti's discussion of the very first sentence of the *Hevajratantra*. Some 'others', he writes, claim that that sentence is not (as Ratnākaraśānti emphatically asserts that it is) simply the *nidānavākya*, the initial statement giving the circumstances in which the Buddha taught the tantra, but has a quite different, extremely esoteric (*paramarahasya*), meaning. And of these 'others' he writes: 'So these [other commentators][24] are, with the purpose of amazing the [easily-]deluded, forcing a meaning that will be taught [only later in the scripture] into a text-passage [namely the opening sentence] which has a different meaning' (*tad amī vakṣyamāṇam artham anyārthe granthe haṭhena ghaṭayanti mūḍhavismāpanārtham*, MS A f. 2r3, MS B f. 2r1). These deluded people or fools, eager to believe the most extraordinary secrets to lie behind anything in the tantra, even the simple statement (spoken not by the Buddha but by the first reciter of the scripture, the *saṃgītikāra*) of the setting in which the Buddha taught it, ready to swallow anything any fraudulent teacher might tell them (and the more extraordinary the better), are surely, for Ratnākaraśānti, blinded by and in risk of being destroyed by their excessive faith.

Finally, regarding the expression *na gauravāt*, 'not [just] out of reverence]', in the last quarter of our verse, it should be noted that it is quite likely that Ratnākaraśānti in using it is consciously echoing a verse which he expected many of his readers to know. The earliest occurrence of the verse that I mean is, as far as I am at present aware, as *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3588, and it is possible that, in this wording at least, it is Śāntarakṣita's composition, although we are of course supposed to understand the words to be addressed by the Buddha to his monks:

> *tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ /*
> *parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt*[25] //
>
> O monks, my words should be accepted by the wise after they have examined/tested them, as gold [is accepted by the wise after they have

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[24] A marginal note in MS A here reads *padmāṃkuravajrapādādaya* (sic). Unfortunately the commentary on the *Hevajratantra* by Padmāṅkuravajra has not, as far as I know, survived in Sanskrit, and the Tibetan translation (Ōtani 2318, Tōhoku 1188) lacks the beginning; nor have I been able to find other evidence in support of the identification offered by the anonymous annotator.

[25] Cf. also the similar verse TaSa 3344.

tested it] through heating it, cutting it, and [the use of] a touchstone — not just out of reverence [and without examination].

This reminder of the need to test, critically, even what is (held to be) the words of the Buddha may perhaps seem to some inimical to the 'spirit' of tantric Buddhism, at least as that is often represented. But we would do well to be cautious of too sweeping generalizations about so complex, multi-facetted, and heterogenous a phenomenon as the Vajrayāna. This same verse is quoted or referred to with approval more than once in Buddhist tantric literature,[26] and it may well have been in Ratnākaraśānti's mind as he wrote the opening verses to the *Muktāvalī*.

I shall conclude by briefly reiterating some of the main points that I have attempted to make.

1. The verse that Sa-paṇ quotes from Ratnākaraśānti, which warns not only against lack of faith but also against having too much faith (or perhaps one might say 'credulity'), is from a tantric context, rather than from a non-tantric one as JACKSON had supposed.[27]

2. It is consistent with other passages from Ratnākaraśānti's tantra-commentaries where he appears to take issue with other tantric teachers or commentators who deliberately try to bedazzle the credulous or interpret tantras in ways that are not (in Ratnākaraśānti's opinion) faithful to the words and intentions of the scriptures.

3. This 'critical' attitude of Ratnākaraśānti, to which Sa-paṇ's position seems indeed close in spirit, is coupled with — or perhaps one should say is part of — a vision of tantric Mahāyāna as being in harmonious

[26] See ViPra vol. 1 p. 66 ll. 11-13 and vol. 3 p. 71 ll. 13-14. Note that Sa-paṇ quotes this verse too in the *Phyogs bcu'i saṅs rgyas daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams la źu ba'i phrin yig*, shortly before quoting the verse from the *Muktāvalī*; see JACKSON 1994, 96 and n. 234 on the same page.

[27] And since Sa-paṇ can certainly be assumed to have known from what work the verse he quoted came, and what its context was, I think we can conclude that when he quoted it he wished to enlist Ratnākaraśānti's support for a critical approach not only 'within the general Mahāyāna' (JACKSON 1994, 143, already quoted in my opening paragraph above) but within tantric Mahāyāna. After all the main theme of Sa-paṇ in the *Phyogs bcu'i saṅs rgyas daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpa' rnams la źu ba'i phrin yig* is the need for a critical approach, founded on the basis of scripture and reasoning, in view of the fact that 'the false opinions of (Tibetan) imposters are widely spread among the ignorant as "teachings of **Tantric** adepts (*siddha*)"' (JACKSON 1994, 95; my emphasis).

accord with the non-tantric Mahāyāna, the *pāramitānaya*.[28] It is in no small measure his efforts to demonstrate this harmony — using reasoning and scripture with ingenuity and learning — that make Ratnākaraśānti's tantric writings, of which the *Muktāvalī* is the largest and most important one that survives in Sanskrit, of particular interest and value.

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[28] In addition to the adjective *darśitasūtrānugamā*, in the second verse edited and translated above, note also e.g. such remarks as *iyatā mahāyāne yat karaṇīyaṃ tat samāsato vyavasthāpitam, mahāyānābhisaṃgrahatvān mantranayasya* (MuĀv MS A f. 12r4-5, MS C f. 9r5-6). Ronald DAVIDSON's remark that 'even a cursory glance at Ratnākaraśānti's corpus of work must indicate that one of his primary contributions to Buddhist thought was his systematic treatment of ritual and esoteric exegesis through the lens of Vijñānavāda' (1999, 28) is not unfounded, and nor is his complaint about the 'neglect of this material' [i.e. of Ratnākaraśānti's tantric commentaries] (1999, 29 n. 16). For a small early contribution on the Yogācāra basis of Ratnākaraśānti's tantra-exegesis (not referred to by DAVIDSON in the article just mentioned) see TUCCI 1954. The excerpt from Ratnākaraśānti's commentary on the *Khasamatantra* given by TUCCI contains, however, several errors. The complete edition of the same commentary by Jagannath UPADHYAYA which is referred to by DAVIDSON (1999, 29 n. 16) is unfortunately not available to me at present.

tively, and have not been taken into account for the critical edition.

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Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition: On the Precarious Position of Early Nyāya*

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Already in the Vedic period the Indian intellectual tradition displays an unusually high capacity for systematic and analytical thinking which it applies to various areas of human concern. It suffices to mention two prominent examples in core areas of interest: in the religious sphere, the so-called speculations of the Brāhmaṇa-s which, following OLDENBERG's designation,[1] deserve to be styled a "pre-scientific science," and in the linguistic sphere, initially subservient to religious and ritual purposes, the sophisticated analysis of the Sanskrit language as we encounter it in full bloom in Pāṇini's famous grammar, where analysis is augmented by the achievement of the creation of an artificial language[2]. Also reaching back to the Vedic period is the practice of public or semi-public debate on initially only religious, later also philosophical and other topics, a practice which led to the development of special eristic and dialectical traditions; this development in turn was closely interwoven with the development of the systematic philosophical traditions of the classical period. As these traditions evolved in mutual dialectical interaction, their epistemology and logic being continuously refined in the course of philosophical analysis, reason and religious tradition assumed a relationship of actual or potential confrontation, at times even one of opposition, or at least such was supposed by some.

The "orthodox" brahmanical tradition now had to react to this situation and first of all define its attitude towards the employment of the various refined instruments and methods of reasoning as well as towards those who employed them – "orthodox" being used here as a convenient abbreviation to differentiate from the so-called heterodox traditions, i.e., the Buddhist and Jain traditions. The thinkers of the

* I am indebted to Eli Franco for his careful reading of this paper and his valuable constructive criticism, and to Anne MacDonald for her insightful remarks.

[1] Cf. OLDENBERG 1919.

[2] Cf. most recently STAAL 1995, 101-109.

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 221-251

philosophical traditions, for their part, especially those who considered themselves followers of the "orthodox" tradition in general, had to reflect on their respective school's relationship to tradition and to determine the role of reason, in the sense of their specific methods of reasoning and analysis, in this light. As can be expected, the position of the orthodox tradition varies considerably, not only for the different schools but in some cases also for the different historical stages of a given school, as does the more specific understanding of the nature of tradition itself; the intensity of reflection on the relation between tradition and reason, on the other hand, reflects the degree of importance of the tradition for a specific school, be it the importance of the tradition as such for the school's doctrinal self-understanding, as exemplified to a high degree in classical Vedānta, or its importance as the focal point and decisive factor in the attempt to locate the school safely in the "orthodoxy," in the wider sense of the dominant and prestigious cultural milieu shaped by it.

The classical philosophical tradition of Nyāya provides a prominent example for vigorous reflection on the role of reason and its own methods of reasoning vis-à-vis the orthodox tradition, belonging to the second type just outlined. Of fundamental importance in this connection is the famous exposition by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, the earliest Nyāya author whose work has come down to us in its entirety, in his commentary on the programmatic first *sūtra* of the *Nyāyasūtra,* an exposition which has been treated by a number of Indian and Western scholars not only in the present context, but also in the related context of the question about the ancient Indian term for philosophy and about the Indian notion of philosophical thinking. In the following I want to indicate just the most important names in chronological order.

The first substantial treatment was undertaken in 1911 by Hermann JACOBI in his well-known article on the early history of Indian philosophy[3] which was translated into English by his Indian student V.A. SUKTHANKAR and published in the *Indian Antiquary* in 1918.[4] On the Indian side, Satish Chandra VIDYABHUSANA, two years

[3] Cf. JACOBI 1911, 734-736; 741.

[4] Cf. JACOBI 1918. Although it could be suspected that V.A. Sukthankar, at the time writing from Indore, is identical with the famous V.S. Sukthankar, and although the information provided by S.M. KATRE in the latter's obituary on his stay in Germany and subsequent return to India (cf. KATRE 1943, 129-131) would allow for a brief period of study also with Jacobi at Bonn, all the more conceivable because of Jacobi's involvement, together with Heinrich Lüders, in Moriz Winternitz's project to critically edit the *Mahābhārata* presented to the International Association of Academies and Learned Societies around the turn of the century, Helmuth VON GLASENAPP's obituary for Jacobi mentions a doctoral student of Jacobi's named Vasudev A. Sukthankar who must be the translator in question (cf. VON GLASENAPP 1938, 6). – I am indebted to my colleague Chlodwig H. Werba for the

later, in his then pioneering and fundamental *History of Indian Logic* which was published posthumously,[5] utilized Vātsyāyana's statements, obviously unaware of JACOBI's contribution, for his idiosyncratic, but interesting reconstruction of the early history of Indian philosophy and logic as well as the early history of the Nyāya school.[6] He was almost immediately followed in 1922 by his countryman and fellow native of Navadvīpa, Surendranath DASGUPTA, in his still widely read *History of Indian Philosophy*, who rightly criticizes aspects of JACOBI's interpretation of Vātsyāyana's statements concerning the self-understanding of Nyāya, but does not touch upon the main problem of JACOBI's article. His own interpretation, although disputable from the point of view of the history of the Nyāya school proper,[7] brings us closer to an understanding of Vātsyāyana's historical and hermeneutic situation.[8] Essential progress in this respect was made by Paul HACKER in his 1958 article on Ānvīkṣikī,[9] in which he also engaged in extensive criticism of JACOBI's central claim. Wilhelm HALBFASS, for his part, continued HACKER's criticism and provided, in his characteristic and erudite way, Vātsyāyana's exposition with the hermeneutic perspective of Nyāya self-understanding in a much more comprehensive manner by addressing the general issue of the opposition of reason and tradition as evidenced in Indian intellectual history; he also placed the discussion in the philosophical context of the question about the very nature of philosophy.[10] In my following brief analysis and interpretation I will confine myself to the most essential features of Vātsyāyana's self-representation of his school, not without deviating from the earlier interpretations[11] in my understanding of details and emphases.

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reference to the obituary by KATRE.

[5] VIDYABHUSANA died suddenly before he had seen all of the book through the press; cf. the Preface by I.J.S. TARAPOREWALA in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, xi.

[6] Cf. VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 5; 40.

[7] There is no need to comment further on DASGUPTA's otherwise superficial and slightly confused treatment.

[8] Cf. DASGUPTA 1922, 277-278.

[9] Cf. HACKER 1958, 65-71; 73.

[10] Cf. HALBFASS 1988, 275-276 (on his criticism of some of HACKER's opinions cf. pp. 283-286); HALBFASS 1991, 24; 27-28. HALBFASS also points out the earlier criticism of JACOBI's article by Moriz WINTERNITZ, unknown to HACKER (cf. WINTERNITZ 1929).

[11] Among further, more extensive treatments one may mention OBERHAMMER 1964, 308-310; 316-317 and 1992, 246-252; NARAIN 1983, 72-81; MATILAL 1986, 70-73 (who, despite his "Western" context and orientation, is unfortunately unaware of JACOBI's and HACKER's contributions); PERRY 1997, 450-452. Briefer references are to be found, e.g., in KEITH 1919, 12;

Vātsyāyana's assertions in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* are introduced and motivated by a reproach formulated by a real or imaginary opponent; the latter criticizes the composition of *Nyāyasūtra (NS)* 1.1.1[12] inasmuch as the separate enumeration of the dialectical-eristic items or relevant topics *(padārtha)*[13], that is, doubt, etc., next to the initial mention of means and objects of valid cognition *(pramāṇa, prameya)* is useless because the former are included in the latter.[14] Vātsyāyana concedes this point, but continues that the four sciences *(vidyā)*, among which the examining or investigative science *(ānvīkṣikī)*, the science of Nyāya, counts as the fourth,[15] are taught for the sake of living beings[16] inasmuch as they, that is, the sciences, proceed in different ways. To the science of Nyāya belong doubt, etc., inasmuch as it has its separate procedure *(prasthāna)*[17] in this way[18]; without the explicit mention of these relevant

MISHRA 1966, 17; THAKUR 1975, 41; JUNANKAR 1978, 114-115.

[12] *pramāṇaprameyasaṃśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātinigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

[13] In the *Nyāyasūtra* itself the term *padārtha* is not used in this sense; cf. also HALBFASS 1992, 85 (n. 39).

[14] Cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh)* p. 2,13-14: *tatra saṃśayādīnāṃ pṛthagvacanam anarthakam. saṃśayādayo hi yathāsambhavaṃ pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti.* This criticism is introduced after Vātsyāyana's comments on the second topic "object of valid cognition" *(prameya)*. Compare also *Nyāyamañjarī (NM)* p. 23,1-2: *saṃśayādayas tu padārthā yathāsambhavaṃ pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntarbhavanto 'pi* ... . It should be noted that THAKUR's ms. J, i.e., the Jaisalmer ms., reads *prameye ca* instead of *prameyeṣu ca*, a reading which is supported by the corresponding passage of the *Nyāyamañjarī* as it appears in the editio princeps (in principle referred to in *NM* with the siglum *kha)*; cf. *NM* (VSS) p. 9,20. As Vātsyāyana uses the word *prameya* in the immediately preceding passage in the singular (cf. *NBh* p. 2,9) and *prameye* is also found in Uddyotakara's paraphrase of the relevant sentence in *Nyāyavārttika (NV)* p. 14,6 *(saṃśayādayaḥ prameye 'ntarbhavantīti pṛthak te na vācyāḥ;* cf. also *NV* p. 20,26 with variant 12 transmitted in ms. J), I consider it to reflect the original reading.

[15] Compare *NM* p. 9,7: *iyam evānvīkṣikī catasṛṇāṃ vidyānāṃ madhye nyāyavidyā gaṇyate* ...

[16] On this motivation to teach on the part of trustworthy persons *(āpta)* cf. *NBh* (CalSS) p. 566,1-4 (on 2.1.68 = *NS* 2.1.66; the passage is translated and commented upon in FRANCO 1997, 30-33).

[17] I would like to conjecture *pṛthakprasthānāyāḥ*, as a *bahuvrīhi*-compound relating to *tasyāḥ* (cf. the text given in n. 19). The variant *pṛthakprasthānam* recorded by THAKUR in ms. J (cf. his variant 6, obviously followed in MATILAL 1986, 71) seems to be a *lectio facilior* as compared to *pṛthakprasthānāḥ* of all editions known to me, which I myself cannot construe and understand (cf., however, OBERHAMMER 1992, 248 where *prasthāna* is obviously assumed to be a masculine noun; for this "solution" see already JACOBI 1911, 734). For a corroboration of this conjecture compare the obvious *bahuvrīhi*-compound in *NBh* p. 2,15 (cf. again n. 19) and *NM* p. 10,4: *pṛthakprasthānā hīmā vidyāḥ*. As to my interpretation of *prasthāna* as "procedure," it is supported by Vācaspati Miśra's paraphrase of the term with *vyāpāra* in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVT)* p. 65,23. Cf. also APTE

topics it would be a mere science concerned with the Self *(adhyātmavidyāmātra)*, as are the Upaniṣads. Therefore it is set into motion, i.e., propagated by its founder, with doubt, etc., as its special method.[19] In his following remarks, too, Vātsyāyana aims at the identification of the Nyāya with *ānvīkṣikī,* the investigative science, this time in an argumentative way. First he defines Nyāya as "the examination of things by means of the means of valid cognition." Here[20] he refers obviously to the school's characteristic mode of proceeding as the definiendum, that is, not to the school or tradition called Nyāya, but to a specific method *(nyāya)*, namely, that of inquisitive thinking, or, already more specifically in view of the immediate context, to methodical thinking or reasoning, also called *nyāya.*[21] This *nyāya* is further determined as the act of inferring, literally: "subsequent judging" or "measuring" *(anumāna)*[22], based

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1957, *s.v.*, 6: method," and JUNANKAR 1978,114; 456: "method of treatment." HACKER's (unjustified) translation and interpretation of *prasthāna* as "Gegenstand" (cf. HACKER 1958, 65; 73 and already JACOBI 1911, 734; see also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309: "formal object," "object," corrected to "methodisches Vorgehen" and "methodisches Element" [to relate *pṛthakprasthānāḥ*, as a *karmadhāraya*-compound, meaningfully to the plural *padārthāḥ*] in OBERHAMMER 1992, 248; MATILAL 1986, 71: "subject matter") is mainly responsible for his not very favourable judgment on Vātsyāyana's statements; cf. also the polite criticism in HALBFASS 1988, 275. DASGUPTA (1922, 277) speaks of doubt, etc., as the "separate branches" of the Nyāyavidyā, PERRY (1998, 451) of "basis."

[18] Compare *NM* p. 23,1-2: *saṃśayādayas tu padārthāḥ ... nyāyapravṛttihetutvāt pṛthag upadiśyante.*

[19] Cf. *NBh* p. 2,14-18: *satyam evam etat. imās tu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtām anugrahāyopadiśyante yāsāṃ caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā. tasyāḥ pṛthakprasthānā<yā>ḥ saṃśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ. teṣāṃ pṛthagvacanam antareṇādhyātmavidyāmātram iyaṃ syād yathopaniṣadaḥ. tasmāt saṃśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ pṛthak prasthāpyate.*

[20] The context is provided by Vātsyāyana's brief exposition of the relevant topic "motive, purpose" *(prayojana)*.

[21] Cf. also OBERHAMMER's distinction of *nyāya*, in the sense of "method," from Nyāya in OBERHAMMER 1964, esp. 309 and 317, although he also speaks of the "method of *nyāya*." In OBERHAMMER 1992 he even argues for the fact that Vātsyāyana was responsible for the self-designation of his philosophical school as Nyāya, on the basis of his re-interpretation of the term *nyāya*, in the sense of "leading principle," as found in the exegetical tradition of the Mimāṃsā. This interesting claim certainly deserves to be taken up in a more detailed historical examination. PERRY (1998, 451) distinguished "reasoning" *(nyāya)* and Nyāya.

[22] That is, if one considers the word to be a derivative of the root √*mi,* to account for the fact that Vātsyāyana connects the terms *pramātṛ, pramāṇa, prameya* and *pramiti*, which should belong to the same root as *anumātṛ, anumāna*, etc., with the verbal form *praminoti* (cf. *NBh* p. 1,10) which cannot be a present tense form of √*mā* ("to measure"), but only of √*mi* ("to fix, set up") (cf. WERBA 1997, *mi*[138]). For this root, a derived meaning "to judge, cognize, perceive" is assumed (cf. BÖHTLINGK and ROTH 1868, s.v. 1. *mi,* 3). However, it is highly doubtful that *-māna* is a derivative of this root (cf. MAYRHOFER 1993, s.v. *MAY*[1]). From the semantic point of view, a confusion of √*mi* with √*mā* can be observed, according to MAYRHOFER (loc. cit.), in "younger texts," a fact

on sense perception and tradition which thus necessarily precede this activity in their respectively different ways. This "subsequent judging" or "measuring," however, is an investigation, literally: "a subsequent viewing" *(anvīkṣaṇa, anvīkṣā)* of what has already been seen by means of sense perception and tradition.[23] By means of this very activity proceeds the investigative science *(ānvīkṣikī)*. Thus, *ānvīkṣikī* is nothing but the science of methodical thinking *(nyāyavidyā)* as, of course, represented by the Nyāya school - which has not only specifically adopted this procedure but also made it an essential concern; and it is nothing but the teaching of methodical thinking *(nyāyaśāstra)*, "teaching" in the sense of a doctrinal corpus, i.e., the whole of the tenets of the Nyāya school as laid down in its basic treatise.[24]

Vātsyāyana's concluding remarks to his brief exposition of the sixteen relevant topics of Nyāya make it sufficiently clear that in this context of defining the identity of his own philosophical school by way of its method and position he accommodates it within the framework of the four sciences which are mentioned in the introductory part of Kauṭilya's or Kauṭalya's[25] *Arthaśāstra*; as is well known since JACOBI's seminal article was published, in these concluding remarks Vātsyāyana also integrates a slightly modified version of a verse which occurs - probably taken from an older source - in the very same context in the *Arthaśāstra*[26]. He states that the investigative science - that is, the science of *nyāya* or Nyāya, as his commentator Uddyotakara

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which could also explain Vātsyāyana's *praminoti*. In this case, he would after all have understood *pramāṇa* and *anumāna* as referring to a "(subsequent) measuring," as has traditionally been assumed in modern scholarship.

[23] Compare *NM* p. 9,9-10: *pratyakṣāgamābhyām īkṣitasyānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣānumānam ity arthaḥ. tadvyutpādakaṃ śāstram ānvīkṣikī.* Cf. also Kṣīrasvāmin on *Amarakośa* 1.6.5 as quoted in HACKER 1958, 77.

[24] Cf. *NBh* p. 3,5-8: *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam. pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumānam; sānvīkṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhāyam īkṣitasy[ārthasy]ānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram.* Cf. on this passage, already translated in JACOBI 1911, 735, especially HALBFASS 1988, 275; cf. also OBERHAMMER 1992, 250; PERRY 1997, 451.

[25] On the use of "Kauṭalya" instead of the equally attested "Kauṭilya" cf. SCHARFE 1968, 82-83. Obviously, SCHARFE could no longer take into consideration KANGLE's detailed argumentation for "Kauṭilya" and against "Kauṭalya" (cf. KANGLE 1965, 109-113).

[26] Cf. *Arthaśāstra (AŚ)* 1.2.12. According to SCHARFE 1968, 4, both texts may quote from a third source. RUBEN, on the other hand, seems to assume that Vātsyāyana himself would have quoted the verse correctly and therefore concludes that he must have taken the already changed verse from some "metrical excerpt" (cf. RUBEN 1926, 354). MATILAL has not noticed the deviation at all (cf. MATILAL 1986, 72; similarly DASGUPTA 1922, 278).

and much later the Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña add here[27] –, inasmuch as it is being differentiated by its special relevant topics, *pramāṇa*, etc., from all other sciences,[28] "has been examined[29] in the instruction on the sciences[30] as the lamp of all sciences,

[27] Cf. the quotation of the introductory sentence to the verse (cf. the text given in n. 31 below) in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū)* p. 71,12-14. The addition of *nyāyavidyā,* which once more clarifies Vātsyāyana's identification, also occurs in the *Nyāyavārttika* on this passage (cf. *NV* p. 21,1) and may have crept, in the course of transmission, into the quote in the *Nyāyabhūṣana*; the opposite scenario, the loss of this clarification in the course of time, is not so easily explained. Vācaspati Miśra clearly understands *nyāyavidyā* as part of the explanatory sentence in the *Vārttika* (s. *NVT* p. 67,8). The addition is also lacking in the corresponding quotation in Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (NMGBh)* p. 6,3-4. – The supplement *vidyā* found in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha (SDS)* p. 245,1 is in any case secondary.

[28] Here I follow the variant *pravibhajyamānā* (as opposed to *vibhajyamānā)* as found in *NBhū* p. 71,12, *NMGBh* p. 6,4 and *SDS* p. 245,2, which would exclude an interpretation of the phrase to the effect that a "division" of the science "by means of," i.e., "into" the relevant topics was intended (cf. e.g., HACKER 1958, 71), an interpretation which seems less plausible in the present context. Also the remarks which follow the quotation of this introductory phrase in the *Nyāyavārttika* point to the understanding adopted by me: the means of valid cognition, etc., are not found in the other sciences, namely, inasmuch as these sciences do not make them their special topics. Cf. also the corresponding interpretation by Phanibhusana TARKAVAGISA as reported in CHATTOPADHYAYA and GANGOPADHYAYA 1967, 28.

[29] With some hesitation I adopt the reading *parīkṣitā*, reported by THAKUR as preserved in ms. J, which is also found in a number of quotations of this verse from the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, namely, in *NM* p. 28,14-15, *NBhū* p. 71,13-14 and *SDS* p. 94,4-5; it is confirmed in *NMGBh* p. 6,6 and *Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇaka (ŚKṬ)* p. 65,32.As opposed to the reading *prakīrtitā*, it would make the reference to the entire relevant section in the *Arthaśāstra*, where *ānvīkṣikī* is indeed – although only briefly – examined (cf. *AŚ* p. 4,8-10), more specific; assuming that Vātsyāyana modified the verse himself, it also would imply his superimposition of his notion of the three *śāstrapravṛtti*-s employed in the Nyāya (cf. the introduction of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* to *NS* 1.1.3) because in the *Arthaśāstra* itself the subsection is designated *ānvīkṣikīsthāpanā*. The reading *prakīrtitā* ("praised") would correspond better to the wording in the concluding verse as given in the *Arthaśāstra* by offering some kind of equivalent to *śaśvat ... matā* ("always considered"). However, I think it highly implausible that the predicate "praised" would have been replaced by the less laudatory (but well attested) "examined" in the course of the tradition. – In Sivaprasad BHATTACHARYYA's quotation of the verse *garīyasī* is to be found at this place, a variant not known to me from other sources; cf. BHATTACHARYYA 1956, 50 (n. 6). MATILAL's translation is obviously based on Vātsyāyana's version of the verse but does not take either reading into account ("It is thus enumerated in [the list of] the branches of learning") (MATILAL 1986, 73)! Similarly, THAKUR's comment that Vātsyāyana was "mentioning the fact that they (i.e., the first three feet) are taken from the Vidyoddeśa section of the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya" (cf. THAKUR 1975, 41) does not point towards a decision for either variant.

[30] In the *Arthaśāstra*, the section is called *vidyāsamuddeśa*, not *vidyoddeśa*. This change had to be introduced here probably *metri causa* unless Vātsyāyana did not modify the verse as found in the *Arthaśāstra* himself, but quoted it from an original context where it was connected with a *vidyoddeśa* (cf. n. 26 above).

as an aid for all undertakings, as the foundation of all norms."[31]

The other three sciences are, according to the *Arthaśāstra*, the Vedic science, the science of material acquisition and the science of government.[32] In this way, the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* equates his philosophical tradition with one of the four royal sciences of the *Arthaśāstra*, namely, the science - or rather methodology - which

> "investigating the strength and weakness of these [three sciences] by means of reasons *(hetu)*, assists the sentient world, strengthens the intellect in distress and in good fortune, and causes confidence in [one's own] understanding, speech and action."[33]

This amounts to the establishment of the Nyāya in the framework of a scheme which may not be an orthodox brahmanical scheme, but which nevertheless can be assumed to have been generally accepted in the dominant cultural milieu of Vātsyāyana's time and place, and to have carried with it considerable prestige.

However, Vātsyāyana adds to his modified quotation of the verse that adequate understanding *(tattvajñāna)* and the attainment of the highest good[34] have to be understood according to the specific science. For the science of Nyāya, inasmuch as it is

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[31] Cf. *NBh* p. 5,14-17: *seyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhiḥ pravibhajyamānā*
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām /
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ vidyoddeśe parīkṣitā // iti.

The text as given by THAKUR has *vibhajyamānā* and *prakīrtitā*; cf. nn. 28 and 29 for an explanation of my preference for the above readings. - The last *pāda* reads differently in the *Arthaśāstra*: *śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā.*

[32] Cf. *AŚ* 1.2.1: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ.*

[33] Cf. *AŚ* 1.2.11: ... *balābale caitāsāṃ hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyopakaroti, vyasane 'bhyudaye ca buddhim avasthāpayati prajñāvākyakriyāvaiśāradyaṃ ca karoti.* On the pronounced neutral aspect of the *ānvīkṣikī* in Kauṭilya's presentation, evident especially in this passage, cf. HALBFASS 1988, 278; 284; PERRY 1997, 451, with n. 16.

[34] The reading found in *NBh* (CalSS), *niḥśreyasādhigamārtham*, instead of *niḥśreyasādhigamaś ca*, is also found in the editions of the text in *VSS, ASS* and *SS* (vol. 10, with Sudarśanācārya's *Prasannapadā*, ed. Dwarika Das SHASTRI, Varanasi 1986) and solves the problem that *veditavyam* (n. nom. sg.) (cf. the text as quoted in n. 37) seemingly has to be construed with *tattvajñānam* (n.) and *niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ* (m.). However, it is also possible to take *tad idam* as the subject of the sentence, *veditavyam* as its nominal predicate, and the two problematic nouns as appositions placed after the subject: "The following, namely, ... and ..., is to be understood ... ." The reading chosen by THAKUR, which is also accepted in the *KSS* edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, is confirmed by *NV* p. 21,9f. and *NVT* p. 68,9.

a science concerned with the Self *(adhyātmavidyā)*[35], adequate understanding consists in the understanding of the soteriologically relevant objects of cognition, among which the Self figures prominently,[36] whereas the attainment of the highest good consists in the obtainment of liberation.[37] Thus, after Vātsyāyana has first distinguished the science of Nyāya from a mere science concerned with the Self, such as the Upaniṣads, on the basis of its specific procedure, that is, its method, he now affirms and stresses that the Nyāya is indeed an *adhyātmavidyā* as regards its content, as well as its final aim and purpose. Concerning the content of the science or its central objects of understanding, Vātsyāyana, as already earlier on in his commentary,[38] brushes aside the fact that there are, next to the objects of valid cognition, after all 15 additional relevant topics mentioned in the programmatic first *sūtra* as objects of adequate understanding, an understanding which is claimed there to lead to the attainment of the highest good. Although all of these topics constitute the special method of the Nyāya and thus - according to Vātsyāyana - account for its nature as the investigative science *par excellence*, and although their adequate understanding is indeed of importance for the adequate understanding of the Self, etc., Vātsyāyana probably does not mention them here explicitly as the content of the science because they do not have direct metaphysical and soteriological significance, and are thus devoid of the status of real objects of adequate knowledge;[39] without them the agreement of the Nyāya with tradition in content as well as in final aim can be presented more convincingly. As regards the agreement in content, it has been referred to by Vātsyāyana already in the preceding, with a brief sentence complementing his identification of the Nyāya with the investigative science by way of its characteristic procedure of inference; in this connection he added that an inference which stands in contradiction to sense perception and tradition just *seems* to be an instance of the application of the outlined method of inquisitive thinking, is only an *apparent* instance

[35] H.N. RANDLE states that Vātsyāyana defines the Nyāya as an *ātmavidyā*; however, as he refers to the *VSS* edition of the text which reads, as all other editions available to me, *adhyātmavidyā*, this must have been a slip of pen (cf. RANDLE 1930, 11 [n. 2, continuing from p. 10]).

[36] The text of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* according to *ASS, KSS, VSS* and *SS* reads *ātmāditattvajñānam*, instead of *ātmādijñānam*, which, however, is contradicted by *NV* p. 21,17.

[37] Cf. *NBh* p. 5,18-20: *tad idaṃ tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasādhigamaś ca yathāvidyaṃ veditavyam. iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmādijñānaṃ tattvajñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti.* Cf. also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309; PERRY 1997, 452.

[38] Cf. *NBh* p. 2,9: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

[39] Cf. also HALBFASS 1988, 275-276.

of methodical thinking or reasoning *(nyāyābhāsa)*. It is implied there that such a procedure does not have its place in the science of Nyāya.[40]

We can thus observe that Vātsyāyana, next to anchoring his philosophical tradition in a prestigious secular classification of science and in the most excellent position to boot, is concerned to accommodate it with the established religious tradition and place it, so to say, in line with the Upaniṣads. The *Nyāyasūtra* itself does not address the topic specifically and explicitly; the only source which may tell us something about its compilers' attitude, or about the attitude of one of its compilers, as regards the position of the Nyāya vis-à-vis the science concerning the Self, are the concluding *sūtra*-s of the fourth book of the *Nyāyasūtra,* starting with *sūtra* 4.2.38. The whole section, reaching up to 4.2.50 and thus comprising 13 *sūtra*-s,[41] begins rather abruptly with an argumentative reference to the continuous repetition or practice of a specific concentration *(samādhi)*,[42] that is, to a yogic exercise, an interpretation corroborated by *NS* 4.2.41, a *sūtra* following upon two objections, which speaks of the practice of *yoga (yogābhyāsa)* in the wilderness, in caves, on sandbanks or islets, etc.[43] One would not originally connect yogic practices with a philosophical school that developed out of a tradition of debate, but even if the compositional history of the sequence of *sūtra*-s concerned has still to be studied in detail,[44] it is clear that in both cases we are dealing with *siddhāntasūtra*-s. This is also the case with *NS* 4.2.45 which not only strengthens the connection to yogic practices because

[40] Cf. *NBh* p. 3,8: *yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti.* This sentence is quoted in *NM* p. 293,15. Cf. also HALBFASS 1988, 277 (with reference merely to *kṣudratarka* in n. 62, i.e., to *NM* p. 9,13); MATILAL 1990, 24.

[41] RUBEN rightly suggests that two sub-sections have to be assumed here, consisting of *sūtra*-s 38-45 (i) and 46-50 (k); cf. RUBEN 1928, 125-128. See also, from the point of view of stratification of the *Nyāyasūtra* as a whole, MEUTHRATH 1996, 196-203; MEUTHRATH speaks of two independent sub-sections, one on meditation, the other on the "code of conduct for Naiyāyikas," which have most probably been joined together by the redactor of *NS* 4.2 who was also responsible for linking the other originally independent sub-sections of *NS* 4.2.

[42] Cf. *NS* 4.2.38: *samādhiviśeṣābhyāsāt.*

[43] Cf. *NS* 4.2.41: *araṇyaguhāpulinādiṣu yogābhyāsopadeśaḥ.*

[44] A first, not yet detailed and sufficiently argued attempt has been presented in MEUTHRATH 1996, 199; MEUTHRATH considers 38 and 45 to be the oldest *sūtra*-s of this sub-section, and the intervening objections, replies and explanations to be later accretions. For a possible grouping together of 38-40 and 45 see below, n. 46. Individual *sūtra*-s, together with Vātsyāyana's comments, have been treated, from the perspective of hermeneutics of religion, in OBERHAMMER 1984; cf. pp. 8-9, 24-25 and 55-56 on *NS/NBh* 4.2.38, p. 20 on *NBh* 4.2.41, p. 24 on *NS/NBh* 4.2.42, pp. 21, 23-24 and 30 on *NS/NBh* 4.2.45, pp. 56-57 and 123 on *NS/NBh* 4.2.46.

of the employment of the terms *yama* and *niyama*,[45] but also puts the Self explicitly at the centre of the activities mentioned and, one can assume, recommended:

> "For this purpose (i.e., for the purpose of release)[46] the Self *(ātman)* is prepared with [general] restraint and [specific] discipline, and [also] on account of *yoga* with means [prescribed] for the practice concerning the Self *(adhyātmavidhi)*."[47]

After the discussion concluded with *sūtra* 45, a discussion which evidently touches upon aspects of the Nyāya which could corroborate its designation as an *adhyātmavidyā*, there follows a sequence of five *siddhāntasūtra*-s which, within the

[45] Cf. also JACOBI 1929, 163.

[46] The reference of the anaphoric pronoun *tad-* is anything but settled. RUBEN (cf. RUBEN 1928, 127) supplies three referents in his translation, i.e., concentration, true cognition and release, obviously, because he could not reach a decision among the three contextually justifiable possibilities. As she considers 38-45 to constitute an originally independent (although composite) sub-section on the topic of meditation, MEUTHRATH supplies only "Versenkung" as the referent of *tad-* (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 198). Vātsyāyana, whose interpretation I follow preliminarily, clearly interprets *tad-* to refer to release *(apavarga)* (cf. also JACOBI 1929, 163, JUNANKAR 1978, 471 and OBERHAMMER 1984, 123 [n. 228]); the term occurs first in the *pūrvapakṣasūtra* 4.2.42 and concludes the immediately preceding *siddhāntasūtra* 4.2.44. Bhāsarvajña, who quotes the *sūtra* in *NBhū* p. 445,27-28, seems to follow this interpretation: although he does not gloss *tadartham*, the fact that the quotation follows immediately after his statement that *dharma* produced with pure means, such as devotion to God and the "limbs" of *yoga*, is nothing but a cause for the highest good *(niḥśreyasa)* – and does not also lead to suffering in an indirect way – (cf. on this passage OBERHAMMER 1984, 77; 96), suggests that he understood *tad-* to refer to *niḥśreyasa,* i.e., *apavarga*. Furthermore, his introduction to his partial quotation of 4.2.45 earlier on in the text (cf. *NBhū* p. 10,19-20: *tathā cātmādīnāṃ pramāṇopapannatvaṃ pratipādya "adhyātmavidhyupāyair" ity uktaṃ śrīmatsūtrakṛteti)* follows upon the concluding statement "... to the effect that a circumspect person, who is free of uncertainty after having determined that everything which has been stated in the Upaniṣad-s, etc. (i.e., 'and in other teachings of *yoga*,' cf. line 12) is indeed true, will attain release inasmuch as he [then] enacts the means which is well established there" *(... yenopaniṣadādyabhihitaṃ sarvaṃ tathyam eveti niścitya nirāśaṅkasya prekṣāvatas tatprasiddham evopāyam anutiṣṭhato 'pavargaprāptir bhavatīti)*. This sequence of concluding statement, introduction and partial quotation also implies that *tad-* should refer to release according to Bhāsarvajña (for another partial quotation of 4.2.45 cf. *NBhū* 584,11: *yogāc cādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ;* on the whole passage see also OBERHAMMER 1984, 122-123).

It may also be considered to connect this *sūtra* with *sūtra*-s 39-40, assuming the interpolation of 41-44, because an answer to 40 has not been given and 41 does not provide its answer to 39 in the more straightforward way as is typical for the standard dialectical style of the *sūtra*-s. *tad-* would under this assumption relate back to *samādhi(viśeṣa)* in 38; the compound would thus mean "for the purpose of the [special concentration]," with the implication "for the purpose of counteracting the disturbances of the special concentration mentioned by the opponent in 39 and 40."

[47] *NS* 4.2.45: *tadarthaṃ yamaniyamābhyām ātmasaṃskāro yogāc cādhyātmavidhyupāyaiḥ*.

macro-structure of the *Nyāyasūtra* as known to and commented upon by Vātsyāyana (i.e., under the presupposition that a division into five *adhyāya*-s was already in place), provide a transition to the fifth book of the text which deals foremost with purely eristic topics, namely, the so-called sophistic objections *(jāti)* and the points of defeat in debate *(nigrahasthāna)*. The sequence in question is obviously taken from some other text belonging to the tradition of debate because the threefold division of debate presupposed in this section, namely, *saṃvāda*,[48] *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, terminologically differs from the threefold division as found in the first book of the *Nyāyasūtra*. There, in *NS* 1.2.1-3, three types of debate called *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are characterized after *vāda* has been mentioned in the programmatic first *sūtra* as a relevant topic, presumably to be understood as a generic term for debate. This terminological deviation regarding the types of debate and their internal classification, that is, the grouping together of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as "contentional discourse" *(vigṛhyakathanam)*[49] which is not addressed at all in the first book,[50] are discrepancies which concern the doctrinal basis of the Nyāya school and thus point at the fact that we are dealing here with a cutout from elsewhere, most probably from a text close to the tradition of debate which is reflected in the section on debate presented in the *Carakasaṃhitā*.[51] As has been shown by VIDYABHUSANA,[52] Guiseppe TUCCI[53] and Erich

[48] *NS* 4.2.46-47 (cf. nn. 58 and 61) speak of *saṃvāda* as the "honest" truth-seeking and friendly type of debate. According to MEUTHRATH, who considers a "code of conduct for Naiyāyikas" including "conversation" as the topic of the sub-section, the use of *saṃvāda* (translated as "conversation") only alludes to *vāda* as taught in book one; on the other hand, MEUTHRATH speaks of the fact that here a discussion is recommended to be conducted with equal-minded persons only as a reason for the slight modification of the term, a statement which seems to imply that according to her interpretation a specific type of *vāda*, as taught in book one, is meant by *saṃvāda* in *NS* 4.2.46 (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 201).

[49] Cf. *NS* 4.2.50 (quoted below, n. 65).

[50] This is not to say that according to the relevant *lakṣaṇa*-section in the first book, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* were not conceived to be contentional; the usage of distortions, sophistic objections and points of defeat in debate mentioned as the distinctive characteristic of the two vis-à-vis the first type of debate (cf. *NS* 1.2.2 and by implication 3) clearly implies their contentional nature.

[51] The affinity to the classification and terminology of types of debate as found in the section on debate in the *Carakasaṃhitā (CaS)* Vimānasthāna ch. 8, §§ 16, 18, 21-22, 28, is conveniently presented in KANG 1998, 20.

[52] Cf. VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 25-35; the presentation as well as the interpretation of the materials in this truly pioneering work have to be approached with caution, of course, and judged more for their merit of having drawn sufficient attention to this important area of research than for their philological precision and historical plausibility. Hakuju UI's translation and treatment of a large part of the relevant section in the *Carakasaṃhitā* in his *Studies in Indian Philosophy* (cf. UI 1925,

FRAUWALLNER,[54] to mention the names of the three most important pioneers in this connection,[55] the intellectual environment of origin of the Nyāya was related to this tradition of debate.

Next to this terminological and classificatory discrepancy, a further remarkable feature has to be mentioned which touches upon the very nature of the first type of debate as described in the section at the end of book four: According to *NS* 4.2.48, *saṃvāda* is also recommended if a counter-position is not held by one of the participants in the colloquy (cf. also below, p. 235). In book one, however, an exception to the overall requirement of a position and counter-position in debate[56] is made only in the case of *jalpa* which then turns into *vitaṇḍā*.[57] The relevant statement in *NS* 1.2.3, if interpreted in a strict manner, may point to an even more pronounced classificatory discrepancy between the two sections than assumed above: according to *NS* 1.2.1-3, debate *(vāda)* would only be twofold, namely, *vāda* and *jalpa*, the latter with an acceptable variant called *vitaṇḍā*.

426-471), which is not accessible to me, were certainly provoked by VIDYABHUSANA's work, as was DASGUPTA's inclusion and extensive treatment of the section in his *History of Indian Philosophy* (cf. DASGUPTA 1932, 373-392). Rudolf ROTH, who already in 1872 (cf. ROTH 1972) drew attention to Vimānasthāna ch. 8 up to § 67, still on the basis of manuscripts, unfortunately jumped over the part which from our present-day point of view is of most interest for the history of Indian philosophy, stating in a footnote that the part contains "the enumeration and definition of 24 terms belonging to logic and dialectics, which a disputant must know," but that "their treatment is only peculiar inasmuch as the examples are all taken from medicine" (cf. ROTH 1872, 451 [n. 1]).

[53] Cf. TUCCI 1929, 468-469; cf. also the tables in TUCCI 1929b, xvi-xxii; xxv-xxvi.

[54] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1984, ch. V.1.

[55] Next to KANG 1998, MATILAL 1998, 38-42 (published posthumously, without any references to earlier discussions either by the author himself or by the editors) seems to be the most recent treatment of this material.

[56] Cf. *NS* 1.2.1, translated below, p. 237.

[57] Cf. *NS* 1.2.3: *sa* (scil. *jalpaḥ) pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*. Although RUBEN already noticed this discrepancy, he did not draw further conclusions from his observation (cf. RUBEN 1928, 128: "Sonst pflegt nur beim Wortstreit (*vitaṇḍā*, Ib3) der eine der Gegner auf eine eigene Behauptung zu verzichten ...").

However, even if the five relevant *siddhāntasūtra*-s do not have their original place at the conclusion of book four of the *Nyāyasūtra*, I feel justified by their very inclusion at this place to use them for my present purpose as representing the point of view of early Naiyāyikas prior to Vātsyāyana and at the time when the compilation of the *Nyāyasūtra* came to its close. The first of these *sūtra*-s, 4.2.46,[58] interpreted in its present context,[59] proclaims two more activities conducive to release in addition to the preparation of the Self *(ātmasaṃskāra)* by means of yogic discipline and practices

[58] Cf. *NS* 4.2.46: *jñānagrahaṇābhyāsas tadvidyaiś ca saha saṃvādaḥ.*

[59] It is conceivable that the sentence *NS* 4.2.46, before the incorporation of the sequence 46-50 into the *Nyāyasūtra,* contained a characterization of the first type of debate called *saṃvāda*: "The colloquy with experts is (i.e., constitutes) a continuous repetition/practice of grasping of knowledge." This would imply that *ca*, which links the two nouns and thus induces the understanding of an *anuvṛtti* of *tadartham* in 4.2.45, to provide for a nominal predicate to which the juxtaposed nouns could be related as subjects, is an interpolation. This interpolation could have occurred even after 46-50 had become part of the *Nyāyasūtra* because *sūtra* 46, at the beginning of the sequence in question, could have introduced the topic of the fifth book even without *ca* while at the same time, even if not immediately and syntactically linked to 45, it would relate debate back to the preceding discussion on the means for obtaining adequate knowledge and their practice. In any case, the reading of *ca* is firmly grounded in the gloss on this *sūtra* in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (cf. also the quotation of the *sūtra* in the *Nyāyavārttika* and the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* ad loc.). RUBEN correctly reports the lack of *ca* in James R. BALLANTYNE's edition of the *Nyāyasūtra* accompanying his 1850 translation (with volume three published in 1854), as well as in two old editions of the *sūtra*-text together with the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti,* of which one dates from 1828 (cf. also the edition heading the list appended in HALL 1897, 203, probably to be identified with the undated Calcutta edition by Nilmani VIDYALANKARA *[ni]* used in the *Vṛtti* edition in the *Nyāyadarśanam* [Preface, p. 8, cf. *NBh* (CalSS)], although the editor's name appears as Nimāicandra Śiromaṇi in my copy; this edition, published by the Calcutta-based Education Press, is missing in POTTER 1995 which mentions as the earliest available printed text a 1821 edition by Kasinath TARKAPANCANANA in Bengali characters [cf. POTTER 1995, 101, item 48.1.1], which, however, is a Nāgarī and Bengali-script edition and a translation into Bengali of Viśvanātha [Nyāya-]Pañcānana [Bhaṭṭācārya]'s *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, with the author's name appearing as Viśvanātha Tarkālaṅkāra [Viswonath Turkaluncar!], supplemented by a Bengali commentary from the pen of the editor/translator and published under the English title *A System of Logic written in Sunscrit by the Venerable Sage Boodh, and Explained in a Sunscrit Commentary by the very Learned Viswonath Turkaluncar* by the Calcutta Mission Press) the other edition mentioned by RUBEN is from 1919 (cf. RUBEN 1928, 127). Certainly, BALLANTYNE's pioneering work was very much influenced by the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, the only commentary available in print during his time, and probably the only one current among the pandits he consulted; the text of the *Nyāyasūtra* itself was then only known through two editions of the *Vṛtti* (I have not the other pre-BALLANTYNE edition from Paris [1841], mentioned by POTTER under 48.1.2). BALLANTYNE's text does therefore not constitute independent evidence next to the reading as found in the *sūtra*-text printed in 1828 together with the *Vṛtti*. I could not check all editions of the *Vṛtti* as recorded by POTTER; at least the editions available to me all have the reading *ca*. However, it is quite improbable that an original reading not known to Vātsyāyana could have survived in some "underground" tradition and reemerged in some mss. of this late commentary, and the rather simple gloss on the two juxtaposed nouns in the *Vṛtti* does not rule out that Viśvanātha had a reading *ca* before him after all.

concerning the Self, the activity mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*. These two are (1) the continuous engagement in the grasping, that is, firm comprehension *(rahaṇa)*, of knowledge *(jñāna)*,[60] and (2) the colloquy *(saṃvāda)* with experts. A type of debate is thus placed in the context of the final aim of liberation and of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. The following *sūtra*, naming those persons with whom one should conduct a colloquy,[61] evokes strong traditional connotations: it mentions disciple *(śiṣya)* and teacher *(guru)*, fellow-students of the orthodox tradition *(sabrahmacārin)*, learned authorities *(śiṣṭa)*[62] and those who (equally?) strive for the supreme good *(śreyorthin)*. And although a colloquy, as a type of debate, normally would presuppose a position and a counter-position, it may - according to the next *sūtra* - also alternatively, or even preferably(?),[63] be conducted without a counter-position, in case one asks for it(?) for the sake of the specific aim, which presumably would be, in the present context of the *sūtra*, knowledge and the highest good resulting from it.[64] Even the remaining two types of debate, which are classified as constituting

[60] Obviously following RUBEN 1928 (cf. also JUNANKAR 1978, 471), MEUTHRATH translates the first compound as if its final member would be a *dvandva*-compound ("Erfassen und Wiederholen der Lehre"; "Lehre" for *jñāna* also goes back to RUBEN's translation, probably influenced by Vātsyāyana's paraphrase with *ātmavidyāśāstra* in *NBh* [CalSS] p. 1097,2) (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 200). However, the masculine nom. sg. case-ending is difficult to explain in this case.

[61] Cf. *NS* 4.2.47: *taṃ śiṣyagurusabrahmacāri[vi]śiṣṭaśreyorthibhir anasūyubhir abhyupeyāt.* On my emendation of the text as compared to the *sūtra* as edited by RUBEN cf. below, n. 62.

[62] Although the *sūtra* is quoted, as edited in RUBEN's edition, with the reading *-viśiṣṭa-* in *Āyurvedadīpikā (ĀVD)* p. 631,24-25 on *CaS* Vimānasthāna ch. 8, § 18, the carefully weighed testimony of the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* on this *sūtra* as well as the quotation in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 70,8-9) speak very strongly in favour of an original reading *-śiṣṭa-*, also supported by Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara's *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* (ed. Kishor Nath JHA, Allahabad 1979; to be placed chronologically between the *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Udayana's *Pariśuddhi)*, a reading which seems to have been replaced not only in the modern editions of the basic text, the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* itself, but also in the mss. by *-viśiṣṭa-*.

[63] This tentative interpretation of *api vā* follows Joachim Friedrich SPROCKHOFF's recent observations on the usage of *api vā* in the ritual Sūtras (cf. SPROCKHOFF 1999). The occurrences studied by SPROCKHOFF are sentence-initial, with one exception adduced from the *Vaikhānasaśrautasūtra*. If it could be demonstrated that also in the philosophical *sūtra*-literature *api vā* is used in the meaning "or better" - to suggest the best, preferable alternative - proposed by him, *api vā* in *NS* 4.2.48 would strengthen the hypothesis that the sequence 46-50 is taken from elsewhere, more specifically from a context where another statement preceding the sentences preserved in the *Nyāyasūtra* would declare the less preferable alternative, i.e., a colloquy in which positions and counter-positions are held.

[64] Cf. *NS* 4.2.48: *pratipakṣahīnam api vā prayojanārtham arthitve.*

contentional discourse in the concluding *sūtra* of the fourth book,[65] are placed in the service of protecting the soteriologically relevant determination of the true nature of things,[66] namely, verbal contest *(jalpa)* and *vitaṇḍā*, i.e., – if it is assumed that the term is used here in the same way as in the first book – a dispute in which only one of the participants attempts to prove a particular position. Although the basic hostility and aggressiveness which characterizes them is not denied, a dispassionate disputant, when using them in this beneficial and meritorious function, is free of moral reproach, as one can infer from the illustration "just as one screens off [a plot of land] by means of thorny branches for the sake of protecting the development of seeds."[67] The similarity of this example with the example used apologetically at the very beginning of the Buddhist text on debate known as **Upāyahṛdaya*,[68] which is unfortunately only preserved in a Chinese translation datable to 472 AD,[69] points towards the fact that the cutout inserted here between books four and five of the *Nyāyasūtra* conserves material belonging to a related tradition of debate, which shared its intellectual environment of origin with the Nyāya, close to the related tradition as reflected in the *Carakasaṃhitā*, but also in some respects close to a Buddhist tradition of debate partaking of this very environment to a degree – material that found its way into the *Nyāyasūtra* at the time when the basic tenets of the Nyāya school, developed from an older tradition of debate within the common environment, had been fixed into a manual, now sheltered in books one and five, and gradually supplemented and rounded off with the dialectically structured books two, three and four.

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[65] Cf. *NS* 4.2.50: *tābhyāṃ vigṛhyakathanam.*

[66] RUBEN, followed by MEUTHRATH, understands the compound differently: similar to the case of 4.2.46 (cf. above n. 60) he interprets *-adhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇa-* as a *dvandva*-compound; however, I wonder how one could protect (or defend) the truth in the sense of the true nature of things *(tattva)* (cf. RUBEN 1928, 128 and MEUTHRATH 1996, 201). MATILAL speaks more adequately of the "protection of one's learning," restricting, however, this function of the two types of debate to the "young beginner" (cf. MATILAL 1990, 15).

[67] Cf. *NS* 4.2.49: *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat.* This *sūtra* is quoted e.g., in *Nyāyakumudacandra (NKC)* p. 319,2 and in *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā (PM)* on *sūtra* 30, p. 63,21-22, in the latter with the variant reading *-paricaraṇavat.* Bhāsarvajña quotes only the first compound in *NBhū* p. 11,8.

[68] Cf. **Upāyahṛdaya (*UH)* 23b, retranslated into Sanskrit in TUCCI 1929b, Part I, Upāyahṛdaya, p. 3; see also KANG 1998, 38.

[69] TUCCI refers to Prabodh BAGCHI's *Le canon bouddhique en Chine*, Vol. I, Paris 1927, for an earlier translation by Buddhabhadra belonging to the Eastern Tsin dynasty (who died in 429 AD according to BAGCHI, p. 344) that has been lost (cf. TUCCI 1929b, xi), a piece of information obviously not taken up by Yuichi KAJIYAMA (cf. KAJIYAMA 1991, 107).

To sum up, for those early Naiyāyikas who were responsible for the insertion and phrasing of the two sequences 38-45 and 46-50 at the conclusion of *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2, the Nyāya is indeed a science concerning the Self due to its inclusion of Self-oriented yogic practices (cf. the keywords *samādhiviśeṣa, yoga* and *ātmasaṃskāra),* practices which are meaningful activities directly and indirectly aimed at achieving adequate knowledge and release through it. The foundational Nyāya activity of debate in its three accepted varieties, which forms a central topic and concern of the school, is not in contradiction to these activities and their purpose; on the contrary, the latter are vigorously supported by it in more than one way. The closeness to the orthodox tradition where the practice concerning the Self *(adhyātmavidhi)* is authoritatively anchored and cultivated is also warranted by the fact that the basic type of debate, the colloquy, is meant and envisioned to take place between persons who identify and comply with this tradition. Now, this justification of debate is at the same time a justification of its means and the intense occupation with them; their refinement eventually serves the achievement of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. A glance at the characterizations of the three types of debate provided earlier on in *NS* 1.2.1-3, in the portion of the *Nyāyasūtra* sheltering the typically Nyāya manual of debate, reveals that the various components of debate include the most important among the 16 relevant topics of the school. This applies especially to the characterization of the basic type of debate, there simply designated as *vāda*:

> "Debate consists in the taking up of a position and a counter-position in which proof and censure are [accomplished] through [the use of] the means valid cognition *(pramāṇa)* and reasoning *(tarka),* which is not in contradiction to established tenets, and which is endowed with the five parts [of proof]."[70]

At the heart of debate we thus find the means of valid cognition, four in number according to *NS* 1.1.3 and including verbal communication *(śabda)* which comprises tradition as the instruction of a trustworthy person[71]. Reference to tradition thus appears as an integral part of debate. Of equal relevance as the *pramāṇa*-s in the characterization of debate is reasoning *(tarka)*, which just as the *pramāṇa*-s and the five parts of proof constitutes a separate relevant topic of the Nyāya; it is character-

[70] Cf. *NS* 1.2.1: *pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ.*

[71] Cf. *NS* 1.1.7.

ized in the first book of the *Nyāyasūtra* in the following manner:

> "Reasoning consists in deliberation *(ūha)* with regard to a thing/event whose true nature is not [yet] known, aiming at [its] adequate knowledge on the basis of the appropriateness of reason(ing)s."[72]

The distinctive feature of reasoning as described here and further explained in Vātsyāyana's commentary on this *sūtra* is its hypothetical aspect implied in the phrase "deliberation on the basis of the appropriateness of reason(ing)s *(kāraṇopapattitaḥ ... ūhaḥ)* – thus the familiar translation of *tarka* in the Nyāya context as "hypothetical reasoning." That is, the reasoning person tries to find out if the individual reason(ing)s *(kāraṇa)*[73] which could be adduced under the assumption of certain contradictory, still to be proven properties of the thing or event in question, are appropriate or suitable in the light of their conformity with other basic assumptions. Reasoning thus examines reason(ing)s and in the course of this examination itself operates with reasons, in this way preparing the ground for the application of the means of valid cognition which alone effect the definitive ascertainment of the true nature of a thing or event.

As another important element of debate one can isolate the most crucial component of proof among its five "limbs," namely, the reason *(hetu)*.[74]

The central component *tarka,* together with the five parts of proof, is also assumed for the remaining two types of debate as characterized in the *Nyāyasūtra*.[75] This means that if the early Naiyāyikas found at work at the end of book four of the *Nyāyasūtra* claim that debate as such is a meaningful and important activity in company with other practices and objectives to be connected with an *adhyātmavidyā*, this claim certainly includes the activity of examination with reasons – which again

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[72] Cf. *NS* 1.1.40: *avijñātatattve 'rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattvajñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ.*

[73] On the usage of *kāraṇa* ("cause") in the sense of "reason(ing)," which is rather unusual in philosophical texts of the classical period, cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS)* 9.20: *hetur apadeśo liṅgaṃ nimittaṃ pramāṇaṃ kāraṇam ity anarthāntaram.*

[74] The *pramāṇa* "inference" functions with reasons according to the classical Nyāya after the time of the compilation of the *Nyāyasūtra*. In the *Nyāyasūtra* itself, however, there is insufficient evidence as to whether reasons are employed in inferences. Thus, the usage of inference, as a *pramāṇa,* in debate as characterized in *NS* 1.2.1 does not necessarily constitute another instance of the application of reasons in debate.

[75] Cf. *yathoktopapannaḥ* in *NS* 1.2.2 (characterizing *jalpa*), also to be applied to 1.2.3 *(vitaṇḍā)*.

distinguishes Kauṭilya's investigative science *(ānvīkṣikī)* (cf. above, p. 228), thus opening the way for Vātsyāyana's explicit identification of the Nyāya with the *ānvīkṣikī* while stressing at the same time its aspect as an *adhyātmavidyā.*

The position which I have attempted to uncover above for early Nyāya prior to Vātsyāyana can be compared to the attitude displayed in a group of chapters called Vārṣṇeyādhyātma[76] in the Mokṣadharma section of the *Mahābhārata*[77] which simply presuppose that examination with reasons is not in contradiction with the concern about the Self, and thus with an *adhyātmavidyā.* The chapters present a path characterized by examination and consideration leading to the elimination of faults as the cause for the liberation of the Self. Among the keywords in this context one first notices "understanding" *(buddhi),*[78] clearly preferred to "knowledge" *(vidyā).*[79] Furthermore, there occur a number of verbal derivatives of *pari-√īkṣ*[80] which evoke one of the three ways of the "proceeding of the teaching" *(śāstrapravṛtti)* evidenced according to Vātsyāyana in the *Nyāyasūtra,* namely, the third one which is called "examination" *(parīkṣā)*[81]. Even if the term *parīkṣā* itself in this specific methodological sense is not used in the *Nyāyasūtra*, other derivations of *pari-√īkṣ* figure in the characterization of two relevant topics in the first chapter of the first book[82] and testify to the fact that the notion of examination belongs to the older strata of the Nyāya school. This is corroborated by the frequent employment of derivatives of *pari-√īkṣ* in the section on debate in the *Carakasaṃhitā,* Vimānasthāna chapter 8, which, as already mentioned above (cf. p. 232f.), reflects an older tradition of debate in whose environ-

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[76] On Vāsudeva's affiliation to the Vṛṣṇi tribe belonging to the Yādava clan cf. BHANDARKAR 1982, 5; 11-12, and for a more extensive discussion MATSUBARA 1994, 60-61; 121-122.

[77] Chapters 203-210 are translated on the basis of the Bombay edition (B) (chapters 210-217) in DEUSSEN 1906, 244-270.

[78] Cf. *Mahābhārata (MBh)* 12.205.3; 26a (quoted in n. 88); 25b.

[79] Cf. *MBh* 12.205.33d.

[80] Cf. *MBh* 12.205.18ab: ... *samyak* ***parīkṣeta*** *doṣān ajñānasambhavān*; 24: *doṣāṇām evamādīnāṃ* ***parīkṣya*** *gurulāghavam / vimṛśed ātmasaṃsthānām ekaikam anusantatam //*; 206.20: *indriyāṇāṃ rajasy eva prabhavapralayāv ubhau /* ***parīkṣya*** *sañcared vidvān yathāvac chāstracakṣuṣā //.*

[81] On examination as a *śāstrapravṛtti* cf. PREISENDANZ 1994, 202-203; 692-693.

[82] Cf. *NS* 1.1.25 (on "illustration"): *parīkṣaka*, and 1.1.31 (on a set tenet): *aparīkṣita, parīkṣaṇa.*

ment the Nyāya tradition may have developed.[83] The affinity of the medical tradition with this older tradition of debate finds its expression in the strikingly copious usage of these derivatives also in those parts of the relevant chapter of the Vimānasthāna which surround the sections relating to debate proper.

Of terminological interest in the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma chapters are also the verbal derivates of *vi-√mṛś*[84] — consideration *(vimarśa)* functions essentially in the characterization of the relevant topic "doubt" in the first chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra*,[85] and is also referred to in this very section as preceding the decision, another relevant topic[86]. Moreover, the employment of reasons (*hetu*) appears in a decidedly positive light according to one Vārṣṇeyādhyātma half-verse which concludes that "due to intellectual vision *(jñānacakṣus)* so much (i.e., the preceding teaching) can be proclaimed as being endowed with reasons *(hetumat)*."[87] The use of the term *jñānacakṣus*, which I understand literally as "faculty of vision which is nothing but knowledge," implies that knowledge which provides matters with reasons is acknowledged to have the same status as the most powerful sensory perception. The following question of the disciple, asked of his instructing teacher, is related to the statement just translated; it carries with it strong associations with the characterization of the *ānvīkṣikī*'s procedure I have already adduced from the *Arthaśāstra* (cf. above, p. 228) because the disciple asks: "The strength and weakness of which [faults] should the wise consider with [their] understanding by means of reasons?"[88] The *ānvīkṣikī* for its part "investigates the strength and weakness of the [other three sciences] with reasons *(hetu)*."

In the first chapter of the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma we even encounter, in a macrocosmic context, methodical thinking *(nyāya)* on an equal standing with a group of well-

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[83] Cf. in the initial exposition concerning the practice of debate *(sambhāṣāvidhi)* § 18 (5 instances), and in the treatment of the topics *(pada)* relevant for debate §§ 37 (on the set tenets, 3 instances), 46 (on inquisitiveness, 2 instances; the topic *jijñāsā* itself is determined as *parīkṣā*), 52 (on critical inquiry, 1 instance), and 67 (concluding remarks, 1 instance).

[84] Cf. *MBh* 12.205.24cd: ***vimṛśed** ātmasaṃsthānām ekaikam anusantatam* (for the full verse cf. n. 80); cf. also 26b, quoted in n. 88.

[85] Cf. *NS* 1.1.23.

[86] Cf. *NS* 1.1.41.

[87] Cf. *MBh* 12.209.20ab: ***hetumac** chakyam ākhyātum etāvaj jñānacakṣuṣā.*

[88] Cf. *MBh* 12.205.26ab: *keṣāṃ* (scil. *doṣāṇāṃ) balābalaṃ **buddhyā hetubhir vimṛśed** budhaḥ?*

established sciences or branches of knowledge including the sacred tradition[89].[90] At the beginning of the *yuga* the great sages received the Veda-s together with the traditional narratives *(itihāsa)* which had been hidden at the end of the previous *yuga*. The Bhagavat knew the Veda-s, Bṛhaspati pronounced the "limbs of the Veda" *(vedāṅga)* and Bhārgava the teachings relating to government and politics *(nītiśāstra)*, Nārada the science of music *(gāndharvaveda)*, Bharadvāja archery *(dhanurgraha)*, Gārgya the deeds of gods and sages *(devarṣicarita)* and Kṛṣṇātreya medicine *(cikitsita)*. After this enumeration,[91] the text continues:

> "By all these [sages] individually, when engaged in debate *(vādin)*, many basic models/rules of methodical thinking *(nyāyatantrāṇi)* have been taught. What has been taught with reasons *(hetu)*, tradition *(āgama)* and good conduct *(sadācāra)*, that is resorted to."[92]

Taken in this way, that is, considering its immediate context, the verse thus implies that methodical thinking or reasoning on the part of the great sages accompanies the various sciences mentioned, being voiced or expressed specifically in the context of

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[89] To my knowledge, the classification presented here has not yet been included in studies of the brahmanical *vidyāsthāna*-s and related concepts.

[90] Cf. *MBh* 12.203.17-20.

[91] The Kumbhakonam edition of the *Mahābhārata* adds a verse in which Gautama, as the authority on the Nyāyatantra, Dvaipāyana, as having seized or apprehended Vedānta and Karmayoga, and Bhṛgu, responsible for the Śilpaśāstra, are mentioned. This is certainly an interpolation as the association of the name Gotama/Gautama with the Nyāya and its Sūtra occurs, to my knowledge, in the preserved Nyāya literature itself first in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (referring to the *gautamamata*), that is, only from the tenth century onwards; the name is connected implicitly with the Nyāya in the well-known satirical verse quoted e.g., *NBhū* p. 594,18-19, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi (NVTP)* p. 90,22-23 and *ŚKT* p. 15, § 84. Explicit, maybe earlier associations are found at a few places in the Purāṇic literature.

[92] Cf. *MBh* 12.203.20: *nyāyatantrāṇy anekāni tais tair uktāni vādibhiḥ / hetvāgamasadācārair yad uktaṃ tad upāsyate //*. This verse (corresponding to B 12.210.22) is quoted also in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 39, and referred to ibid., p. 7 (as proof for VIDYABHUSANA's claim that the Ānvīkṣikī was called Hetuśāstra or Hetuvidyā) and p. 42 (used by VIDYABHUSANA as evidence for the use of *nyāya* in the sense of logic in the *Mahābhārata*); cf. also VIDYABHUSANA's introduction p. xviii, to his translation of the *Nyāyasūtra* as published in VIDYABHUSANA 1930 (original introduction p. xv). Further references to this verse have been made in MISHRA 1966, 9, and THAKUR 1974, 404 (as evidence for the existence of different Nyāya schools and treatises; cf. also THAKUR 1975, 39 and 43 [with wrong reference in n. 8]). All authors mentioned follow readings not adopted in the critical edition; most relevant for differences in their interpretations are *hetvāgamasamācāraiḥ* and *yad yuktam* in the second part of the verse. HALBFASS obviously sees a continuation of the classification of "orthodox sciences" in the reference to the "various systems of logic," as he interprets *nyāyatantrāṇy anekāni* (cf. HALBFASS 1988, 539 [n. 60]; cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 225).

debate. Moreover, according to the second part of the verse employment of reasons goes hand in hand with reference to tradition and appropriate behaviour.

From the historical point of view I would certainly consider it mistaken to claim that in the Vārṣṇeyādhyātma chapters we encounter a developmental stage of the Nyāya preceding the stage represented by the final compilation of the *Nyāyasūtra*. However, one could characterize these materials as presented in the Mokṣadharma (1) – using Vātsyāyana's terminology – as reflecting an *adhyātmavidyā* which works as an investigative science *(ānvīkṣikī)* relying on examination and consideration by means of reasons, and (2) as belonging in this latter aspect to, or having drawn from, the intellectual milieu concerned with debate out of which the Nyāya developed as a philosophical school and of which further traces, touching upon other distinctive features of this milieu, remain in the Epic. Of more specific relevance in the present context, however, is the fact that apologetics do not figure in these philosophically and at the same time soteriologically and theologically oriented materials. I want to place them therefore at a time and in a climate when tradition did not yet feel seriously threatened by the employment of reasons and dialectical–eristic means vis-à-vis its specific topics, and those employing them did not think it absolutely necessary to counteract these feelings.

Nonetheless, elsewhere in the Epic, and not excluding the Mokṣadharma section, we do find some rather pronounced attacks against the use of reason and reasons in matters concerning the Self or the tradition as such, reflecting or even parallelling historically the extreme caution, suspicion and even hostility to be observed in general towards the free employment of reasoning in the Dharmaśāstra literature – in contradistinction to the attitude displayed in the Dharmasūtra-s. In the context of the present essay it suffices to adduce briefly two examples from the Mokṣadharma. The first one refers to reasoning under the term *tarka* discussed above as an essential activity and one of the relevant topics of the Nyāya (cf. p. 237f.). A secret teaching leading to the knowledge and understanding of the Self and meant for students of the Veda who have completed their training[93] should not be communicated to, among others, a person who has been "burnt," that is, destroyed completely, by the (or: a) teaching concerning reasoning *(tarkaśāstradagdha)*[94]. The second example attacks

[93] Cf. *MBh* 12.238.13 (= B 12.246.13): *rahasyaṃ sarvavedānām … ātmapratyayikaṃ śāstram idam … anuśāsanam*; 15cd (= B 16ab): *snātakānām idaṃ śāstram … anuśāsanam*; 18a-c (= B 19a-c): *idam … rahasyadharmam …* .

reasoning, referring to it with an array of related terms. God Indra, appearing in the form of a jackal, narrates in a warning tone to the wise, but deeply distressed Brahmin Kāśyapa how his own birth in the form of this despised, impure animal came about:

> "I was a little pandit, busy with reasons *(haituka)* [and] censuring the Veda, devoted to the useless investigating *(ānvīkṣikī)* science of reasoning *(tarkavidyā);* I made bombastic speeches about reasons *(hetu)* and spoke, equipped with reasons, in the assemblies. I abused twice-born [persons] and snapped [at them] in the context of [their] statements on *brahman*. I was a [heretical] denier *(nāstika)* and an all-doubting fool who deemed himself a scholar."[95]

The jackal adds that should he ever be reborn as a human being, he would wish to know only what one should and may know, and would avoid what is to be avoided.[96] Taking also into consideration the usage of the alarming term *nāstika*, the words of the jackal can be understood as a warning to the developing orthodox philosophical traditions with their growing emphasis on logic and increasing distance from the Veda, at their head the Nyāya.

The resulting precarious position of the Nyāya is articulated in the *Skandapurāṇa* in the form of a legend about Gotama, as the legendary founder of the Nyāya school is called there,[97] linked with the episode of the jackal in the Mokṣadharma and expressing the continuing ambivalent attitude of the orthodox tradition vis-à-vis reasoning in an almost anecdotical manner:

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[94] Cf. *MBh* 12.238.17c (= B 12.246.18c): *na tarkaśāstradagdhāya* ... (K_1: *na hetuvācamugdhāya*; D_1: *na tatkuśāstradaṇḍāya*; G_2: *na tacchāstravidagdhāya*). Cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 224; VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 37, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xiii); WINTERNITZ 1929, 7 (n. 18); THAKUR 1974, 403 and 1975, 42 (266 should be corrected to 246).

[95] Cf. *MBh* 12.173.45-47ab (= B 12.180.47-49ab):
aham āsaṃ paṇḍitako haituko[1] vedanindakaḥ[2] /
ānvīkṣikīṃ[3] tarkavidyām anurakto nirarthikām // 45 //
hetuvādān pravaditā[4] vaktā saṃsatsu hetumat /
ākroṣṭā cābhivaktā[5] ca brahmayajñeṣu[6] vai dvijān // 46 //
nāstikaḥ[7] sarvaśaṅkī[8] ca mūrkhaḥ paṇḍitamānikaḥ /

For the relevant variants and further details cf. the appendix relating to this sequence.

[96] Cf. *MBh* 12.173.49cd (= B 12.180.51cd): *jñeyajñātā bhaveyaṃ vai varjyavarjayitā tathā //.*

[97] On this name cf. above, n. 91.

> "Gotama, however, inasmuch as he destructively tore apart [matters] here and there with his reasoning, was finally cursed by the wise and reborn as a jackal. And [later] again he was favoured [by them, with the words]: Your teaching should be of assistance to the whole world [inasmuch as it proceeds] from revelation, the established tenets [of the tradition] and reasoning."[98]

In this way, within the foundations of Gotama's teaching after his rehabilitation reasoning *(tarka)* has been relegated to the last place.

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Appendix on *MBh* 12.173.45-47ab (= B 12.180.47-49ab):

aham āsaṃ paṇḍitako haituko[1] *vedanindakaḥ*[2] /
ānvīkṣikīṃ[3] *tarkavidyām anurakto nirarthikām* // 45 //
hetuvādān pravaditā[4] *vaktā saṃsatsu hetumat* /
ākroṣṭā cābhivaktā[5] *ca brahmayajñeṣu*[6] *vai dvijān* // 46 //
nāstikaḥ[7] *sarvaśaṅkī*[8] *ca mūrkhaḥ paṇḍitamānikaḥ* /

For the present purpose the following variants are of relevance:

[1] Ś$_1$, K$_{1,7}$, D$_{a4}$, G$_1$: *hetuko*

[2] K$_{2,4}$ read *vādanindakaḥ* ("censuring in debate"); G$_1$: *devanindakaḥ* ("censuring the gods"). Although with "censuring in debate" the connection between reasons and disputation would be addressed already at this point, this reading seems to presuppose a rather unusual type of dissolution of the compound; cf. also *Manusmṛti* (*MS*) 2.11:

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[98] Cf. *Skandapurāṇa*, Kālikākhaṇḍa 17, quoted and referred to in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 17; 37; 48, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xiii):

> *gotamaḥ svena tarkeṇa khaṇḍayaṃs tatra tatra hi* /
> *śapto 'tha munibhis tatra śārgālīṃ yonim ṛcchati* //
> *punaś cānugṛhīto 'sau śrutisiddhāntatarkataḥ* /
> *sarvalokopakārāya tava śāstraṃ bhaviṣyati* //

I have not yet succeeded to locate these verses in the editions of the *Skandapurāṇa* accessible to me. THAKUR (1975, 42 [n. 5]) reproduces the reference as Kālikākhaṇḍa 7 (cf., however, 41 [n. 4]: Kālikā 17).

yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ /
sa sādhubhir bahiḥkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ //

(on this verse see also Keith 1919, 12; Vidyabhusana 1920, 7 and 1930, xv [original introduction p. xiii]; Winternitz 1929, 4; Halbfass 1988, 279; Perry 1997, 450; quoted in *Bālakrīḍā [BK]* p. 89,20 on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.223).

[3] K_1: *anvīkṣikīṃ*; K_7, B_9, D_{a4}, D_{S1}: *ānvikṣikīṃ*; D_{S2}, D_7, T_1, $G_{3,6}$: *ānvīkṣakīṃ*; G_2: *ānvīkṣyaki*

[4] D_{a4}: *pra*titā*; D_{S2}: *pravadatā*

[5] $K_{1,7}$, V_1, $B_{0,7\text{-}9}$, $D_{a3,a4}$, D_7, T, $G_{1,2}$, $M_{1,5\text{-}7}$: *cāti*(K_1: *vi*)*vaktā ca*; D_4: *ca dvijātīnāṃ*; D_9: *cātivaktānāṃ*; G_3: *atikroṣṭātivaktā ca*

[6] I translate *brahmavākyeṣu* following B 12.180.48d and the reading found in $D_{n1,n4}$, D_s, D_2, M_1, C_n; D_7, T_1, $G_{2,3,6}$, $M_{6,7}$: *-vādyeṣu*; T_2, M_5: *-vadyeṣu*; G_1: *-vidyeṣu*; C_a: *jñeyeṣu*. Although *brahmavākya* is not attested in the dictionaries, the reading *-vādya* seems to support this choice and the interpretation of the situation as one comparable to the situation in which *brahmodya*-s are voiced, i.e., in which statements relating to *brahman* are pronounced for comment and discussion. *brahmayajñeṣu,* i.e., "in the context of [their] recitation and study of the *śruti,*" does not fit the context well because these activities are not necessarily performed publicly and in interaction with others.

[7] M_1: *nāstitaḥ*

[8] G_1: *pariśaṅkī*

12.173.45cd is quoted in Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (BSBh)* p. 80,8 on 2.2.17 (I am indebted for this reference to my colleague Roque Mesquita; cf. Mesquita 2000, 56 [n. 24]). On the entire sequence cf. also Dahlmann 1895, 219 and the references in Vidyabhusana 1920, 8; 36-37, and 1930, xv (original introduction p. xiii); Winternitz 1929, 4; Mishra 1957, 462 and 1966, 9; Thakur 1974, 404 and 1975, 42 (conflated with the anecdote about Gautama's birth as a jackal in the *Skandapurāṇa,* cf. above, p. 243f.); Halbfass 1988, 278-279; Perry 1997, 450.

Elements of the jackal's self-description are taken up in a speech on honourable and dishonourable persons by Bhīṣma directed to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Anuśāsanaparvan; the Veda-censuring Brahmin who is described there is equated with a dog in this context. Cf. *MBh* 13.37.11-14:

aprāmāṇyaṃ ca vedānāṃ śāstrāṇāṃ cātilaṅghanam /
sarvatra cānavasthānam etan nāśanam ātmanaḥ // 11 //
bhavet ***paṇḍitamānī*** *yo brāhmaṇo* ***vedanindakaḥ*** /
ānvīkṣikīṃ tarkavidyām anurakto nirarthikām // 12 //
hetuvādān *bruvan satsu vijetā* ***hetuvādikaḥ*** /
ākroṣṭā cātivaktā *ca brāhmaṇānāṃ sadaiva hi* // 13 //
*sarv**ābhiśaṅkī mūḍhaś** ca bālaḥ kaṭukavāg api* /
boddhavyas tādṛśas tāta naraśvānaṃ hi taṃ viduḥ // 14 //

13ab is interpreted differently in MESQUITA 2000, 126 (n. 215).

For the situation of 12.173.46ab cf. 14.87.1 (= B 14.85.27):

tasmin yajñe pravṛtte tu vāgmino hetuvādinaḥ[1] /
hetuvādān[2] *bahūn prāhuḥ*[3] *parasparajigīṣavaḥ* //

Relevant variants:

[1] M_2: *brahmavādinaḥ*
[2] D_1: *devavādān*
[3] D_{C1}: *hetuvādānukūlāt tu*

Cf. again VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 39 and 1930, xviii (original introduction p. xv); THAKUR 1974, 404. Cf. also *Rāmāyaṇa* (*R*) 1.13.14:

karmāntare tadā viprā hetuvādān bahūn api /
prāhuḥ suvāṅmino dhīrāḥ parasparajigīṣayā //

and *MBh* 2.33.3-4.

ABBREVIATIONS

AŚ — *Arthaśāstra,* as edited in R.P. KANGLE, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Part I, Bombay 1960.

ĀVD — *Āyurvedadīpikā*, in *The Caraka Saṃhitā of Agniveśa ... With the Āyurveda-Dīpikā Commentary of Cakrapāṇidatta*, ed. GANGASAHAYA PANDEYA, Varanasi 1983 (KSS 194, actually a remake of the 3rd Nirnaya Sagar Press edition, ed. JADAVAJI TRIKAMJI, Bombay 1941).

ĀSS — Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series.

*UH — **Upāyahṛdaya,* Taisho ed., Vol. 32, No. 1632.

KSS — Kashi Sanskrit Series.

CalSS — Calcutta Sanskrit Series.

CaS — *Carakasaṃhitā,* see ĀVD.

NKC — *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra, ed. MAHENDRA KUMAR, Vol. I, Bombay 1938.

NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya,* in *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana*, ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Vol. I: *Chapter I*, Darbhanga 1967.

NBh (CalSS) — *Nyāyabhāṣya*, in *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana*'s *Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti,* Vol. I, ed. TARANATHA NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA and AMARENDRAMOHAN TARKATIRTHA, Calcutta 1936; Vol. II, ed. AMARENDRAMOHAN TARKATIRTHA and HEMANTAKUMAR TARKATIRTHA, Calcutta 1944.

NBhū — *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, ed. YOGINDRANANDA, Varanasi 1968.

NM — *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇi – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor*, ed. K.S. VARADACHARYA, Vol. I, Mysore 1969.

NM(VSS) — *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,* ed. GANGADHARA SASTRI TAILANGA, Part 1, Benares 1895.

NMGBh — *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. NAGIN J. SHAH, Ahmedabad 1972.

NV — *Nyāyavārttika*, cf. *NBh.*

NVT — *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā,* cf. *NBh.*

NVTP — *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi,* cf. *NBh.*

NS — *Nyāyasūtra,* as edited in RUBEN 1928.

PM — *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra, ed. SUKHALALJI SANGHAVI, MAHENDRA KUMAR SASTRI and DALSUKH MALVANIA NYAYA TIRTHA, 2nd edition, Ahmedabad 1989.

B	Bombay edition of the *Mahābhārata*.
BK	*Bālakrīḍā*, in *The Yājñavalkyasmṛti with the Commentary Bālakrīda of Viśvarūpāchārya*, ed. T. GANAPATI SASTRI, Trivandrum 1921-1922.
BSBh	Madhva's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,* in *Sarvamula Granthāh*, Vol. 1: *Prasthānatrayi*, ed. SRI ANANDATHIRTHA BHAGAVATPADA, Udipi 1969.
MBh	*Mahābhārata*, ed. VISHNU S. SUKTHANKAR et al., Poona 1933-1966.
MS	*Manu-Smṛti with nine commentaries ...*, Vol. I, ed. JAYANTAKRISHNA HARIKRISHNA DAVE, Bombay 1972.
R	*The Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa*, Vol. 1, ed. G. H. BHATT, Baroda 1960.
VS	*Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, ed. MUNI SRI JAMBUVIJAYAJI, Baroda 1961.
VSS	Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
ŚKṬ	*Śrīkaṇṭhaṭippaṇakam by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya,* ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Calcutta 1986.
SDS	*Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava*, ed. VASUDEV SHASTRI ABHYANKAR, 3rd edition, Poona 1978.
SS	Sudhī Series.

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On the Expressions *chandaso āropema, āyataka gītassara, sarabhañña* and *ārṣa* as applied to the 'Word of the Buddha' (*buddhavacana*)

D. SEYFORT RUEGG, London

1. The Pali expressions *chandaso āropema* and *sakā nirutti*.

In a well-known and much-discussed passage of the *Cullavagga* in the Pali Vinaya we read the following passage in which several expressions are notoriously of uncertain denotation, or at least possessed of more than one possible meaning (v.33.1 = Vin ii.139; Nālandā ed., pp. 228-9):

> *tena kho pana samayena yameḷutekulā nāma bhikkhū dve bhātikā honti brāhmaṇajātikā kalyāṇavācā kalyāṇavākkaraṇā / te yena bhagavā ten' upasaṃkamiṃsu, upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdiṃsu / ekamantaṃ nisinnā kho te bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etad avocuṃ: etarahi bhante bhikkhū nānānāmā nānāgottā nānājaccā nānākulā pabbajitā / te sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanaṃ dūsenti / handa mayaṃ bhante buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemā ti / vigarahi buddho bhagavā: kathaṃ hi nāma tumhe moghapurisā evaṃ vakkhatha [...]/ n' etaṃ moghapurisā appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya pasannānaṃ vā bhiyyobhāvāya/ atha khv etaṃ moghapurisā appasannānaṃ ceva appasadāya pasannānaṃ ca ekaccānaṃ aññathattāyā ti / atha kho bhagavā te bhikkhū anekapariyāyena vigarahitvā [...] bhikkhūnaṃ tadanucchavikaṃ tadanulomikaṃ dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhū āmantesi: na bhikkhave buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropetabbaṃ / yo āropeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa / anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā buddhavacanaṃ pariyāpuṇituṃ ti /*

This rather enigmatic passage might be translated as follows:

> 'Then, further, there were at that time the monks called Yameḷutekula, a pair of brothers, of Brahman birth, whose voices were good, whose

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 283-306

vocal delivery (?) was good.[1] They approached the Lord and, having approached him, they saluted the Lord and seated themselves to one side. Being seated to one side, these monks addressed the Lord [saying]: "Now, Venerable Sir, monks of different name, clan, birth and family have entered religious life. They spoil (*dūsenti*) the Buddha's Word [each] through his own speech (*sakāya niruttiyā*).[2] Well then, Venerable Sir, let us put the Buddha's Word in *chandas* (*buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropema*)."[3] – The Lord admonished them [saying]: "Foolish men, how will you say thus [...]? This, foolish men, is not conducive to receptive serenity (*pasāda*) for those not receptively serene (*appasanna*) [toward the Buddha's Word], nor to [its] increase for those [already] receptively serene. Foolish men, this is indeed conducive to lack of receptive serenity precisely for those not receptively serene, and to alteration for some [already] receptively serene." Then, having admonished the monks in many ways [...], and having delivered to the monks an appropriate and fitting discourse on Dharma, the Lord spoke to the monks [saying]: "The Buddha's Word is not to be put (*āropetabba*) in *chandas*. One who might [so] put [it] (*āropeyya*) commits a *dukkaṭa*-offence. Monks, I prescribe that the Buddha's Word should be acquired (*pariyāpuṇitum*) in one's own speech (*sakāya niruttiyā*)."'[4]

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[1] S. LÉVI, 'Sur la récitation primitive des textes bouddhiques', *JA* 1915, p. 441, translated the expression *kalyāṇavākkaraṇa* by 'bel organe vocal'; F. EDGERTON, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit grammar* (*BHSG*), p. 1 n. 3, glossed this term by 'eloquent and mellifluous speech'; E. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* (Louvain, 1958), p. 610, translated by 'bonne prononciation'; and S. COLLINS, 'Some oral aspects of Pali literature', *IIJ* 35 (1992), p. 125, rendered the same expression in Vin iv.51 by 'pleasant voice'. The *CPD* renders *kalyāṇavākkaraṇa* by 'speaking, reciting pleasantly', and *kalyāṇavāca* by 'having a pleasant voice'. The *Samantapāsādikā* ascribed to Buddhaghosa (vi, p. 1214) glosses by *madhurasaddā*. (For Skt. *vākkarman*, see n. 14 below.)

[2] i.e. manner of speaking embracing intonation and/or pronunciation? For a discussion of the question whether *nirutti* here denotes speech or language, and how the *buddhavacana* might be 'spoilt', see below.

[3] This could perhaps be glossed as: 'Let us treat the Buddha's Word as *chandas*' (particularly if the ending *-o* corresponds to the Skt. genitive-ablative ending *-as* used predicatively). For further discussion see below.

[4] On the connotations and implications of the rendering 'in one's own speech' (cf. S. LÉVI, p. 441: 'façon de parler') see below.

It would seem that little more could be usefully said concerning this Vinaya passage which has been repeatedly discussed by scholars, in particular since Sylvain LÉVI's article entitled 'Sur la récitation primitive des textes bouddhiques' in the *Journal asiatique* of 1915 (pp. 401-47). Yet it appears worthwhile to return once more to this vexed topic. For lack of space no attempt will be made here further to explore the entire traditional Buddhist exegesis of this passages in the various sources; and for our present purpose it will suffice to refer back to previous studies on the subject, in particular to the important article 'Bombai' on Buddhist chanting published in the *Hōbōgirin* in 1929-30 (Fascicle i-ii, pp. 93-113), as well as (among more recent discussions) to Lin Li-kouangs's *L'aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi* (Paris, 1949), pp. 217-18, 222, 225, to E. LAMOTTE's treatment of the matter in his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* (Louvain, 1958), pp. 610-14, and to J. BROUGH's concise treatment of the issue in his article 'Sakāya niruttiyā' published in H. Bechert (ed.), *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung* (Göttingen, 1980), pp. 35-42.[5]

It is worth emphasizing first of all not only that the two brothers who, in the *Cullavagga* passage quoted, made the proposal rejected by the Buddha are said to have been Brahmans, but also that they are specifically described at the start as having good voices/speech and good vocal delivery (*vākkaraṇa*, on which see n. 1). The question is what precise significance may be attached to this particular description of the brothers in relation to the still quite enigmatic phrase *chandaso āropema*.

Concerning the verb *ārop-*, in the present context it may mean 'put', and more specifically 'couch', 'fix', 'settle' or 'formulate'.[6] It is true that *āropeti* has sometimes been rendered as 'translate'; and in cases where the object is *buddhavacana*, *bhāsā* or *tanti*, this meaning has been registered – beside 'transfer to' – in the *Critical Pali dictionary* ii (1967), p. 190. But it is not in fact clear that this assigned meaning is securely established for this verb: for *ārūḷha* in the same contexts, the *CPD* has indeed simply provided (p. 182) the meaning 'transfer, hand down to'.[7]

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[5] For additional bibliographic references, see below.

[6] cf. *tantiṃ āropeti* 'formuler textuellement', in H. SMITH, *Saddanīti* (Lund, 1949), p. 1131 (who compares *pālim ārūḷha* and *tantī ṭhapitā*). Compare n. 3 above.

[7] cf. H. SMITH, Saddanīti, p. 1131. It may also be observed by the way that the idea of the translation of a Buddhist 'Urkanon' from 'Old Ardhamāgadhī' into the languages in which the *buddhavacana* has actually been transmitted down to us was advocated in particular by H. LÜDERS, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons* (Berlin, 1954). Other scholars have, however, questioned the hypothesis that there ever existed any translation properly speaking of this putative original canon into the extant canons transmitted in Indo-Aryan languages (Pali, Gāndhārī,

As for *chandaso*, more than one interpretation of the word appears to be possible linguistically, and to yield an at least prima facie plausible sense. On the one hand the word - analysable as corresponding to Skt. *chandas-aḥ*(?), or possibly to *chandaḥ-śas* (?) - could be the Pali equivalent of Skt. *chandas* meaning 'metre, metrics, versification'. Such has in fact been the opinion of several modern scholars, and it is possible also to understand part of the Buddhist tradition in this manner. But on the other hand the word - analysed rather as *chanda-so* corresponding to Skt. *chanda-śas* - might be understood as the Pali reflex of Skt. *chanda* 'wish, desire'. This view has been taken by K. R. NORMAN.[8] In his already cited paper published in 1980 (in *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, pp. 35- 36), John BROUGH argued against this interpretation. In a recent book NORMAN has maintained his interpretation somewhat less emphatically, albeit without explicitly withdrawing it.[9] Concerning further possible meanings that have at one time or another been assigned by scholars to Pali *chandaso*, 'in(to) Vedic' - a meaning in fact attested for *chandasi* in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* - has been retained by several scholars including Jean FILLIOZAT, who rendered 'mise en vers à la manière védique', explaining the prescription ascribed to the Buddha as 'l'interdiction d'accomoder la parole du

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Sanskrit, etc.); and to this hypothesis there has been preferred the idea of the gradual, incremental and protracted process of linguistic transposition within the Indo-Aryan domain. See F. EDGERTON, *BHSG* § 1.17; and the present writer's review of LÜDERS' book in *JA* 1955, pp. 263-4. The idea of transposition (Übertragung, Umsetzung), as disinct from translation (Übersetzung), has been adopted for example by H. BECHERT in his contributions in *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung* (Göttingen, 1980), pp. 12, 26-29, 182.

Concerning the ontological status in Buddhist thought of the *buddhavacana,* see, e.g., Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* i.25. According to Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* on this (ed. Wogihara, p. 52), *buddhavacana* may be classified as belonging to the *rūpaskandha,* as a *vāgvijñapti* (cf. *AKBh* iv.3d) included in the *śabdāyatana* (according to the Sautrāntikas), or as belonging to the *saṃskāraskandha,* as a *cittaviprayukta* (i.e. *nāma-, pada-* and *vyañjana-kāya*), Ābhidhārmikas having recognized both classifications. For the link between *buddhavacana* and the *(artha-* and *nirukti-)pratisaṃvid*s, see *AKBh* vii.40b. According to *AKV* i.25 also, *buddhavacana* is either *kuśala* 'wholesome', as the expression of the Tathāgata in possession of a *kuśalacitta,* or *avyākṛta* 'indeterminate', as the expression of the Tathāgata in possession of an *avyākṛtacitta*. On the *buddhavacana* as *subhāṣita* 'well-formulated, well-formed', see the note in D. SEYFORT RUEGG, 'Some reflections on the place of philosophy in the study of Buddhism', *JIABS* 18 (1995), pp. 179- 80. And on *buddhavacana* as *pramāṇa* '(authoritative) standard', see, e.g., *AKBh* ix, p. 456. See also *Hōbōgirin* s.u. Butsugo.

[8] K. R. NORMAN, 'Middle Indo-Aryan studies VIII', *JOIB* 20 (1971) (= *Collected papers*, i, pp. 122-4) ('in accordance with their various desires'); id. 'Pali lexicographical studies VIII', *JPTS* 15 (1990), p. 146 ('willingly'), and 'Pali lexicographical studies IX', *JPTS* 16 (1992), p. 83 (= *Collected papers*, iv, p. 156; cf. v, p. 77).

[9] *A philological approach to Buddhism* (London, 1997), p. 60.

Bouddha à la mode d'une littérature religieusement rejetée par le bouddhisme ou simplement à la mode poétique, où la valeur technique des expressions canoniques peut être perdue de vue'.[10] But, in the last analysis, the meaning 'in(to) Vedic itself seems hardly suitable in the context of this *Cullavagga* passage (despite the weight apparently [?] lent it by the comment ascribed to Buddhaghosa). Nor does the related interpretation 'in(to) Sanskrit' appear appropriate even though it has had the support of some ancient and modern scholars.[11]

In 1949 Helmer SMITH offered another approach to the issue when he rendered *chandaso āropema* by 'astreindre ... à des règles orthoépiques de récitation' (*Saddanīti: La grammaire palie d'Aggavaṃsa,* iv [Lund, 1949], p. 1131). SMITH was followed by Louis RENOU, who translated by 'astreindre à des règles orthoépiques pour la récitation'. Renou then added: 'Cela doit viser l'intonation'.[12] Now the interpretations 'rule for pronunciation' and 'intonation' (the latter an understanding that seems to go back to LÉVI's article of 1915) would appear to be two distinct things. Moreover, RENOU did not specify just what 'intonation' was meant by him to cover.

Étienne LAMOTTE summed up his own view in his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* (1958), pp. 613- 14, by writing: 'Les Vinaya défendent aux bhikṣu de psalmodier [!] les Sūtra bouddhiques à la façon des Veda, en d'autres termes d'appliquer le *chandas* avec mélodies et intonations prolongées. En revanche, ils autorisent le recours aux dialectes locaux, en matière tant de prononciation que de vocabulaire.'

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Our question must now be: Of the various interpretations proposed which is

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[10] L. RENOU and J. FILLIOZAT, *L'Inde classique* (Paris-Hanoi, 1953), ii, § 1943.

[11] The comment on this passage in the *Samantapāsādikā* ascribed to Buddhaghosa (vi, p. 1214) curiously compares the 'Veda' (!) and may allude to Sanskrit (the passage is not perfectly clear): *chandaso āropemā ti: vedaṃ viya sakkatabhāsāya* [variant: *sakkaṭabhāsāya*] *vācanāmaggaṃ āropema*. Cf. the discussion in F. WELLER, 'Cullavagga V,33,1', *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus* 1 (1922), pp. 211-13; id., 'Zu Buddhaghosas Erklärung von Cullavagga V,33.1', *AM* 2 (1925), pp. 348-51; E. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* (Louvain, 1958), p. 610; K. R. NORMAN, 'Middle Indo-Aryan studies VIII', *Collected papers*, i, p. 123; and J. BROUGH, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

[12] See RENOU's communication to LAMOTTE quoted in the latter's *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 611: 'Cela doit vouloir dire (cf. HELMER SMITH, *Saddanīti*, p. 1131) astreindre à des règles orthoépiques pour la récitation, non pas exactement transposer en sanskrit védique, ce qui eût été une gageure irréalisable. Cela doit viser l'intonation.'

the more pertinent contextually, intertextually and, of course, linguistically and lexicographically?

The 'spoiling' (Pali *dūs-*) through *sakā nirutti* of *buddhavacana* alleged by the Brahman brothers in this *Cullavagga* could take place on the morphological and syntactic levels of language or dialect, on the level of (segmental) phonology, or on the prosodic and intonational levels of speech patterns and speech-delivery.[13]

It might be supposed that the Buddha's permission to make use of *sakā nirutti* pertained to an individual person's language/dialect (this having perhaps been the most widely accepted interpretation among modern scholars). But it would appear that an interpretation of the word *nirutti* that takes it to refer instead to an individual's manner of speaking - his speech pattern or vocal delivery (pronunciation or intonation) - could very well be more in keeping with the overall context of the *Cullavagga* passage in which it appears. Besides, Pali *nirutti* as well as the corresponding Skt. *nirukti* do not appear to be words usually used to denote a language or dialect.[14]

[13] Here and in the sequel, the terms 'prosody' and 'prosodic' are being used not in the sense of metrical prosody proper to versification but in the linguistic sense of melodic prosody embracing non-segmental features of language such as intonation. On linguistic prosodies, including intonation, see, e.g., O. DUCROT and T. TODOROV, *Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage* (Paris, 1972), pp. 228-39, and O. DUCROT and J.-M. SCHAEFFER, *Nouveau dictionnaire des sciences du langage* (Paris, 1995), pp. 340-57; E. COUPER-KUHLEN, *An introduction to English prosody* (Tübingen, 1986); and A. CRUTTENDEN, *Intonation* ([2]Cambridge, 1997), who draws a partial distinction between prosodies and suprasegmentals (pp. 2-4).

[14] In Majjhimanikāya iii.234 (*janapadaniruttiṃ nâbhiniveseyya samaññaṃ nâtidhaveyyā ti ... janapadaniruttiyā ca anabhiniveso ... samaññāya ca anatisāro*), examples given for *samaññā* are *pātī, pattaṃ, sarāvaṃ, poṇaṃ*, etc., all apparently words meaning 'bowl'. No example appears here specifically for *janapadanirutti*. The latter expression could mean 'country/regional speech' (i.e. pronunciation or intonation) or 'country/regional language'; a Tibetan equivalent would be *yul gyi skad*. Compare further the designation of the Buddha's speech or language as *māgadhikā nirutti* ('Magadhan pronunciation/accent'?), and his *māgadhikā bhāsā* that is considered as *sabhāvanirutti* and as *mūlabhāsā* 'natural/original speech or language(?)'; cf. H. SMITH, *Saddanīti*, p. 1131. The *Samantapāsādikā*'s explanation of *sakāya niruttiyā* in the *Cullavagga* passage is (vi, p. 1214): *sakāya niruttiyā ti ettha sakā nirutti nāma sammāsambuddhena vuttapakāro māgadhiko vohāro*. Still, in Buddhaghosa's *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* on the phrase *evam me sutam* at the beginning of the *Brahmajāla-sutta* of the Dīghanikāya, another view seems to be recognized (i, p. 27): ... *anekajjhāsayasamuṭṭhānaṃ atthavyañjanasampannaṃ ... sabbasattānaṃ sakasakabhāsānurūpato sotapatham āgacchantaṃ tassa bhagavato vacanaṃ ...* In D ii 63 and 68, *niruttipatha, adhivacanapatha* and *paññattipatha* are found together in an enumeration where *nirutti* appears to mean 'explanation' (cf. T. VETTER, 'Zwei schwierige Stellen im Mahānidānasutta', *WZKS* 38 [1994], p. 137 ff.); and in D i 202, *lokasamaññā, lokaniruttiyo, lokavohāra* and *lokapaññattiyo* appear together. In Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* i.25 (p. 52), as glosses of *tathāgatasya vāg vacanam*, there appear both *vākkarman* and *nirukti* alongside *vyāhāra* (~ *vyavahāra*), *vākpatha, vāgghoṣa, vāgvijñapti*, etc.

A historical objection against taking *nirutti* in this passage of the *Cullavagga* to refer to an individual's particular manner of speaking and vocal delivery rather than to his language/dialect might of course lie in the well-known fact that Buddhist traditions have indeed considered that the Buddha's Word can be spread and studied in languages other than the particular one in which he actually taught. But this fact can scarcely be regarded as excluding the interpretation under discussion here, with which it is not incompatible.[15]

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In view of the use in it of the epithets *kalyāṇavācā* and *kalyāṇavākkaraṇā,* it might be surmised that the whole of our *Cullavagga* passage somehow relates to elocution. But the problem arises as to whether elocution is here to be understood (like articulation and pronunciation) to bear in the first place on the phonetic realization of phonemic (segmental) constituents of language, or whether it concerns the vocal delivery of prosodic – i.e. non-phonemic (suprasegmental) – elements of speech (with which pronunciation and articulation may of course also be related).[16] If, as may indeed be the case judging from these two epithets of the Brahman brothers, it is to prosodic features of vocal delivery that reference was being made, it is difficult to see how orthoepy – i.e., basically, the correct pronunciation/articulation of phonemes and morphemes – as suggested by SMITH, and also by RENOU in his first explanation, could have been the main issue in this passage.

It is, therefore, worth considering whether RENOU's second interpretation 'intonation' (already envisaged by LÉVI) is not best in keeping with what was intended in the *Cullavagga* passage.[17] It would in fact seem that the word *chandaso* per

[15] We know of course that, unlike other Buddhist schools, the Theravādins of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia did study and spread the Buddha's Word in Pali rather than in translations into local languages.

[16] For the relation between prosody as a whole and articulation as one of its dimensions, see L. COUPER-KUHLEN, *op. cit.*, p. 5 f.

[17] The matter of the prosodic in relation to the phonemic has not been investigated by most scholars who have written since LAMOTTE, such as J. BROUGH, 'Sakāya niruttiyā', in: H. Bechert (ed.), *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, pp. 35-42; K. R. NORMAN, 'The dialects in which the Buddha preached', *ibid.*, pp. 61-71 (who takes *nirutti* to mean 'gloss'); O. VON HINÜBER, 'On the history of the name of the Pali language', in: *Beiträge zur Indienforschung* (Festschrift E, Waldschmidt, 1977) = *Selected papers*, i. p. 78 ('We should express the Word of the Buddha in [?] *chandas*'); id., 'Origin and varieties of Buddhist Sanskrit', in: C. Caillat (ed.),

tains here not to language/dialect, nor to any feature of segmental phonology and morphology, nor even to the pronunciation/articulation of phonemes, but, rather, to the prosodic feature that is constituted by the vocal delivery – the manner of speaking or intonation – of a text in a more or less sung (i.e. melodic/melopoeic) form.[18]

To the extent that a view of the matter that involves prosodic features ('intonation') in recitation is actually attested within Buddhist exegetical tradition, it seems to have been deliberately set aside by many scholars at least partly on the ground that it is found only in (supposedly) later school traditions, namely in those of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins (including I-ching, the translator into Chinese of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins). The Mūlasarvāstivādins and Sarvāstivādins have, moreover, even been suspected of having self-servingly substituted this particular interpretation for the one concerning the (supposed) prohibition of the Sanskritization of the *buddhavacana* just because they transmitted their canons in Sanskrit.[19] Although they are, of course, not altogether impossible intrinsically, I must confess to being sceptical of such arguments that seem more based on preconceived hypotheses and on speculation than on foundations of firm textual, contextual and intertextual evidence (fragmentary though the latter admittedly is in this matter).

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Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes (Paris, 1989), p. 351 (evidently taking *chandas* to refer to Vedic Sanskrit); S. COLLINS, 'Notes on some oral aspects of Pali literature', *IIJ* 35 (1992), p. 125 with notes 30-32 (on *sarabhañña* in contrast with ordinary *dhammakathā*, and on *āyataka gītassara* 'drawn-out singing voice'); and K. R. NORMAN, *A philological approach to Buddhism*, pp. 60, 109, 157. The question of prosodies and the sub-phonemic has, however, been touched on by J. C. WRIGHT, '*Sithila, kathā* and other current topics in Pali', *BSOAS* 59 (1996), pp. 44-66 (WRIGHT understands *nirutti* as 'articulation' [p. 51], but in connexion with 'Vedic-based phonological material', and he renders *chandaso* by 'as we wish' [p. 52]). The views of Chi Hsien-lin/Ji Xianlin/Dschi Hiän-lin have been outlined by T. H. BARRETT, 'Ji Xianlin on the original language of Buddhism', *IIJ* 35 (1992), pp. 83-93. – The matter of *nirvacana* and *nirukta* in Indian semantics is a separate one, on which see recently E. KAHRS, *Indian semantic analysis* (Cambridge, 1998).

[18] In India, such melodic recitation is a feature of the vocal delivery of a metrical text.

[19] See Lin Li-kouang, *L'aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi* (Paris, 1949), p. 221; but cf. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 39. Having preferred on p. 37 of his article the interpretation 'in Sanskrit' for *chandaso*, BROUGH discussed on p. 38 the meaning of the expression *chanda-veda* presupposed by the Chinese transscription, putting aside not only the suggestion that *chandaso* refers to metre (p. 37) but also the suggestion that it relates to singing of the *sāmaveda* (p. 38). In his article 'Sur la récitation primitive des textes bouddhiques', *JA* 1915, pp. 445-7, S. LÉVI seemed, however, to accept that *chandaso* (and its congeners in other Vinayas) may indeed be close in meaning to accent – i.e. to a prosody – even though he has himself rendered *chandaso* by 'en vers' (p. 441).

It might be objected that the interpretation according to which *chandaso āropema* refers not to a translation from one language into another (such as from Middle Indo-Aryan into either Sanskrit or 'Vedic') but to a fixed and regulated form of vocal delivery - even to a sort of prosodic and, perhaps, orthoepic *diaskeuasis* of the *buddhavacana* - is inconsistent with the mention, in the same *Cullavagga* passage, of the expression *sakāya niruttiyā*. But this is not necessarily so. Indeed, contrary to the widely accepted interpretation mentioned above, the Pali word *nirutti* could probably just as well refer to a manner of speaking - to an individual's vocal delivery - as to language/dialect (i.e. to a linguistic entity translatable into another language/dialect). Indeed, as mentioned above (p. 288), Pali *nirutti* as well as Skt. *nirukti* do not appear to have been usual words to designate a language or dialect. And there would seem to exist no cogent evidence for rendering *āropema* by 'translate' rather than by 'fix', etc. (see p. 285).

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2. *Āyataka gītassara* versus *sarabhañña*.

Vis-à-vis the epithets *kalyāṇavācā* and *kalyāṇavākkaraṇā* which the passage just discussed has attached to the two Brahman brothers who made bold to propose to the Buddha that his Word should be put in *chandas*, there is found in the same *Cullavagga* a second very significant passage that seems germane to the present considerations, but which has often been omitted from recent discussions of our first passage from the *Cullavagga*.

This second passage reads as follows (v.3.1-2 = Vin ii.108; Nālandā ed., pp. 196-7):

> *tena kho pana samayena chabbaggiyā bhikkhū āyatakena gītassarena dhammaṃ gāyanti / manussā ujjhāyanti khiyyanti vipācenti: yath' eva mayaṃ gāyāma evam ev' ime samaṇā sakyaputtiyā āyatakena gītassarena dhammaṃ gāyantī ti / assosuṃ kho bhikkhū tesaṃ manussānaṃ ujjhāyantānaṃ khiyyantānaṃ vipācentānaṃ / ye te bhikkhū appicchā santuṭṭhā lajjino kukkuccakā sikkhākāmā te ujjhāyanti khiyyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma chabbaggiyā bhikkhū āyatakena gītassarena dhammaṃ gāyissantī ti / atha kho te bhikkhū bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ / [...] dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhū āmantesi / pañc' ime bhikkhave ādīnavā āyatakena gītassarena dhammaṃ gāyantassa: attanā pi*

tasmiṃ sare sārajjati, pare pi tasmiṃ sare sārajjanti, gahapatikā pi ujjhāyanti, sarakuttiṃ pi nikāmayamānassa samādhissa bhaṅgo hoti, pacchimā janatā diṭṭhānugatiṃ āpajjati / ime kho bhikkhave pañca ādīnavā āyatakena gītassarena dhammaṃ gāyantassa / na bhikkhave āyatakena gītassarena dhammo gāyitabbo / yo gāyeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ti / tena kho pana samayena bhikkhū sarabhaññe kukkuccāyanti/ bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ / anujānāmi bhikkhave sarabhaññaṃ ti /

'Then, further, at that time the monks belonging to the Group of Six[20] were singing the Dharma with a protracted (drawn-out) melodic sound.[21] [At this ordinary lay] people took offence, were vexed and irritated,[22] [saying]: "Even as we sing, just so do the Śramaṇas, the sons of the Śākya, sing the Dharma with a protracted melodic sound." The monks then attended to the people who took offence and were vexed and irritated. And those monks who had few desires, were contented and modest, scrupulous and desirous of training, [themselves] took offence, were vexed and irritated [saying]: "How then will the monks belonging to the Group of Six sing the Dharma with a protracted melodic sound?" Then the monks apprised the Lord [...]. And the Lord, having delivered a Dharma-discourse, addressed them [saying]: "Five, monks, are the faults when one sings the Dharma with a protracted melodic sound [namely]:

(i) the [singer] himself becomes enamoured of this sound;[23]
(ii) others also become enamoured of this sound;

[20] On the *chabbagiya/ṣaḍvārgika* (Tib. *drug sde*) monks, see H. OLDENBERG, *Buddha*, pp. 428-32; G. P. MALALASEKERA, *Dictionary of Pali proper names*, s.u. *chabbagiya*; *Mahāvyutpatti* (ed. Ishihama and Fukuda) nos. 9402-7; and EDGERTON's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary* (*BHSD*) s.u. *ṣaḍvārgika*. These six monks are to be distinguished from the group of six heterodox teachers (*mu stegs [can gyi] ston pa drug [po]*) also known to the Vinaya and listed in the *Mahāvyutpatti* nos. 3542-7, on whom see C. VOGEL, *The teachings of the six heretics* (Wiesbaden, 1970).

[21] In *JA* 1915, pp. 428-9, S. LÉVI translated this as 'chante avec l'intonation prolongée du chant'.

[22] In the *Divyāvadāna*, p. 492, the parallel expressions are: *avadhyāyanti dhriyanti vivācayanti*. See *BHSD* s.uu. *kṣīyati, dhriyati, vivācayati/vipācayati*, along with *Mahāvyutpatti* nos. 9292-4. For Pali *khiyyanti* there is the variant *khīyanti* in the PTS ed.

[23] In *JA* 1915, p. 429, LÉVI has translated by 'intonation'.

(iii) householders take offence;

(iv) concentration is broken when one takes pleasure in the timbre of voice (? *sarakutti*);[24]

(v) people in [their] wake take to following what was [thus] experienced [?].

These indeed, monks, are the five faults when one sings the Dharma with a protracted melodic sound. The Dharma is not to be sung with a protracted melodic sound. One who would [thus] sing [it] commits a *dukkaṭa*-offence." - Then, further, the monks felt remorse [also] for recitative chanting/psalmody (*sarabhañña*). They apprised the Lord of this matter. [He then declared]: "Monks, I prescribe *sarabhañña*".'[25]

The significance of the third fault in this fivefold list of the second *Cullavagga* passage is clarified by a parallel textual pericope found in the Aṅguttaranikāya. There we read (A ii.251):

gahapatikā pi ujjhāyanti: 'yatheva mayaṃ gāyāma evam ev' ime [v.l.: *kho] samaṇā sakya puttiyā gāyanti'*

'The householders took offence [saying]: "Even as we sing, just so do the Śramaṇas, the sons of the Śākya, sing".'

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[24] On Skt. *svaragupti* (for **svara-kḷpti* ?) see *BHSD* s.u. *gupti*. In the Sanskrit *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (ed. Waldschmidt § 23.4) this term corresponds to *sara* in the Pali and to *dbyaṅs kyi ṅa ro* in the Tibetan version. For the translation 'timbre', see LÉVI, *JA* 1915, p. 429; earlier in the same article, at p. 404 n. 1, LÉVI justified his translation of *guptikā* (Tib. *ṅa ro*) by 'timbre'. G. SCHOPEN has translated *svaragupti* (corresponding to Tib. *skad kyi gdaṅ rag* [?]) by 'measured intonation'; see his article 'Marking time in Buddhist monasteries', in: P. Harrison et al. (ed.), *Sūryacandrāya: Essays in honour of Akira Yuyama* (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1998), pp. 165, 174.

[25] In *JA* 1915, pp. 428-32 and p. 435, S. LÉVI rendered *sarabhañña* (Skt. *svarabhāṇya*) by 'mélopée', specifying 'une mélopée qui évite les défauts de l'*āyataka*', and explaining *s(v)ara* as 'une mélopée fortement marquée, qui tendait de plus en plus vers le chant'. LÉVI opposed melody and plain-chant at p. 433.

Concerning the term *sarabhañña* used here to denote a recitative/chant/psalmody, a variant attested elsewhere is *sarabhāṇa*. The word for chanter is *sarabhāṇaka*, which is found in Vin ii.300 together with the expressions *āgatāgama, dhammadhara, vinayadhara, mātikādhara*, and alongside the epithets *lajji(n), kukkuccaka* and *sikkhākāma* which we have already found in Vin. ii.108. On *sarabhañña* and the *sarabhāṇaka*, see further S. COLLINS, *IIJ* 35 (1992), p. 125. It may be recalled that *brahmassara* (Skt. *brahmasvara*) is one of the 32 *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa*s characterizing the Buddha; see e.g. D ii 211, 227; *Mahāvyutpatti*; and *Hōbōgirin* s. uu. Bonnon *'brahmasvara'*, Button *'buddhaśabda'*, and Butsugo *'buddhavacana'*.

Thus, whilst in our second *Cullavagga* passage five grounds for disapproval merely formed part of the introductory narrative to the entire textual pericope concerning the Buddha's prohibition against singing the *buddhavacana* with a protracted melodic sound, in the parallel Aṅguttaranikāya passage it is the third ground that is adduced as the specific cause for householders' taking offence at the singing of the Dharma by monks of the Group of Six. But in both versions the objection raised against the mode of delivering the Dharma in *āyataka gītassara* appears to be the fact that it coincides with the practice of ordinary people or householder laymen (*manussā, gahapatikā*).

The enumeration in the second *Cullavagga* passage of the disadvantages that result from singing the Dharma with a protracted melodic sound, and in particular the reference to singing interrupting concentration, may be compared, moreover, with the references in the first *Cullavagga* passage to the danger to *pasāda* 'receptive serenity' occasioned by the distraction due to fixing the *buddhavacana* in *chandas*, a procedure which, as suggested above, may refer to vocal delivery characterized by certain prosodic features including singing.

In the light of this second *Cullavagga* passage, it would appear that if, indeed, the Pali word *nirutti* figuring in our first *Cullavagga* passage does denote 'speech' in the sense of manner of speaking/vocal delivery (rather than a language/dialect), there also existed the important restriction to the effect that the prescribed forms of vocal delivery of *buddhavacana* excluded the one characterized by *āyataka gītassara* 'protracted melodic sound' (as distinct from *sarabhañña*) that was reminiscent of – and perhaps inspired by – certain types of Vedic speech-delivery (such as that of the Sāmaveda).[26]

Now the question arises as to why householders (*gahapatika*) are reported to have taken offence and become vexed and irritated at the sung delivery of the Dharma. In the passages of the *Cullavagga* and the Aṅguttaranikāya cited above, this question has, unfortunately, not been answered with any great degree of clarity. What householders objected to could perhaps have been just a popular, and secular, style of delivery in song. Or their objection might have been more specifically directed against any singing that was reminiscent of the ritual singing of *sāman*s in

[26] On the adoption by Buddhists of practices of the *tīrthikas* (Tib. *mu stegs pa*), however, see G. SCHOPEN, 'Marking time in Buddhist monasteries', in: *Sūryacandrāya: Essays in honour of Akira Yuyama*, p. 174.

the Vedic tradition of the Brahmans. The former view of the matter appears to be the one assumed by much of Buddhist exegetical tradition. But the understanding found among the Mūlasarvāstivadins (and reported by I-ching) concerns very specifically Brahmanical singing of ritual *sāmans*, and the hand gestures used when singing, in Vedic tradition.[27]

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In his 'Sur la récitation primitive des textes bouddhiques' of 1915, S. LÉVI has considered both our passages drawn from the *Cullavagga*, and his concluding comment (pp. 445-6) clearly shows that he linked their contents.[28] Nevertheless, in his article (p. 441), LÉVI translated the crucial expression *chandaso āropema* of our first *Cullavagga* passage as 'faire passer en vers', and this rendering suggests that he may not in fact have accepted an especially close connexion between the two issues discussed in the present paper. Thus, on the one hand, LÉVI's rendering of *chandaso* did not yield a contextual interpretation of our first *Cullavagga* passage that was wholly coherent with the expression *sakāya niruttiyā*, which he rendered by 'façon de parler' (p. 441). (In another context, on pp. 444-5, LÉVI did, however, render *chandaso* differently, by 'accent', i.e. a prosody.) On the other hand, LÉVI's discussion did not provide a fully coherent and explicit intertextual account of the relationship between the themes found in our two *Cullavagga* passages, even though he evidently did perceive their linkage. The same applies also to some more recent treatments of the matter, though H. SMITH and L. RENOU have most certainly contributed explanations that significantly advanced our understanding of the matter. It has therefore appeared worthwhile to consider the matter once more here.

To recapitulate: the enigmatic word *chandaso* will mean neither 'in(to) Vedic' or 'in(to) Sanskrit' on the one side, nor 'as desired' on the other side. Nor does it pertain basically to metre and versification. Rather, it will relate to prosodic ('suprasegmental') features of language (such as are found, inter alia but of course not exclusively, in singing). If this interpretation is correct, the word may be understood to mean in effect 'in the melodic form of sung vocal delivery'. And the prohibition

[27] See *Hōbōgirin* s.u. Bombai, p. 94; and LIN LI-KOUANG, *L'aide mémoire*, pp. 221-2.

[28] *JA* 1915, p. 445 (speaking of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivadins): 'le *chandas* est alors, sous une autre désignation, l'*āyataka gītassara* proscrit par le Culla Vagga, V,3 ...'

against putting the Buddha's Word in *chandaso* could (pace BROUGH[29]) amount to forbidding its recitation in the way Brahmans did the Sāmaveda. (Needless to say, also, the *buddhavacana* was not to be subjected either to the special modes of recitation recorded for the Padapāṭha and Kramapāṭha of the Veda.) Thus, in at least an important section of Buddhist tradition, the form of recitative/chant reserved for *buddhavacana* would indeed set the latter apart from the melodic delivery used in singing with which, for Buddhists, the Brahmanical chanting of the Vedas, and in particular of the Sāmaveda, was apparently comparable.[30] The interpretation of *chandas* and *āyataka gītassara* evoked here converges in part with the Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition followed by I-ching. It also picks up several elements of S. LÉVI's discussion in his article of 1915, and also the second interpretation suggested in the 1950s by L. RENOU (as quoted by LAMOTTE). It is of course none the worse for this: in so far as some recent treatments of the issue have lost sight of valuable earlier efforts toward explanation, they have tended to oversimplify what is a complex, and very intriguing, set of problems. Within the frame of the present discussion, *nirutti* in the expression *sakāya niruttiyā* found in the same passage of the *Cullavagga* would denote 'speech', that is, an individual's manner of speaking or vocal delivery (rather than either 'language/dialect' or 'explanation, exegesis, gloss'[31]). It of course remains a well-attested fact that Buddhist tradition (with the exception notably of that of the Theravādins[32]) maintained an open attitude toward not only the transposition of the *buddhavacana* from one Indo-Aryan language into another, more or less closely related, form of Indo-Aryan but also toward its translation into genetically unrelated languages such as Chinese and Tibetan.

Briefly stated, then, what our first *Cullavagga* passage would appear to refer to, under the designation of *chandas*, as being prohibited was a prosodically fixed and regulated form of melodic vocal delivery. This had been advocated by two Brahman brothers described in the same place as possessing pleasing, mellifluous voices. (For those who advocated it, the fixing and regulation thus envisaged might even have gone so far as to involve some thorough-going *diaskeuasis* of the *buddhavacana*.)

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[29] See his article 'Sakāya Niruttiyā', p. 38.

[30] See S. LÉVI, *JA* 1915, pp. 438-9; and *Hōbōgirin* s.u. Bombai, p. 94.

[31] As suggested by K. R. NORMAN (see n. 17 above). On articulation in relation to prosody, see n. 16 above.

[32] Compare the observations by Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA, 'Übersetzbarkeit und Unübersetzbarkeit', in: *Dharmadūta: Mélanges offerts au Vénérable Thích Huyên-Vi* (Paris, 1997), pp. 183-93.

And it would pertain to prosodies characterized by the protracted, drawn-out, melodic sounds referred to as *āyataka gītassara* in our second *Cullavagga* passage. By contrast, what was prescribed in our first *Cullavagga* passage on *sakā nirutti* would seem to be a form of recitative/chant delivered by each reciter in his own individual manner of speaking (on the two levels of the vocalization of segmental phonemes and non-segmental prosodies). The recitative/chant authorized was the *sarabhañña* of our second *Cullavagga* passage. Contextually, this view of a fairly complex linguistic situation with regard to the vocal delivery of *buddhavacana* appears to provide a coherent account of the two enigmatic expressions *chandaso āropema* and *sakāya niruttiyā* within our first *Cullavagga* passage. Intertextually, it appears to yield an interpretation of this passage that is consistent with our second *Cullavagga* passage, and with the related Aṅguttaranikāya passage also quoted above. It seems besides to be in keeping with what we know of the history of Buddhism as well as of the lexicography and history of both Pali and Sanskrit.

3. The Sanskrit grammatical term *ārṣa*.

The term *ārṣa(vidhi)* is, by contrast, an expression relating directly to grammar (morphology and phonology). It has been employed by Kumāralāta in his Sanskrit grammar - the *Kaumāralāta* - to designate linguistic forms in the language of the Ṛṣi = Buddha - in other words in the *buddhavacana* - regarded as grammatically irregular in relation to standard Sanskrit.[33] This work, the only recorded Buddhist source for this special grammatical usage of the word, was first studied in 1930 by Heinrich LÜDERS in his monograph entitled *Kātantra und Kaumāralāta* (*SPAW*, Phil.-historische Klasse, 1930/xxv, pp. 504, 507-09, 514, 530, 532 = *Philologica indica*, pp. 683, 686-9, 693, 712, 714), and again in his article 'Nachträge zum Kaumāralāta' (*ZDMG* 94 [1940], pp. 27, 29). The term *ārṣa* has also been employed by the Jainas to denote the language which, according to them, was used by the Jina (i.e. Mahāvīra), namely the Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit.[34]

[33] On the Sautrāntika master Kumāralāta, see J. KATO, 'Notes sur les deux maîtres bouddhiques Kumāralāta et Śrīlāta', in: *Indianisme et bouddhisme* (Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte, Louvain, 1980), pp. 197-213, who places (p. 213) this master before Harivarman, Śrīlāta, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra; and B. DESSEIN, 'History and Sarvāstivāda', in: C. Willemen et al. (ed.), *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist scholasticism* (Leiden, 1998), p. 107.

[34] See R. PISCHEL, *Grammatik der Prākrit-Sprachen* (Straßburg, 1900) § 16. See also O. VON HINÜBER, *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick* (Vienna, 1986) § 45, and 'Origin and varieties of Buddhist Sanskrit', in: C. Caillat (ed.), *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, p. 361.

Elsewhere in Buddhist usage, *ārṣa* may more broadly denote what belongs to the Ṛṣi = Buddha in general, inclusive of language.[35] The *ārṣa* has even been identified with *māgadha*, that is, evidently, with 'Māgadhī', a traditional designation of Pali which was employed as their canonical language by the school tradition of the Theras.[36] *Ārṣa* has, moreover, been connected with *chandas* by Ratnākaraśānti in his *Muktāvalī* on the *Hevajratantra*;[37] this linkage between the two is all the more remarkable in view of the controversy discussed in the first part of this article on putting *buddhavacana* in *chandas* (a controversy about which Ratnākaraśānti could hardly have been totally unaware).

Because of the scantiness of the surviving fragments of the *Kaumāralata* grammar it is not possible to determine exactly the full range of linguistic forms and usages that could be covered by the grammatical term *ārṣa(vidhi)*.[38]

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[35] In the *Mahāvyutpatti* (no. 1437) the lexeme *ārṣa* = Tib. *gtsug lag* is listed alongside *āgama, pravacana, śāsana*, and *sūtrānta.* Compare Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* i.3-4 (ed. Wogihara, p. 7), where the form *ārṣokti* is found linked with the hermeneutical etymological procedure (*nairuktavidhāna*) for the word Bhagavant interpreted as 'he who has destroyed (*bhagnavān*) the defilements (*kleśa*) etc.'. – For *ārṣā gāthā* (Tib. *gtsug lag gi tshigs su bcad pa*), see G. SCHOPEN, 'Marking time in Buddhist monasteries', in: *Sūryacandrāya: Essays in honour of Akira Yuyama*, pp. 165-6 ('verse of the Sage'). In his *BHSD*, s.u., EDGERTON considered *ārṣa* a 'corruption for *ārṣabha*'; but it must in fact be a *vṛddhi* derivative from *ṛṣi* 'sage', meaning 'of (relating to) the Sage = Buddha'.

For meanings and connotations of Skt. *ārṣa* = Tib. *gtsug lag*, see D. SEYFORT RUEGG, *Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel dans la pensée bouddhique de l'Inde et du Tibet* (Paris, 1995), pp. 40, 137; and M. HAHN, 'Apropos the term *gtsug lag*', in: H. Krasser et al. (ed.), *Tibetan studies* (Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vienna, 1997), pp. 347-54.

[36] See Vajragarbha, *Ṣaṭsāhasrikākhyā hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā* (ed. Sferra), i. 72ab: *yac cârṣaṃ pravadanti bhikṣujanās tan māgadhaṃ nâparaṃ vākyaṃ yat piṭakatraye bhagavatas tat {sthāvarīye mate}* (Tib., P, f. 5b-6a: *gtsug lag dge sloṅ skye bo la gsuṅs gaṅ de'aṅ ma ga dha skad gžan pa min/ /sde snod gsum du bcom ldan 'das kyis gsuṅs gaṅ de ni gnas brtan sde pa'i lugs su ste//*). This passage refers explicitly to the Sthaviras (= Theras). See further *op. cit.* i.73cd: *sêyaṃ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇā bhagavato 'py evaṃ mayêtyādinā bhāṣârṣêti nigadyate budhaj{a}nair āścaryam etan na kim//* (Tib.: *gsuṅ dbyaṅs de 'di'aṅ legs sbyar mtshan ñid can gyis evaṃ mayā žes sogs kyis/ /gtsug lag bad ces smra 'di skye bo mkhas pa rnams kyis mtshar bya cis ma yin//*). – For the 'Continental Sthaviras', see P. SKILLING, 'The *Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtaviniścaya* of Daśabalaśrīmitra', *BSR* 4/1 (1987), pp. 3-23; id., 'Theravādin literature in Tibetan translation', *JPTS* 19 (1993), pp. 69-201.

[37] Fol. 4b-5a: *ārṣaṃ hi vacanaṃ sarvam eva cchando, na vā kiṃcid api*. The Sanskrit text of this passage, which concerns *liṅgavyatyaya* in *chandas*, I owe to Dr H. ISAACSON, who is editing the work in which it is found.

[38] An objection against any potential use of the term *ārṣa* as a generalized designation for the non-standard Sanskrit of certain Buddhist canonical texts having been raised recently by Professor

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As is well known, in his two invaluable works on the subject of 1953 – *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit grammar* (*BHSG*) and *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary* (*BHSD*) – Franklin EDGERTON adopted the single and uniform appellation of 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit' (BHS) to designate the language of a very large number of diverse Buddhist texts. These included ones belonging to the canons of various Śrāvakayānist schools/orders (*nikāya*) – the Sarvāstivādins, Mūlasarvāstivādins, (Lokottaravādin) Mahāsāṃghikas, etc. – as well as to the Mahāyāna. EDGERTON described this language – which he held to be a 'real language' that was not 'a modification or corruption of any other dialect on record' (*BHSG* § 1.111) – as being of what he termed 'Middle Indic origin' (*BHSG* § 1.33). And, like several other scholars, he evidently supposed that there existed a (single?) Prakrit 'chiefly underlying BHS' (*BHSG* § 1.78). But, unlike LÜDERS and some other writers on the subject, EDGERTON did not, finally, consider that this was an 'eastern dialect' of Middle Indo-Aryan, and he indeed explicitly stated that he knew of 'no way of localizing it geo-graphically at all' (*BHSG* § 1.79; see also § 1.105).[39]

In his Class I of BHS EDGERTON placed works such as the *Mahāvastu* of the Lokottaravādin-Mahāsāṃghika order that are decidedly 'hybrid' (i.e.Prakritic or

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Heinz BECHERT in his article on this word in the 'Nachträge' to the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* 8 (Göttingen, 1994), I should try in the following to clarify the issues as I see them.

In *SWTF* 8 (1994), p. 598a, Professor BECHERT writes *inter alia*: 'Außerdem ist der Terminus *ārṣa* keineswegs nur eine spezielle Bez[eichnung] des buddh. Sanskrit, sondern ist auch als Bez. der als Sprache des Mahāvīra angesehenen Ardhamāgadhī geläufig; deshalb [!] kann diese nicht eindeutige Bez. kaum als "a more convenient term than Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit" für die Bezeichnung der Sprache der alten buddhistischen Texte angesehen werden'. This criticism concerns observations made by the present writer in several places. In a review of Heinrich LÜDERS, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons* (Berlin, 1954) in *JA* 1955, p. 262, the present writer alluded very briefly to the use, in Kumāralāta's grammar, of the term *ārṣa(vidhi)* to designate a grammatically irregular linguistic forms found in the Buddhist canon. Since then, the matter has been touched on in the present writer's review of the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* in *JAOS* 106 (1986), p. 597, and in the paper 'Allusiveness und obliqueness in Buddhist texts' in: C. Caillat (ed.), *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, pp. 295-6. A reply to the cited objection by Professor BECHERT was given in *JAOS* 118 (1998), pp. 553-4.

[39] Concerning what he called in *BHSG* § 1.78-105 the 'underlying Prakrit' of these texts, EDGERTON alluded to the (eastern) Prakrit supposed by LÜDERS to have been the original language of the Buddhist pre/proto-canon ('Urkanon'); and in § 1.79 EDGERTON made it clear that he did not accept this hypothesis.

Middle Indo-Aryan) in the phonology, morphology and syntax of both their verses and prose, notwithstanding the (quasi) Sanskritic (or Sanskritizing) garb in which they are clothed in the manuscripts. Of this class of texts EDGERTON wrote (*BHSG*, p. xxv): 'In these works, the prose parts are thoroughly hybridized, showing as many Middle-Indicisms as the verses' (see also *BHSG* § 1.36). Buddhist tradition has indeed itself held that the language of the Mahāsāṃghika canon was Prakrit; but, actually, the Bāmiyān fragment of the Vinaya ascribed to the Mahāsāṃghika school is in quite 'standard' Sanskrit.[40]

At the same time EDGERTON attached the designation of BHS also to linguistically quite disparate texts characterized in their phonology and morphology by forms of language much closer to standard Sanskrit. These texts he placed either in his Class II – containing *inter alia* the (Mūlasarvāstivādin) *Udānavarga* and the (Sarvāstivādin cum Mahāyānist) *Lalitavistara*, as well as Mahāyānist Sūtras such as the *Kāśyapaparivarta,* the *Samādhirājasūtra* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, where (ac-

[40] In his article 'Particular features of the language of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins and their importance for the early Buddhist tradition', in: H. Bechert (ed.), *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, p. 82, G. ROTH has given as his opinion that 'whereas some portions of the above-mentioned Ma[hāsāṃghika]-L[okottaravādin] texts read like Sanskrit and others include more Prakrit forms together with Sanskrit, PDh [i.e. the 'Patna *Dharmapada/Dhammapada*'] is more Prakritic and more homogeneous in the character of the language, which is closely related to Pali. Here we can study the first attempts to hang a Sanskrit mantle around a Prakrit text, through which the Middle Indic character of the language is clearly shining.' On the 'Patna *Dharmapada/Dhammapada*', see now M. CONE's work in *JPTS* 13 [1989], pp. 101-217; K. MIZUNO, 'A study of the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit *Dharmapada*', *Bukkyō kenkyū* 19 (1990); and P. SKILLING, 'On the school-affiliation of the "Patna *Dhammapada*"', *JPTS* 23 (1997), pp. 83-122, who (along with MIZUNO) proposes a connexion with the Sammatīya/Sāmmitīya school (rather than with the Mahāsāṃghikas). – With regard to the language of the *Bhikṣuṇīvinaya* of the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṃghikas, in his edition (Patna, 1970), pp. lv-lvi, ROTH has written of 'a language in the transitional state from Prakrit to Sanskrit'. In his 'Notes' on Roth's edition of this work in *Buddhist studies in honour of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht, 1974), p. 64, J. W. DE JONG observed: 'The *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* and other Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya texts are written in a Prakrit which has been submitted to a process of Sanskritization'. – For the connexion with the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṃghikas of a Prakritic canonical text quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* xxvi.2 (p. 548), and also in his *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* vi.44 where it is linked with the Pūrvaśailas, see P. HARRISON, 'Sanskrit fragments of a Lokottaravādin tradition', in: L. HERCUS et al. (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (J.W. de Jong Felicitation Volume, Canberra, 1982), pp. 225-7.

On the language of the Bāmiyān fragment attributed to the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya, and which is quite 'standard' and different from that of the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṃghikas' *Mahāvastu*, etc., see S. LÉVI, 'Notes sur les manuscrits sanscrits provenant de Bamiyan (Afghanistan) et de Gilgit (Cachemire)', *JA* 1932 i, p. 2; and J. FILLIOZAT, *TP* 43 (1954), p. 152. The quotation from the canon of the Bhadanta-Mahāsāṃghikas in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* v.22 (ed. Pradhan, pp. 293-4) is also in Sanskrit.

cording to him) it is chiefly the verses that are markedly 'hybrid' –, or in his Class III – containing the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya and *Divyāvadāna*, Mahāyānist Sūtras such as the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, and even non-canonical works such as Ārya-Śūra's *Jātakamālā* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* section of the *Yogācarabhūmi*, where (still according to him) verses as well as prose are largely Sanskritized and which, therefore, EDGERTON himself described as non-standard, or 'hybrid', chiefly with respect to their vocabulary (*BHSG*, p. xxv).[41]

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EDGERTON's conception of the linguistic status of the language he baptized 'BHS' and his distribution of the texts in this language in three Classes may not appear entirely clear to at least some of us.

Thus, texts that in fact reflect quite distinct linguistic stages intermediate, or transitional, between Old and Middle Indo-Aryan – and which belong, besides, to quite distinct school traditions and to various literary genres – have all been without distinction described by EDGERTON as BHS, which he seems to have regarded as in effect constituting a single language despite the not insignificant linguistic differences which he correctly observed between these texts.

Moreover, in the case of his Classes II and III of BHS (as opposed to the linguistic situation for his Class I), EDGERTON's criterion for classification proves to

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[41] At *BHSG*, p. xxv, EDGERTON specified with regard to his Class II that 'the vocabulary, at least, stamps even the prose as BHS'; and with regard to his Class III he wrote that 'vocabulary is the clearest evidence that they [i.e. the texts he assigned to this class] belong to the BHS tradition'. Following the lead thus given by EDGERTON, one writer described as 'BHS' a number of items in the vocabulary of Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* and *Saundarananda*; see Y. HAKEDA, 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit words in Aśvaghoṣa's Kāvyas', *JAOS* 82 (1962), pp. 150-63 (p. 151: 'The rather free use of non-Sanskrit words is one of the characteristics of Aśvaghoṣa's Sanskrit'). Aśvaghoṣa has, it is true, occasionally employed in addition a Middle Indo-Aryan syntactic construction. On Aśvaghoṣa's Sanskrit see O. VON HINÜBER, 'Origin and varieties of Buddhist Sanskrit', in: *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, pp. 347-9; and R. SALOMON, 'The Buddhist Sanskrit of Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda', *WZKSA* 30 (1986), p. 39 ff.

It is to be observed, furthermore, that certain features in Dharmarakṣa's Chinese translation of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* appear to reflect a fairly Prakritic original (or, at least, a Prakritic form of recitation/pronunciation, presumably by Dharmarakṣa, at the time of this work's translation into Chinese). See S. KARASHIMA, *The textual study of the Chinese versions of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra in the light of the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions* (Tokyo, 1992), where the possibility has been considered that this Prakrit was Gāndhārī. See also D. BOUCHER, 'Gāndhārī and the early Chinese Buddhist translations reconsidered: the case of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*', *JAOS* 118 (1998), pp. 471-506.

be no longer basically grammatical but, rather, lexical (and religious), the use of a typically Buddhist vocabulary having been considered by him to be the main criterion for describing the language of a text belonging to these two classes as 'BHS'. This shift from an essentially grammatical (i.e. phonological, morphological and, eventually, syntactic) criterion to a mainly religio-lexical standard for linguistic classification is striking. It is also somewhat disturbing, for it can easily result in blurring the contours of Indo-Aryan linguistic history.

Nor does EDGERTON's description clearly enough differentiate between a more or less Prakritic – but still Sanskritizing or quasi Sanskritic – BHS and a properly speaking Buddhist Sanskrit, that is, a Sanskrit that is more or less regular in terms of the standard Sanskrit of the literary category or genre to which the text attesting it belongs – e.g. (non-canonical) narrative stories, scholastic exposition, etc. – which, according to EDGERTON, would be describable as BHS mainly in terms of vocabulary rather than in terms of grammar.

Also requiring more investigation than EDGERTON was able to accord it in his analyses is – as has been pointed out by Brough and others – the important problem of the extent to which BHS is a genuinely linguistic phenomenon (which it must surely be at least in part) and not just one of orthographic practice reflecting scribal conventions (which it may also be on occasion; see the references in n. 41 above and n. 42 below).

Still another problem of linguistic nomenclature attaching to EDGERTON's term 'BHS' has been pointed to chiefly by some Indian scholars who have argued that what is linguistically hybrid cannot, strictly speaking, be termed 'Sanskrit' and, conversely, that what is properly speaking Sanskrit cannot be described as linguistically 'hybrid'. According to this argument, the denomination 'Hybrid Sanskrit' is nothing short of self-contradictory. Whilst of course made from the standpoint of a traditional Indian view of Sanskrit as codified, e.g., in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, this objection is not totally without historical-linguistic pertinence. Nevertheless, taken by itself, it is certainly not conclusive inasmuch as many other compositions – literary as well as epigraphical – usually considered to be in Sanskrit do in fact betray Prakritic features.[42]

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[42] This is not the place to pursue the matter of non-Old Indo-Aryan elements in Vedic, of the somewhat mixed language of the Sanskrit Epic (cf. V. RAGHAVAN, 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit', *IL* 16 [1955], pp. 313-22, etc.), or of the language of some Sanskrit inscriptions (cf. Th. DAMSTEEGT, *Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit* [Leiden, 1978]). Cf. recently Th. OBERLIES, 'Pali, Pāṇini and

In sum, to attach the single and uniform designation 'BHS' to such very disparate, and linguistically heterogeneous, texts as EDGERTON has done for his Classes I through III of BHS appears problematic. And it is potentially confusing for the purposes of precise linguistic classification since some of the texts in question appear to be practically Prakrit (i.e. Middle Indo-Aryan) dressed in quasi Sanskritic (or Sanskritizing) garb whilst others are (more or less) Sanskrit (i.e. Old Indo-Aryan) with Prakritic influence in varying degrees.

What nomenclature should then be adopted? Should we simply give up forthwith the denomination BHS even though it has become a familiar one in use over many decades? Alternatively, should this name be restricted to EDGERTON's Class I, namely the *Mahāvastu* and some other comparable works of the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṃghika (Madhyoddeśika) tradition that are largely Prakritic, with the designation 'Buddhist Sanskrit' being perhaps reserved for EDGERTON's Classes II and III?[43] Or, on the contrary, should the name BHS be confined exclusively to EDGERTON's Classes II and III in view of the fact that, often, his Class I is linguistically Prakritic despite the Sanskritizing garb in which its texts are dressed up?

At all events, to attach the name 'Buddhist Hybrid *Sanskrit*' to EDGERTON's Class I[44] would seem somewhat anomalous given the fact that, according both to EDGERTON himself and to much scholarly opinion since, the language of the works in question is basically Middle Indo-Aryan (Prakrit) and not Old Indo-Aryan (Sanskrit) at all. And to apply the denomination 'Buddhist *Hybrid* Sanskrit' to EDGERTON's Class III is surely no less strange, for in their grammar the works included by him in this category are barely 'hybrid'. The name BHS might then seem best suited to describing the language of texts in Edgerton's Class II, which are both Sanskritic - or at least highly Sanskritizing (specially in their prose) - and at the same time linguistically hybrid to a very considerable degree (specially in their verses).

"popular" Sanskrit', *JPTS* 23 (1997), pp. 1-26.
EDGERTON's *BHSG* and *BHSD* were the subject of several important reviews and discussions. Amongst the most substantial were J. BROUGH, 'The language of the Buddhist texts', *BSOAS* 16 (1954), pp. 351-75 (which raises the fundamental question as to the degree to which BHS is a matter of language or of orthography reflecting certain scribal practices and conventions [Nevari, etc.]), and J. FILLIOZAT's review in *TP* 43 (1954), pp. 147-71. Important too is C. REGAMEY, 'Randbemerkungen zur Sprache und Textüberlieferung des *Kāraṇḍavyūha*', in: *Asiatica* (Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig, 1954), pp. 514-27.

[43] See O. VON HINÜBER, *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, pp. 341, 353.

[44] See O. von Hinüber, *loc. cit.*

As a name for the language of several linguistically discrete and historically distinct categories of texts, the designation 'BHS' is thus problematic: it clearly raises a number of questions, and some awkward problems of linguistic nomenclature and taxonomy.

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Let us now return to the Kaumāralāta grammar's term *ārṣa(vidhi)*. However uncertain for us (as noted above) the precise range of application of this term was, this linguistically neutral designation has at least the not inconsiderable advantage of neither obscuring nor prejudging – and possibly pre-empting – the crucial question as to whether the language of a given 'hybrid' text was basically and essentially Old Indo-Aryan or Middle Indo-Aryan in its phonology and morphology (and in its syntax).

As for the objection, recently brought by H. Bechert, that as a term Ārṣa is ambiguous ('nicht eindeutig', *SWTF*, p. 598a) because it has been employed also by Jainas, it does not constitute a decisive argument against using this term: by this measure the appellation Sanskrit is no doubt even more 'ambiguous' since it covers forms of language used not only by Buddhists and Jainas but also by Hindus. Moreover, were we really to feel obliged to give up making use in a Buddhist context of an Indian term actually used in the Buddhist tradition simply because it has also been employed, in a more or less similar sense, by Jainas (or by Hindus), we would also have to abandon the use of a large part of Buddhist vocabulary (including such a fundamental term as *karman*). Besides, wherever increased precision is required, it is of course always possible to specify either Buddhist or Jaina Ārṣa.[45]

The appellation 'Ārṣa' does, however, have its limitations. One is that, so far, as a properly grammatical term it has evidently been found attested only in the scanty available fragments of the *Kaumāralāta* grammar edited by LÜDERS between 1930 and 1940 to refer to non-standard linguistic forms. A more significant restriction is that in a Buddhist context, by virtue of its etymology, the term Ārṣa could apply, by extension of the attested usage, only to the Buddha's Word (*buddhavacana*) containing such non-standard items – in other words to texts considered canonical – to the exclusion of non-canonical works also written in a form of 'hybrid' Sanskrit.

[45] See the review of *SWTF* 8 by the present writer in *JAOS* 118 (1998), pp. 553-4.

A further important point to be kept in mind is the fact that the texts in question in their full range are not entirely homogeneous linguistically. Nor do their respective linguistic forms necessarily represent chronologically sequential, linear, stages in the historical development of a single language, whether we call it Ārṣa or BHS. (As noted above, p. 299-300, under the name BHS EDGERTON has subsumed the linguistic usages of more than one Buddhist school or order [*nikāya*] and chronologically discrete literary stages within a school or order, as well as more than one literary category or genre favoured in Buddhist literature.)[46]

Concluding remarks.

It will of course be clear that the above observations do not finally and conclusively resolve all the questions that present themselves in relation to the complex linguistic and historical issues raised: the evidence of our primary sources is frequently too incomplete, and often it is also too ambiguous, for this to be possible. But it is hoped that this review of some problems pertaining to the linguistic form imparted to *buddhavacana* will not, therefore, be perceived as mere *piṣṭapeṣaṇa* or a réchauffé (as John BROUGH humorously - and unduly self-deprecatingly - subtitled his article of 1980: 'cauld kale het' or *crambe repetita*).

We have seen that several passages in Buddhist literature contain important, and highly interesting, material concerning the view Buddhists have themselves entertained of the grammatical and prosodic form of the Buddha's Word (*buddhavacana*). Several of the expressions that have been considered here - *chandaso āropema, āyataka gītassara* and *sarabhañña* - pertain to ways of reciting the *buddhavacana*. All three of these expressions appear to be most easily and coherently understandable, contextually and intertextually, if they are taken to refer to what may

[46] Significant problems attach also to older denominations for this language: 'Mixed Sanskrit' (because of its lack of precision), and 'Gāthā-dialect' or 'Gāthā-language' (which is too narrow because this kind of language is found also outside verse).

As for the name 'Buddhist Sanskrit', in principle it can refer not only to BHS but also to a grammatically more or less regular Sanskrit as used in Buddhist texts, or even to a standard Sanskrit used by Buddhist authors that contains lexical items belonging to Buddhism (see above on the case of Aśvaghoṣa). But it is questionable whether a form of language can be precisely and usefully defined linguistically on the basis mainly, or exclusively, of a religious criterion - unless of course the expression 'Buddhist Sanskrit' is to be understood in a purely sociolinguistic (rather than a properly religious-philosophical) way. H. SMITH has used the expression 'sanskrit appoximatif' in his *Analecta rhythmica* (Studia Orientalia, ed. Soc. Orientalis Fennica, 19/7 [1954]), p. 3. (Th. OBERLIES has recently adopted the appellation 'Popular' Sanskrit in his article 'Pali, Pāṇini and "Popular" Sanskrit', *JPTS* 23 (1997), pp. 1-26.)

be called prosodic, 'suprasegmental', features of speech-delivery (rather than in terms of the segmental, i.e. phonemic and morphological, levels of language relevant to the translation - or even to the transposition - of the *buddhavacana* from one language/dialect into another). In keeping with the prosodic interpretation, the problematic expression *sakāya niruttiyā* seems more intelligible in its context if it is understood to refer to the individual reciter's manner of speaking (on both the prosodic and phonological levels). In other words, it is perhaps best understood as meaning not 'in one's own language/dialect' but, instead, 'in one's own speech' (i.e. vocal delivery).

As for the last term considered here - *ārṣa* –, in its grammatical usage attested in the *Kaumāralāta* grammar it refers to irregular forms found in *buddhavacana.* Thus, of the four expressions considered in this paper, *ārṣa* is the only one that appears directly and exclusively to concern grammatical (phonemic and morphological) features of the Buddha's Word. By extension, it may prove useful as a designation for the non-standard Sanskrit of certain Buddhist canonical texts.

Vyākarana and Śulba in the light of Newton's Lesson

FRITS STAAL

1. Introduction

In a recent contribution, Minoru HARA has described the transition from *tapas* as a source of power, fit to be compared to money or electricity, to *tapas* as the conquest of anger and lust through patience and contentment (HARA 1997).[1] He has shown us that this is a development from an ancient magical to a new ethical concept. My aim is to sketch a parallel transition starting from the magical but leading into another direction: the scientific. I shall also muse on international scholarship, a domain in which my respected colleague and good friend Professor HARA continues to play an important role.

Science and scholarship are international and that pertains not only to the scholars who are its subjects, but also to its objects as I shall try to show. As for subjects, nationalist expressions of scholarship are now relatively rare. One such venue was the publication by the *Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in India* of two volumes entitled *German Scholars in India* (Bombay 1976). On the final page of that publication, one German defends another against the criticism of a Dutchman. It is an apt conclusion but not equally relevant to the scholars themselves since their agree- and disagreements are not based on nationality. As it happens, one is Albrecht WEZLER, one of the editors of the present volume, another is Hartmut SCHARFE and the third, as the reader may already have guessed, is the writer of these lines. I shall briefly pursue our exchange in the spirit of what WEZLER (1997:636) has called "persistent intellectual curiosity" and "sportsmanlike competition," but my chief aim is to use it to study the question: how to account for the birth of a science?

Our discussion started with the famous passage in Patañjali's *M* I 39.10-11: *pramāṇabhūta ācāryo darbhapavitrapāṇiḥ śucāv avakāśe prāṅmukha upaviśya mahatā yatnena sūtraṃ praṇayati sma* which WEZLER (1976:378) translates: "the teacher as

[1] I am grateful to Harold Arnold for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 349-374

an authority, having sat down in a clean place, facing East, with *darbha*-grass in his hand, used to compose the sūtra with great effort" (for an old-time transformational analysis of this sentence, see STAAL 1967:53-4). SCHARFE (1961:10) had translated that same passage in which "der Grammatiker selbst ... verfertigt sein Werk in magischer Haltung und mit größter Konzentration" and wrote about "der magische Zweck der Grammatik Pāṇinis." My review had claimed that Western scholars tend to discern "magico-religious backgrounds in everything Indian" adding: "That the teacher of grammar sits with *darbha*-grass facing East is a culturally determined phenomenon which can be compared with the fact that some Western Professors put on their gown before they teach and interrupt their work at definite times to drink coffee or tea. All this has nothing to do with the views they propound" (STAAL 1963: 256). Louis RENOU (French!) wrote about my review that it "demonstrated certain insufficiencies in this work, which is otherwise very remarkable" and quoted my conclusion: "as a scholar and thinker on the one hand, and as a forerunner of innumerable themes of Indian scientific thought on the other hand, Patañjali could be compared in the West with no less a thinker than Aristotle" (RENOU 1969:498). RENOU did not refer to the *pramāṇabhūta*-passage and WEZLER did not mention my conclusion but he pointed out, quite rightly, that the "magico-religious background" is not imagined by Western scholars but is often there. He added: "When STAAL distrusts Patañjali and prefers to view Pāṇini as an Oxford professor, the *onus probandi* is on him" and: "If there is any cultural phenomenon in the West that can be compared with the way Pāṇini composed his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* according to Patañjali, it is the way in which the Pope under the conditions of infallibility (= *pramāṇabhūta*) proclaims something *ex cathedra*." His final conclusion:

> Pāṇini's achievements as an analytical grammarian and linguist are not diminished through the fact that he, like all his contemporaries, happened to be also deeply impressed by magico-religious ideas, no more so than the progress achieved in Western logic becomes less impressive because of the fact that some modern logicians have believed in Platonic ideas. The admiration Pāṇini commands will in no way suffer; it remains as great as before.

Quite so! That's why I wrote about the magico-religious background of *ācāryas* and professors in general "All of this has nothing to do with the views they propound."

I am less happy about the comparison of *P* with an infallible Pope which is incompatible with KIELHORN's carefully formulated conclusion:

> Nowhere does Patañjali explain Pāṇini for the simple purpose of explanation, but like a second Kātyāyana, he enquires whether anything has been omitted in the *sūtras* that should have been stated, or whether in them there is anything superfluous, faulty, or at all liable to objection (KIELHORN 1876:56).

It is not always easy to decide whether Patañjali concurs with or differs from Kātyāyana in his criticism of *P* (JOSHI 1968:ii); but the critical spirit of Patanjali has never been in doubt. THIEME writes of Patañjali's "critical disapproval" of a rule of *P* (THIEME 1937:340 = 1984:548), RENOU places Patañjali in a "second periode créative, qui complète la période de Pāṇini et parfois s'y oppose" (RENOU 1940:22) and OJIHARA draws attention to another *M* phrase that compares the cutting of the *dīkṣita*'s hair (*nivartana*) with *P*'s shortening of sūtras: "Patañjali a badiné avec ce mot dans son sens particulier au rituel védique" (OJIHARA 1978:233). Surely, no one who belongs to his fold would even think of criticizing, disapproving, opposing or joking in relation to the Pope.

I have no further comment on the term *pramāṇabhūta* which means "authoritative" and is used, but not exclusively, of infallible beings, e.g., the Buddha (HATTORI 1968:73-4). True, Bertrand RUSSELL made fun of Kurt GÖDEL for apparently believing that "an eternal **not** was laid up in heaven, where virtuous logicians might hope to meet it hereafter" (STAAL 1988:45); and yet, isn't modern science (despite behaviorist remnants) thoroughly Platonic in spirit because humans possess innate ideas which scientists as well as children replace by successive theories that are the product of earlier theories and new evidence (cf. STAAL 1999a:39-40)? Patañjali examined *P*'s rules in a kindred spirit: he accepted them if he felt they were *true* of the language described. The *onus probandi* I shall try to bear in the present essay is not that *P* is like an Oxford Professor (which I did not write) or that his holding *darbha* is like putting on a gown (which I did claim), but that, in the large majority of cases, *P*, Patañjali and the Śulbasūtrakāras were seeking (which does not necessarily imply: finding) truth and pursuing *science*. Is that more than a matter of words?

2. Vedic and other sciences

I use the English word *science* because I am writing in English for otherwise I would prefer Dutch *wetenschap*, French *science*, German *Wissenschaft* or Japanese *gaku*, which refer to all forms of systematic knowledge of ourselves and of the universe in which we live. Paradoxically, only English usage reflects the nineteenth-century Ger-

man distinction between *Natur-* and *Kulturwissenschaften* which continues to dominate modern academia. Whatever its worth, we should not impose such a distinction upon ancient India.

The science of *śulba* is a science even in the English sense of the term. Our little discussion reached that domain because Axel MICHAELS' 1978 book *Beweisverfahren in der vedischen Sakralgeometrie,* after misrepresenting my words, joins the conclusion on which we all seem to agree, viz., that: "eine magische Zielsetzung und die Herausbildung einer theoretischen Wissenschaft nicht von vorneherein als einander disjunktive Sachbereiche anzusehen sind" (MICHAELS 1978:97).

Quite so! But if that is true, then why does MICHAELS confound his readership by using the term *Sakralgeometrie* in the main title of his book which is, as the subtitle has it, a *Beitrag zur Enstehungsgeschichte von Wissenschaft*? I shall not pursue this particular problem but turn to the general question underlying our discussion: what precisely is that "sacred" *magico-religious* background? The general answer is not in doubt: it is the *Vedic* background of these sciences. Mere facts such as facing East or holding *darbha* grass are, at best, its symptoms.

The term *science* must be used cross-culturally for otherwise the "grand onward-going movement of the science of all humanity" (NEEDHAM 1976:xxvi-xxvii) would not exist. But contents or boundaries of specific sciences, such as *vyākaraṇa*, *śulba*, grammar, linguistics or geometry, let alone of subdisciplines such as phonetics and phonology, need not be the same across civilizations. And yet the same or similar distinctions may operate. Indian grammarians did not explicitly distinguish between the two levels of description but distinguished features that were later called phonetic and phonological as Deshpande (1997a:47-59) has shown.

What we call sciences and much else were put together in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.2 (FADDEGON 1926) and elsewhere (HORSCH 1966: Part I). The later Vedāṅgas provided a first classification by singling out six auxiliary sciences, meant to facilitate the study of Vedic mantras or rites: *kalpa* (ritual), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), chandas (prosody), *śikṣā* (phonetics and pronunciation), *nirukta* (etymology) and *jyotiṣā* (astronomy). *Sūtra* composition originated among the first three (RENOU 1963: 166-9). The four middle ones deal with features of linguistics, but the terminology was not fixed. The *RT* is a *Prat* of the *SV* but was called *chandogānāṃ vyākaraṇam* (SURYA KANTA 1970:33). "A hard-and-fast line between Śikṣā and Prātiśākhya is not possible" (VARMA 1961:12). The *Nidānasūtra* of the *SV* is allied with *kalpa* as well

as *Prat* (GONDA 1977:536-7). I shall concentrate on *Prat* and *P* and refer to them together as "*Vyākaraṇa* linguistics." The *Jyotiṣā-vedāṅga* of Lagadha contains some mathematics, but geometry in the Greek sense is found, among purely ritual topics, only in the *SuS* that are attached to the *SrS*. All the *vedāṅgas* contain scientific as well as magico-religious elements ("*vedāṅga* utilities": KELLY 1996:104).

3. Vyākaraṇa linguistics

3.1 Padapāṭa. The study of language in India was undertaken primarily to meet the needs of Vedic ritual and the recitations required by it. The first step we know of is Śākalya's *RPP* but it contains older material (see *note* 2). It separated the words of the *RSP*, insured its proper pronunciation, including accents (which I omit from our discussion) and fixed the corpus or "text" thus contributing to *canon formation* during the late Vedic period in Eastern India (Videha around 600-500 B.C.: WITZEL 1997b: 322-24). *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* 3.2.6, composed earlier and much further west, refers to Śākalya discussing with Śūravīra Māṇḍūkeya, Hrasva Māṇḍūkeya, Mākṣavya and others, "the first generation of scientific linguistic thinkers" (DESHPANDE 1993: 141-2). The form of the *RPP* as we know it, however, has been influenced by other grammatical notions, especially *P* (DESHPANDE 1997a:61 *ff.*).

V.N. JHA (1987:101-5) distinguished five stages in the analysis of the *RPP*. The first is the isolation of *pada* as "word." Next, some cases of "stem" and "suffix" are separated: *ṛṣibhiḥ* (*RS* 1.1.2) is analyzed as *RPP ṛṣi-bhiḥ* (I symbolize *avagraha,* the pause of short duration in the recitation, by the hyphen "-").[2] The third step is concerned with cases that are not subject to *sandhi*, such as final long vowels of dual terminations: *-ī*, *-ū*, *-e*. These *pragṛhya* cases are followed in the recitation by *iti*. In the next step, *avagraha* analysis was extended to nominal compounds, but here a problem arose: compounds may consist of more than two members but PP uses *avagraha* in each analysis only once. Recitations have no brackets and Śākalya's solution was inspired by semantics: *daśapramatīm* (*RS* 1.141.2) is analyzed as *daśa-pramatīm* "ten protectors" (i.e., fingers), not *daśapra-matīm* which would correspond to the equally meaningless "tenpro-tectors." A final step, also taken on semantic grounds, deals with irregularities such as *RS* 5.2.7: *sunaścicchepam* analysed as *sunaḥśepam / cit* (STAAL 1967:23). JHA does not mention *parigṛhya* cases which involve *avagraha* as well as

[2] The first two steps are older than Sakalya because they are Indo-Iranian: BRONKHORST 1982:185 with *note* 6, WITZEL 1997b:323 *note* 349.

iti, but it is clear that all these stages exhibit a gradual *extension* or *generalization* of the analysis.[3]

In his study of the *TPP*, Albrecht WEBER (1873) described a similar but more zigzag process of generalization. The *Atharva PP* is similar to the *RPP*. Following BENFEY, WEBER attributed to the *Sāma PP* "eine ziemlich niedrige Stufe sprachlicher Einsicht" (RENOU 1947:96 is more cautious: "le travail d'exégèse rudimentaire qu'il propose s'est effectué, dans chaque Veda, sur des bases autonomes"). The *TPP* made progress by treating all *avagṛhya* cases as *parigṛhya*. The *Vājasaneyi PP* took another step and included *pragṛhya*.

PP was primarily an analysis of *SP*, but by isolating them from each other, it made it easy to produce the opposite of what was intended: the *forgetting* of single words. *KP* and other *vikṛtis* were included to counteract this by further *dārḍhya* "firmly grasping" (*KP* of *SP* and *PP*, like *PP* of *SP*: *CA* 4.4.8-9). The creation of the *vikṛtis* demonstrates (*contra* BRONKHORST 1982) that all these forms belong to the oral tradition. Were these procedures *prescriptive* or *descriptive*?

Let us represent the words of the *SP* as: a b c d ... and the *PP* as: a / b / c / d / .... The *KP* (a b / b c / c d / ...) does not introduce any new *sandhi* combinations but the *Jaṭāpātha* (a b / b a / a b / b c / c b / b c / ...) introduces "b a" and "c b" which are reversals of the order of the *SP* thus inducing "grammar-switching" between *anārṣa* and *ārṣa* sequences (DESHPANDE 1994). But how does one know the correct *anārṣa* form unless one *knows* the language? Brahmins "used the more contemporary forms of Sanskrit in their academic and ritual activity" (DESHPANDE 1997a:61). Otherwise they would not know that the reversal of the first two words of: *palitasya hotus tasya* (from *RS* 1.164.1) is: *hotuḥ palitasya* (often pronounced with *upadhmānīya*) and not **hotus palitasya*, **hotur palitasya* or something else. In the Nambudiri recitation, *Jaṭāpaṭha* is defined in a more complex fashion, involving sequences a b b a a b / b c c b b c / ... introducing other new combinations such as "b b," "c c," etc., e.g., *hotur hotuḥ* (STAAL 1961:46).

I conclude that *vikṛtis describe* forms that are not part of the Veda and are based upon *descriptive* knowledge of the spoken language. Differently put: *ārṣa*

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[3] *Avagraha* and *iti* apply to oral recitation (*pāṭha*, not "reading" as in later Sanskrit) and do not presuppose written forms of transmission unlike *daṇḍa*, a term that does not occur in *Prat* as far as I know. *Prat* specify for the *avagraha* only *duration* (e.g., *Rpr* 1.28: *one* mātrā), not *shape* or *placement*.

sequences such as "a b" correspond to what *P* would call *chandas*, whereas *anārṣa* sequences such as "b a" and "b b" are prefigurations of *P*'s study of *bhāṣā*. The same holds for *ūha* (below **3.3**).

3.2. Prātiśākhya. *PP* practice was formalized in the *Prat* compositions, in principle one for each *śākhā*. The earlier name *pārṣada* suggests that they belonged to a community (*pariṣad*) which orally transmitted and discussed the contents of their *śākhā* (VARMA 1961:12; SURYA KANTA 1970:5). The relationship between *SP* and *PP* is expressed ambiguously by *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* which may be taken as a *tatpuruṣa*: "The Saṃhitā is the base of the Pada" or a *bahuvrīhi*: "The Saṃhitā has the Pada as its base." There are traces of the first interpretation (e.g., the *TPr*: SCHARFE 1977: 127), and later in Bhartṛhari, but *Prat* generally adopt the second method, puzzling from our historical perspective (RENOU 1960:1-2) but signalling a return to the original composers who put words together in their inspired speech just as we put words together whenever we speak or write. *P* presupposes that latter method and limits his explanation of Vedic forms to *PP* without commenting on *SP* (JHA 1987:93; CARDONA 1991). In his grammar of the spoken language, he goes from words to sentences "without any flip-flopping" (DESHPANDE 1997b:94).

Prat are early because of their structure and function, not because of the forms that survive and may have been influenced by *P* or other grammarians. Their aim is completeness. WHITNEY (1871:180,281) noted on a section of *TPr* that he could not discover any case of a retroflex nasal arising in *TS* from a dental nasal in *TP* "that was not duly provided for." WEBER (1873:3) writes "vollständig" and a century later, SURYA KANTA (1970:78) called the *RPr* "*entirely* free from all oversights." To be complete is only possible when we deal with a *finite* corpus of *utterances*, (copies of) unique events in space and time such as the extent of a Vedic *śākhā*. *Prat* have no need for optional rules (SCHARFE 1977:130 *note* 9 but cf. RENOU 1960:8). A living language consists of *sentences* which cannot be enumerated because they are infinite in number (below **3.3**, STAAL 1967:18 *ff.* etc.).

Prat display great variety.[4] SURYA KANTA (1968:24) distinguished between enumerations or lists (*gaṇa*) and generalizations explained by *sūtra* rules. He did not deny that a *Prat* in the form in which we know it may show generalizations and yet

[4] "L'objet des Pr. étant le même, on s'attend que leur plan soit uniforme. Il n'en est rien": RENOU 1960:17.

be older than another that largely consists of lists, but distinguished two *ideal* types which, following DESHPANDE (1997a:60), I refer to as **Types A** and **B**:

Type A. Exhaustive listings (*gaṇas*) of examples showing patterns of linguistic structure but no generalized rules. The first step.

Type B. Generalizations, exceptions to generalizations, no *gaṇas*. The second step.

DESHPANDE concluded first: "In actuality, listings are dependent on generalizations and generalizations are dependendent on lists" **(I)** and after some more analysis: "One may not necessarily assume that there ever existed grammatical texts, some precursors of our Prātiśākhyas, which were strictly related to the facts of a particular Śākhā, and were not at all influenced by or concerned with the general grammar of contemporary Sanskrit" **(II)**. I accept **(II)** which does not say much (one may not *necessarily* assume the opposite either) but how could **(I)** be possibly correct? DESHPANDE indulges here in some flip-flopping of his own making, inconsistent moreover with his characterization of the development from listing to definition in another context (*page* 51). Generalizations are generalizations from listings and therefore depend on them. Given a generalization, it is easy to make a list but what is the point -- unless it is a list of exceptions?

SURYA KANTA's ideal types are needed to explain the extraordinary development of Vyākaraṇa linguistics through increasing generalization; but we may *not* simply assume that grammars of the spoken language have always been around. Why would people pay such obsessive attention to the *minutiae* of their ordinary, natural, given, and apparently unproblematic, spoken language? It did not happen anywhere else: both European *philology* and Chinese *glossography* ("one of the richest traditions in the world": HARBSMEIER 1998:56) derive from the study of ancient texts. It is important, therefore, to distinguish *development* from *origin* though it depends on it. *Generalization* is a feature of the development of Vyākaraṇa but it did not affect another scientific feature that seems to be present from the beginning: the extraordinary attention to form and accuracy that may be characterized as "obsessiveness" or "respect for the facts." Obsessiveness is explained by the ritual background. We shall see that there is a parallel to this type of origin, but not of development, in the case of geometry.

Prat introduced the meta-linguistic use of case-endings, at first the Nominative and Accusative as formulated in almost context-free manner by a *paribhāṣā* meta-rule: *RPr* 1.14 (56): *asāv amum iti tadbhāvam uktaṃ yathāntaram* "the expression

'this (Nom.) that (Acc.)' means becoming-that with reference to the sound which stands nearest to it"; and in context-free manner by *VājPr* 1.133: *tam iti vikāraḥ* "a change is expressed as an accusative." For example: *RPr* 5.1: *sakāraḥ ṣakāram* or *VājPr* 3.55: *saḥ ṣam*. The context-free "A > B" method of transformation is likely to be earlier (CARDONA 1976:275) than *P*'s method of substitution (1.1.49, etc.), which is context-sensitive (STAAL 1965a, 1969:503), although WEZLER 1972 has shown that the latter derives from ritual and, in the final analysis, from Sanskrit usage.

Rpr employs the technical term *yathāntaram*, "nearness, proximity," elsewhere *āntaryena* or *antaratamya*, which contrasts with *yathāsaṃkhya*, "respective correlation" — all devices for determining the choice of a substitute from a range of alternatives. A principle of proximity occurs in most *Prat* (HUECKSTEDT 1995, Ch.4) and may be understood as "featural proximity" (DESHPANDE 1997a, *passim*), defined, like *savarna*, in terms of features *sthāna* "place (of articulation)," *karaṇa* "instrument (of articulation)" or *āsyaprayatna* "oral effort" (*VājPr* 1.43, *P* 1.1.9 [5]). HUECKSTEDT (15-8) distinguishes between "nearness according to quality" and "nearness according to meaning" but why should this principle not also expresses what the term expresses, viz., "proximity in space"? In that case, it would refer to a *spatial* arrangement of sounds, better represented by a two-dimensional table than a list. The invention of such tables may have developed from the square of 5 x 5 stops referred to by *pañca te pañcavargāḥ* "(stops consist of) five series of five" (*RPr* 1.8) or *sparśānām ānupūrvyeṇa pañcapañca vargāḥ* "stops are arranged in order in five-by-five series" (*TPr* 1.10). It is such tables that *P* (who must have been acquainted with them: KIPARSKY 1991:256) replaced by his one-dimensional *Śivasūtra*.

In the practice of recitation, sounds can be enumerated only in *linear* fashion. In writing or published texts, the receptacle — birch-bark, palm-leaf or paper — may be used for sketching a two-dimensional table. If we adopt such a table, as DESHPANDE (1997a:38 ff.) has done, it must preserve proximity as best as possible.[6] In the

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[5] For a critique of the idea that *VajPrat* is the earliest Pratisakhya and later than *P* so that all *Prat* become later than *P* (Scharfe 1977:129) see HUCKSTEDT (1995:51-2). The key-point, as he notes, is the erroneous assumption that *Prat* we have to-day are the same as when they were first composed.

[6] In DESHPANDE, vowels are not part of the system, but they must *ā* be for *i/ī* must be "near" to *y*, *u/ū* to *v*, etc. in the examples below (**3.4.**) where *yathantara/āntaratamya* operates

mental representation of a square, it does not matter whether *varga* denotes a row or a column. Proximity and distance are the same in whatever direction.

DESHPANDE is undoubtedly right that the *akṣara-samāmnāya* was composed "with no reference to writing intended" (*page* 38). RENOU and FILLIOZAT (1953:668) had already taken a more significant step: "On doit même remarquer à ce propos qu'une écriture alphabétique du type sémitique aurait pu entraver les études phonétiques si elle eût alors existé dans l'Inde, car elle aurait donné le modèle d'une analyse commode mais non scientifique des sons du language." It is significant in this context that, according to DESHPANDE, *Prat* tables came into existence by the time the late Vedic literature was being produced, i.e., after 700 B.C.

3.3. **Pāṇini**. The motto of THIEME's *Pāṇini and the Veda* of 1935 stressed the first step of generalization: Patañjali's *sarvavedapāriṣadam idaṃ śāstram* "this science pertains to all the Vedas" or "this science is a Pārṣada = Prātiśākhya for all the Vedas." Actually, *P*'s *chandasi* rules "are patch-up rules added to the rules already established and motivated on the basis of Classical Sanskrit. If all the specifically Vedic rules were erased from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, one could scarcely tell from the structure of what remain that it had ever contained them" (KIPARSKY 1979:56, endorsed by JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1986:11). The second step pertains to *P*'s core rules which apply to the spoken language (*bhāṣā*), an infinite realm that cannot be enumerated so that Patañjali concluded: *kiṃcit sāmānyaviśeṣaval-lakṣaṇaṃ pravartyam* "some kind of body of rules containing the general and the particular has to be devised" (*M* **I** 6.3, transl. JOSHI & ROODBERGEN; cf. THIEME 1935:61 *note* 1). This is the manner in which *P*'s work brought the *Prat* generalizations to perfection and expressed them by means of increasingly abstract and formalized *sūtras*. Underlying *P*'s *sūtras* is a principle of economy (*lāghava*) which KIPARSKY 1991 showed to be his way of achieving gene-

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vertically. To accomodate all cases, DESHPANDE's table would have to be adjusted so that *i/ī* is near not only to *y* but also to the palatal series *c, ch, j, jh, ñ* etc. This may be effected by ordering the vowels differently and two-dimensionally as follows:

a/ā	*i/ī*	*ṛ/ṝ*	*ḷ(/ḹ)*	*u/ū*
	e			*o*
	ai			*au*

as DESHPANDE acknowledges in part in his accompanying prose (*page* 39), but it implies further that the square of stops must be rotated around its diagonal so that the first row consists of *k - c - ṭ - t - p* and comes right below the five groups of vowels. The *antaḥsthā* and *ūṣman* must be shifted one place to the right. The result is a two-dimensional representation of what *Prat* compilers must have had in mind.

ralization (cf. also SMITH 1991 on bracketing in *sūtras*, among other things).

RENOU (1963:182,198 with *note* 171) observed that, among *sūtra* compositions, "les *sū.* grammaticaux (et apparentés) occupent une place bien à part" and "poussent au maximum le formalisme." According to STAAL 1992, these rules signal the beginnings of human science and illustrate that these sciences are liable to formalization and not intrinsically different from the natural or physical sciences. *P*'s rules constitute, as far as I know for the first time in human history, an *artificial language* in which meta-linguistic conventions enable its expressions or "words" (such as *ik, yaṇ, ac*) to be combined into statements or "sentences" *(iko yaṇ aci)*. As we shall see in the next section, all these features are foreshadowed by *Prat.*

I discussed the question of descriptive versus prescriptive in relation to *Prat* but where does *P* stand? BRONKHORST (1991:83 *sq.)* raised this question first with reference to the possibility that Vedic texts were still being composed in his day (cf. BRONKHORST 1982, 275*sq.*; WITZEL 1997b:324-7); but it has no bearing on prescription since the seers might be able to create Late Vedic Sanskrit without the help of *P*. BRONKHORST then discussed *P*'s Vedic rules on *ūha* (mentioned by Patañjali, immediately after *rakṣā*, as a *prayojana* of grammar; cf. JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1986:29-31). *Ūha* applies to the substitution of forms such as *sūryāya* for *agnaye* in mantras that occur in the corpus such as *agnaye tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*. BRONKHORST emphasized that this is a prescription; but it is not an arbitrary prescription. An arbitrary prescription would be for *agnaye* to be replaced by, say, *sūryo3m*. Such prescriptions occur in the *SrS* and apply to the Hotṛ's ritual recitations. They are common in the *SV* (*Puṣpasūtra*) where they are not descriptions of any natural language although they are descriptions of a rule-governed, ritual/ recitational activity. It is true that the substitution of *sūryāya* may be called a prescription for modifying *ārṣa* mantras; but it based upon a description of *bhāṣā*, like the Jaṭāpāṭha cases discussed in **3.1.** *Ūha* turns an utterance of the corpus into a *grammatical* sentence of the natural, spoken language in accordance with rules that correctly *describe.*

The *locus classicus* for the importance of empirical description as *lokataḥ* "on account of (the usage) of the people" is Patañjali's celebrated observation *ghaṭena kāryaṃ kāriṣyan kumbhakārakulaṃ gatvāha kuru ghaṭaṃ kāryam anena kariṣyāmīti / na tadvac chabdān prayokṣyamāṇo vaiyākaraṇakulaṃ gatvāha kuru śabdān prayokṣya iti / tāvaty evārtham upādāya śabdān prayuñjate* (*M* I 7.28-8.1) "one who needs a pot for some purpose goes to the house of a potter and says: You make a pot. I need a pot for some purpose. (But) one who wants to use words does not go to the house of

a grammarian and say: You make words I want to use them. (On the contrary,) having brought to mind (a thing), without further ado, he uses words" (JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1986:115-6).

3.4. A Comparison. There is considerable variation in the scope and formulation of *Prat* and *P* rules (cf. above *note* 4). Following SURYA KANTA 1968:28 and HUECKSTEDT 1995, Ch.4, I shall illustrate it with the help of a brief and simplified comparison between rules that describe well known transformations from vowels into semivowels (or substitutions of the latter for the former). Since HUECKSTEDT has dealt with these concepts exhaustively, I shall not discuss *yathāntaram* or *yathāsaṃkhya*. I list the sources in alphabetical order but putting *Rpr* first and *P* at the end to suggest the kind of *ideal* progressive development that must have taken place.

RPr 2.21: *samānākṣaram antasthāṃ svām akaṇṭhyaṃ svarodayam* "a non-velar vowel becomes its own semi-vowel when followed by a vowel." -- Velar vowels are *a/ā*. Commentator's examples: *RP* 9.97.51 *abhi ārṣeyam* > *RS abhyāṣeyam, RP* 10.93.15 *nu atra* > RS *nvatra*.

CA 3.2.16: *svare nāmino'ntasthāḥ* "before a vowel, the *nāmins* are changed into semi-vowels." *Nāmin* is a vowel other than *a/ā*. Commentator's examples are taken from *P* (see below), not from the *AV* corpus.

RT 107 *ram ṛstham asve* "*r* becomes *r* when a non-homogeneous vowel follows" and 109 *antasthām* which refers to the transformation of semivowels into *i*- and *u*- vowels.

TPr 10.15: *ivarṇokārau yavakāram* "*i* and *u* become *ya* and *va*." *Svaraparau* "when followed by a vowel" has to be supplied (through *anuvṛtti* "recurrence") from 9.10. Commentator's examples include *TP* 4.2.8.1 *abhi asthāḥ TS abhyasthāt*.

VajPr 4:47: *svare bhāvy antasthām* "a non-velar vowel becomes semi-vowel." The rule is given in several steps. *Bhāvin,* the Vājasaneyī term for non-velar vowels.

P 6.1.77: *iko yaṇ aci* "in the place of *i* - *u* -*ṛ* - *ḷ* substitute *ya* - *va*- *ra* - *la* when a vowel follows." Examples from the spoken language: *dadhyatra, madhvatra, kartrartham*.

These rules illustrate that statements such as THIEME's (1935:62), that *P* differs from *Prat* in that it is scientific and not practical, are rough approximations. I quoted this evaluation recently (1999b:115), but it has belatedly dawned upon me that scientific and practical are not incompatible. It is true that *Prat* are "first and foremost, description of recitational practice (*vṛtti*), rather than that of some abstract theory (*pratijñā*)" (DESHPANDE 1997a:438), but only their compatibility may account for the birth of linguistics and its development through progressive generalization from *empirical* beginnings -- albeit with respect to a corpus. Vyākaraṇa became increasingly *abstract* because it abstracted from the *śākhās* and because of the formula-like character of its rules which constitute an artificial language.

4. Śulba geometry

The Vedic background of the Śulba is instructively different from that of Vyākaraṇa linguistics. It is confined to the Yajurveda where up to a third of each Samhitā deals with the Agnicayana ritual in which two new altars are constructed from bricks (*iṣṭakā*). The Old Gārhapatya and Āhavanīya were round and square, respectively, and made from clay. The New Gārhapatya is square, piled from five layers of 3 x 7 rectangular bricks. The New Āhavanīya has the shape of a bird, piled from five layers of 200 bricks of various sizes and shapes. *YV* mantra sections provide the mantras that are recited when the bricks are deposited and *YV* brāhmaṇas provide information about where they are placed. If we combine that information from the relevant *TS*, *KS* and *MS* sections (from the tables in KEITH 1914,I:xlvii-lxvi [7]) with WITZEL (1997b: 299-305) a picture emerges. Gārhapatya and Āhavanīya mantras and brāhmaṇas are dealt with in successive chapters in *TS* (iv and v) and *MS* (ii and iii) but not in *KS* where the Āhavanīya treatment is chaotic in accordance with the fact that of the Katha *SrS* and *SuS* only fragments survive (KASHIKAR 1968:76, WITZEL 1974:I with *note* 13). Since *MS* is earlier than *TS*, the earliest information about brick altars comes from *MS*, i.e., from the Kuru region of c.1100 BC or later since the Agnicayana developed after the Soma rituals.[8] With "Canon Formation in the East" (WITZEL *p*.327), the Taittirīya took over which applies not only to *TS* but also to the

[7] I have not checked these tables because KEITH seems to be good at tables even if CALAND (1924) warns that his translation "nur mit der schärfsten Kritik zu benutzen ist."

[8] Does that include the Soma *saṃsthā*? The Jaiminiya *SV*, arranging differently (WITZEL 1997b:287), has separate sections only for Agniṣṭoma and *one* Soma *saṃsthā*: Atirātra (the two traditions that survive among the Nambudiris: STAAL 1983, I:185).

Brāhmaṇa, *B/Ap SrS* and *SuS* which must have been composed in Videha after 700 BC. What happened during the intervening centuries?

For more information on bricks we have to combine mantras, brāhmaṇas and *SrS* which are closely connected as illustrated by TSUJI's translation from *MS* and *MSrS* on the Agnicayana (1983:135-77). We read, for example (*p*.156): "the *apasyā* bricks are placed, five by five, with ... [mantra] in each of the quarters, while he (the Adhvaryu) steps from the east to the right (pradakṣiṇam)." *BSrS* 10.37-46 (IKARI and Arnold 1983:550-77) is a little more specific, e.g. (*p*.555): "He puts the *vayasyā* bricks in place. He places five on the southern hip with ..., five on the northern hip with ..., one on the southern shoulder with ...," etc. Neither passage tells us much about where the bricks should be deposited *precisely* or anything about their sizes or shapes. But bricks cannot be deposited *imprecisely*: much more information must have been available from the beginning since otherwise the altars could not have been effectively constructed *since nothing would fit*. The many gaps must have been filled by oral traditions, providing the information that is equivalent to what, for the Nambudiri tradition, is depicted in Figures (9, 23, 24, 26-40) and on Tables (3, 6-13) of STAAL *et al.* 1983, I.

SuS provide more information on sizes, numbers and precise location of some of the bricks, but it is still haphazard, jumps from Gārhapatya to Āhavanīya and back,[9] and needs to be supplemented with orally transmitted information, perhaps in part from *takṣaka* carpenters and brickmakers whose duties are introduced in *SuS* by *kārayet* as distinguished from the Adhvaryu where the appropriate verb is *kuryāt* (Kapardisvamin on *ApSuS* II.7). *SuS* also provide further scattered and incomplete notes on ritual. THIBAUT, therefore (followed by Satyaprakash and Ram Swarup Sharma), complemented his edition and translation of *BSuS* with portions from a commentary of much later date (like all Śulba commentaries: PINGREE 1981:6-7) and fragments from other *SuS* to wit: *ApSuS, KSuP* and their commentaries.

RENOU wrote: "Les Brāhmaṇa et les Sūtra sont en general des textes apparentés: les premiers recueillent des spéculations sur les pratiques ou les récitations

[9] On page 97 of the edition of *BSuS*, a long passage from the commentary accompanied by an illustration (Fig.6) refers to the āhavanīya although the entire context deals with the Gārhapatya. KASHIKAR (1978) has pointed out other inconsistentices and mistakes in the description of the āhavanīya construction.

que les second décrivent *pour le terrain* et *pour l'étude théorique*" (RENOU 1947:35; italics mine). According to HILLEBRANDT, the Śrautasūtras "bear a strong family likeness" (quoted in GONDA 1977:490). Both observations apply with special force to *SuS*. *SuS* do not always cover the same ground, but where they do, their expressions are extremely similar. There are few differences in wording and none whatsover in method. Options are expressed by identical expressions (e.g., *BSuS* and *ApSuS* on the *gārhapatya*: *caturasrety ekeṣām / parimaṇḍalety ekeṣām*). There is some information on the shapes of bricks -- and then attention shifts to constructions. Many seem to be necessitated by the ritual requirement, that each layer of the new Āhavanīya altar must be 7 1/2 times a square *puruṣa*, i.e., a square of which the side is the size of the Yajamāna. 7 1/2 is followed by 8 1/2, 9 1/2, ... : increasingly theoretical options. Whether the needs were practical or theoretical, it led to geometrical constructions.

The following example describes the construction of a square equal to the difference of two squares. To properly understand it, the reader may require a figure (*Figure* 5 in STAAL 1999b: 117), but similarities in wording are what are primarily needed in the present context. *BSuS* 1.51 describes this construction as: *caturasrāc caturasraṃ nirjihīrṣan yāvan nirjihīrṣet tasya karaṇyā varṣīyaso vṛdhram ullikhet / vṛdhrasya pārśvamānīm akṣṇayetaratpārśvam upasaṃharet / sā yatra nipatet tad apacchindyāt / chinnayā nirastam*. Thibaut's translation improved with the help of HAYASHI (1995:107): "One who wishes to deduct one square from another square should cut off a piece from the larger square with the side of the square one wishes to deduct. One should draw the longer side of the cut-off piece obliquely up to the opposite side. One should cut that side at the point where it falls. By the line which has been cut off, the small square is deducted." THIBAUT arrived at this translation by using a commentary on the corresponding passage in *ApSuS* (2.15-8) from which he derived the interpretation of *vṛdhra* as "cut off."

The only difference with *ApSuS* is that the word *varṣīyasaḥ*, "larger," is missing there. *ApSuS* and *BSuS* belong to one *śākhā*, *KSuS* to another.[10] The corresponding passage (*KSuS* 3.1) is the same until ...*nirjihīrṣet* and then continues as follows (I include between square brackets references to line segments in *Figure 5*): *tāvad ubhayato 'pacchidya śaṅkū nikhāya pārśvamānīṃ kṛtvā pārśvamānīsaṃmitām akṣṇa-*

[10] Of later date: MYLIUS 1981:7 for the *KSrS;* WITZEL 1997b:324-7 for *VS* in general.

yāṃ tatropasaṃharati / sa samāse 'pacchedaḥ sā karaṇy eṣa nirhnāsaḥ, "one who wishes to deduct one square [EFGH] from another square [ABCD] should cut off from both sides [AB and DC] of the larger square the side [AI = DJ] of the square one wishes to deduct, fix a peg [at A] and draw the longer side [AD] obliquely across the constructed shorter side [DJ = AI]. The cut-off piece [IK] where they connect is the side of the square sought."

The similarity between the main Śulba sutras and the fact that they seem to presuppose or refer to each other has struck all students of these texts. After introducing the *SuS* separately, DATTA 1932 quotes from them without discrimination when treating specific problems (except in his Chapter XIV which deals with "indeterminate problems"). Sarasvati Amma does the same. MICHAELS (1978:52) observes that the *paribhāṣā* section at the beginning of *BSuS* refers to constructions that are only found in other sūtras. SEIDENBERG (1983:99) refers to "the same method in about the same words." VAN GELDER (1921:xi) makes a distinction between Mānava and Āpastamba but it is slight: "Der Inhalt ist zum grössten Teile der gleiche, weniger der Wortlaut." The similarity between *BSuS, ApSuS* and *KSuS* is highlighted by the parallels mentioned by MICHAELS in his "Synoptische Tabelle" (1978:182-5) and by the distribution of technical terms over the sūtras (MICHAELS 1983). Only Thibaut (1875: 270) drew an interesting conclusion: "Many of the rules, which we find now in Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and Kātyāyana, expressed in the same or almost the same words, must have formed the common property of all adhvaryus long before they were embodied in the Kalpasūtras which have come down to us." It seems likely that we must assign this "common property" to the *MS* period of the early Kuru kings of ca. 1100 BC when "the post-RV ritual necessitated a complex re-arrangement of texts, rituals, and priestly functions" including "the composition of early (lost) Brāhmaṇa type explanations of the Śrauta ritual" (WITZEL 1989:118, 250). These explanations must have been joined before long by more precise *SuS* type explanations because the brick altars (which contributed, like the Aśvamedha, to the Yajamāna's status and prestige: WITZEL 1997a:38-9) could not be constructed without them. The beginnings of the Śulba tradition, then, are not merely hidden. There is no reason to assume that the Śulba developed at all.

THIBAUT drew attention to a difference between *SuS* and their commentaries: while the former are concerned with geometrical construction, the latter are fond of numerical calculation and "doing sums," i.e., they measure lines and surfaces in

terms of units. Squares are divided in "troops of small squares" (*varga*). In *SuS,* such "numerical calculation" is rare but a trace of it appears in a passage of *ASuS: yāvat pramāṇā rajjus tāvato vargān karoti* "as many measures a cord contains, so many troops or rows of small squares it produced (when a square is drawn on it)" (THIBAUT *op.cit.*: 274). The geometrical use of *varga* resembles its use in *Prat* (**3.2.** above). In later Indian mathematics, *varga* means "square" in the two senses of the English term: geometrical and arithmetical. The latter meaning occurs in the *Bakshālī* manuscript, perhaps an abbreviation of *saṃvarga* "multiplication" in the *Āryabhaṭīya* (HAYASHI 1995:82).

THIBAUT contrasted the pure geometry of *SuS* not only with their commentaries, but with later Indian mathematics in general (e.g., Bhāskara's *Līlāvatī*). He also wrote (p.238): "Nothing in the sūtras would justify the assumption that they were expert in long calculations." KULKARNI (1983:35) objected to this statement and drew attention to the multiplication of numbers and the use of large numbers in the Vedas. According to him, arithmetic was highly developed prior to the Śulba. This was acknowledged by Thibaut himself in another context (1899:70-71) and does not contradict his thesis, that the *SuS* themselves did not make much use of arithmetic methods. KULKARNI's own *Discussion* (pp.36-37) supports that thesis, culminating as it does in the statement: "It is somehow difficult to understand the round-about and purely constructional methods followed by Śulba sūtrakāras for the layout of different citis when they could have used their arithmetical proficiency and a measuring tape for this purpose." The mystery vanishes when we replace "their arithmetical proficiency" by "the arithmetical proficiency of earlier Indian traditions." Such a conclusion would not be surprising in view of the fact, that the Babylonians, who did not possess a Śulba (or Greek) type of geometry, were proficient in arithmetic and computational methods at a much earlier period. Their methods did not only precede "Euclidian" geometry, but re-appeared in the Hellenistic period under the name of Heron of Alexandria, not "a novel sign of the rapid degeneration of the so-called Greek spirit," but a simple reflection of "the algebraic or arithmetic tradition of Babylonia" (NEUGEBAUER 1957:146 sq.; cf. HEATH 1921, Chs II and III and BOYER 1989:77-9 on "geometric algebra"). Did something similar happen in South Asia?

The Thibaut-Kulkarni discussion must be placed within this wider context which starts with a basic distinction between two facts. One is that arithmetical methods were widespread in Asia (including China) at an early period, left traces in

the Śulba and "re-appeared" in later Indian mathematics. Their traces in the Śulba include rational approximations of irrational numbers. The Indians did not, like the Greeks, discover the uniqueness of the irrational. However, Indian root- approximations were not only very good, but showed awareness of their indefinitely approximate, that is, infinite character. The most famous of these is the definition of the square root of 2 as: *pramāṇam tṛtīyena vardhayet tac ca caturthenātmacatustriṃśenena* "increase the measure by its third part and again by the fourth part (of this third part) less the thirty-fourth part of itself" (*BSuS* I.61-2; *ApSuS I.6; cf. KSuS* II.13). In modern algebraic notation:

$$1+\frac{1}{3}+\frac{1}{3.4}-\frac{1}{3.4.34}$$

No such notations were available to the ancients and we can only explain how these results were arrived at by assuming the existence of artful manipulations with "figured" small squares and oblongs. THIBAUT and DATTA each devised an ingenious hypothesis of how this might have been done. Both are explained in detail in DATTA (1932:189-94) and the latter, more perspicuously, by JOSEPH (1990:234-7).[11] The arithmetic tradition continued in India where these approximations were gradually improved, most famously by Rāma Vājapeyin of the fifteenth century (PINGREE 1981:6-7) who computed a "more accurate" (*sūkṣmatara*) value:

$$1+\frac{1}{3}+\frac{1}{3.4}-\frac{1}{3.4.34}+\frac{1}{3.4.34.33}+\frac{1}{3.4.34.3}$$

(DATTA 1932:11-12).

The second fact is the appearance, within this wider arithmetical context, of the Śulba form of geometry. Since this form appears to be uniquely Greek and Indian, both must derive from a common source (SEIDENBERG 1962, 1978, 1983; van der WAERDEN 1983), probably (STAAL 1999b) the "Bactrian-Margiana Archeological Complex" (BMAC) which flourished at the beginning of the second millennium BC along the Oxus where Soviet archaeologists excavated temples with altars constructed from bricks. That Śulba geometry came from there was first suggested by the rela-

[11] HAYASHI (1995:107) provides other references and observes (*note* 25), referring to HEATH (1921,I:60-3), that Theon gave a similar explanation of Ptolemy's method of extracting square roots.

tionship between two non-Indo-European words: Indo-Aryan *iṣṭakā* and Iranian *ištya*. It is confirmed by other Vedic words of BMAC provenance collected by WITZEL (1999:342-3 with *note* 26) for camel, donkey, mustard, hemp and other terms of material culture associated with agriculture and brick-built settlements. A Tocharian cognate, *izcem*, means "clay." More are listed in a continuation of these studies on "Substrate Languages in Old Indo-Aryan" (WITZEL *forthcoming*) which also discusses words that left traces in Chinese, Tibetan, Altaic and other language families.

That the Śulba geometry came from BMAC would not be surprising if the altars themselves came from Andronovo cultures further north, the region through which speakers of Proto-Indo-Aryan passed first. In 1968, A.M. Mandelstham excavated Andronovian burial sites from around the mid-second millennium BC. Males were buried together with a *square*, females with a *round* hearth. Mandelstham wondered whether these two might be ancestors of the Vedic Āhavanīya and Gārhapatya altars.[12] I am not an archaeologist but his idea appears to have been widely accepted (MALLORY 1989:53-4, PARPOLA 1995:365, ERDOSY 1995:11).

5. Conclusions and Final Remarks

5.1. Vyākaraṇa and Śulba are similar in some respects but differ not only in substance but also in organization. Both were practical which did not prevent them from being scientific. They share one scientific feature with the ritual from which they originated: painstaking, obsessive attention to formal *minutiae*. I'll return to another but everything else seems to be different. Vyākaraṇa developed step for step from *PP*. *PP*'s theoretical underpinnings as formulated in *Prat* developed through progressive generalization and culminated in *P*'s grammar in which *chandasi* is assigned a subordinate role but sūtras exhibit a high degree of formalization and are integrated in an artificial meta-language.

The Śulba, by contrast, did not develop. Much of its substance must have existed at the time of the earliest *YV*. We neither witness nor have reason to postulate a development, let alone progress. In mathematics, whether Indian, Chinese, Arab or

[12] The "Old" Gārhapatya was round and there are obvious links between the domestic fire and the Yajamānapatnī. The Ṛgveda mentions three altars but only *RS* 10.114.3 alludes to a (quadrangular) shape.

European, the level of formalization of Vyākaraṇa was reached only many centuries later with the introduction of *algebra* (STAAL 1995: 101, 107-12). Of Śulba results in geometry, *theoretical* constructions must be generalizations from *actual* ones but our earliest sources already contain both. Theory is widely respected, and so are altars, but Sanskrit scholars have not taken *theoretical rituals* seriously, following HILLEBRANDT (1897:158): "hier versteigt sich Mythus und Phantasie der Yājñika's zu den sechsunddreißg-jährigen Opfern der Sāktyas, den hundertjährigen der Sādhya's, den tausendjährigen der Viśvasṛj (similarly THITE 2000: "theoretical but not practical")." Patañjali did take them seriously because he detected the same recursiveness that governs language: even though some expressions are not used, "they have of necessity to be laid down by rules, like protracted *sattras*" (*avasyaṃ dīrghasattravallakṣaṇenānuvidheyāḥ*: M I.9.15-6). That is the second feature Vyākaraṇa and Śulba share: an awareness of infinity, or at least an inkling.

5.2. Science is international and universal. Our Vyākaraṇa and Śulba scientists are colleagues of Newton, the paragon of modern science. Now, if there is any scientist whose work was pervaded by a magico-religious background, it was Sir Isaac. Even in his most creative work in physics, Newton felt that he was recovering ancient wisdom that Pythagoras, Democritus, Solomon and others had already possessed but hidden in parallel and symbol. His most enduring passion was not physics, not even theology; it was alchemy. According to John Maynard Keynes, not only a famous economist but also a lifelong student of Newton, Newton was not so much the first modern physicist as the last of the Magi (STAAL 1993:11-12).

Apart from science, Newton teaches us a lesson: look at the results, not at what scientists and others say or believe about it (not to mention intentions or motives: KELLY 1996). I referred to that lesson explicitly in 1993 and (as I can now say with hindsight), implicitly in 1963, when I wrote about the "magico-religious" background of *ācāryas* and professors: "All of this has nothing to do with the views they propound." Newton's Lesson explains why the most spectacular results of science have least to do with the background of scientists. A contemporary view according to which historians of science should construct, for each culture, what is seen as a changing notion of science, may help explain the work of mediocre scientists. It cannot account for the results of those who left behind what came before them. The reason is the nature of knowledge of which philosophers have long been aware: *na vastuyāthātmyajñānaṃ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam ... kevalam vastutantram eva tat / na*

codanātantram "knowledge of the nature of a thing does not depend on human notions or authoritative statements. It depends only on the thing itself" (*Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.1.2 and 4).

Science originates from non-science just as a new biological species originates from something different from itself; and often by chance. Al-Bīrūnī, great as a scientist and student of Indian civilization, characterized Indian science as "a mixture of pearl shells and sour dates, or of pearls and dung, or of costly crystal and common pebbles." It has caused anger and even NEUGEBAUER (1957:174) called his expression "somewhat drastic." But al-Bīrūnī was right: scientific discoveries are rare and errors are vastly more common than correct knowledge Āryabhaṭa knew it for otherwise he would not have written at the end of his work:

> *sadasajjñānasamudrāt samuddhṛtaṃ devatāprasādena*
> *sajjñānottamaratnaṃ mayā nimagnaṃ svamatināvā*
>
> "By the grace of God, the precious sunken jewel of true knowledge has been rescued by me, by means of the boat of my own intelligence, from the ocean of true and false knowledge."

Johannes Keppler was aware of this *sadasajjñānasamudra* and took another step:

> No one should regard it as incredible that out of the nonsense and godlessness of astrology, not a useful thought or insight,
> out of dirty slime, not something edible for a snail, mussel, oyster or eel,
> out of a big heap spun by catterpillars not a spider,
> and finally out of a stinking pile of excrement, by an industrious chicken
> not something, a good grain, even a pearl or goldpellet
> can be extracted and found. [13]

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APr: *Atharva-Prātiśākhya,* Surya Kanta 1968
ApSrS: *Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra,* R.Garbe, I-III, 1882-1902

[13] First of three mottos from the *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*.

ApSuS:	*Āpastamba-Śulba-Sūtra*, Thibaut/Satyaprakash and Ram Swarup Sharma, 1968
BSrS:	*Baudhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra*, W.Caland, I-III, 1904-23
BSuS:	*Baudhāyana-Śulba-Sūtra,* G.Thibaut, *The Pandit*, Old Series 9-10, 1874-75; New Series 1, 1876-77.
CA:	*Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā,* Madhav M. Deshpande, 1997a
KP:	*Krama-Pāṭha*
KS:	*Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā*
KSrS:	*Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra*
KSuP:	*Kātyāyana-Śulba-Pariśiṣṭa*, I-II, G. Thibaut, *The Pandit*, New Series 4, 1882
KSuS:	*Kātyāyana-Śulba-Sūtra,* S.D. Khadilkar, 1974
M:	Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya,* F. Kielhorn, 1880-85
MS:	*Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā*
MSrS:	*Mānava-Śrauta-Sūtra*
P:	Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*
PP:	*Pada-Pāṭha*
Prat:	*Prātiśākhya*
RP(-P):	*Ṛk-Pada(-Pāṭha)*
RPr:	*Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya*, Mangal Deva Shastri, 1931
RS(-P):	*Ṛk-Saṃhitā(-Pāṭha)*
RT:	*Ṛk-Tantram*, Surya Kanta 1933, 1970
SP:	*Saṃhitā-Pāṭha*
SrS:	*Śrauta-Sūtra(s)*
SSrS:	*Śāṅkhyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra,* W. Caland, 1953
SuS:	*Śulba-Sūtra(s)*
SV:	*Sāmaveda*
TP(-P):	*Taittirīya-pada(-pāṭha)*
TPr:	*Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya*, William Dwight Whitney, 1871
TS:	*Taittirīya-Saṃhitā*
VajPr:	*Vājasaneyi-Prātiśākhya*, A.Weber, 1852
VS:	*Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā*
YV:	*Yajurveda*

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The *Svabodhodayamañjarī*, or how to suppress the mind with no effort[1]

RAFFAELE TORELLA, Rome

Introduction

A literary genre that enjoyed a certain popularity in medieval Kaśmīr is the short versified work which develops philosophical-religious themes, mainly drawn from the Śaiva tradition but also with some significant contributions from the Vaiṣṇava side, as in the case of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*. Among the authors that contributed to this genre, we can find some of the most illustrious names of the Śaiva tradition, such as Utpaladeva, Sadyojyotis, Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja, Rāmakaṇṭha II. Other notable examples, which have sometimes come down to us only partially through citations, are the philosophical stotras of the *Stavacintāmaṇi* by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa (extant), the *Jñānagarbha*, the *Tattvagarbha*, the *Kakṣyāstotra* by Bhāskara, the *Kramastotra,* the already mentioned *Saṃvitprakāśa*, etc.

The work that is edited here for the first time -Vāmanadatta's *Svabodhodayamañjarī* (henceforth SBUM), also known as *Svabodha*° (or *Subodha*°)*mañjarī*[2] - is a short treatise in verse. Very little is known of its author, except that he belonged to rather well defined circles of Kashmirian Śaivādvaita[3] and that only one more work can be ascribed to him with absolute certainty, the *Dvayasampattivārttika*, also known as *Bodhavilāsa*.[4] Vāmanadatta's date is also rather vague, being comprehended be-

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[1] This article is intended to be a modest token of my appreciation for Professor Minoru Hara, an outstanding scholar and exemplary gentleman, from whom I have learnt so much. I wish to thank my colleagues and friends A. Aklujkar, A. Passi, S. Sandahl and W. Slaje for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.

[2] The SBUM has been translated into Italian by R. GNOLI (1989: 123-136), who based his translation on the collation of some MSS consulted by him during his stays in Kashmir in the seventies. The differences between GNOLI's translation and mine mainly depend on our establishing the text differently at several points.

[3] On his connection with the Krama school see TORELLA 1994b:494-495.

[4] Edited and translated into Italian by R. GNOLI (1974: 451-455). The colophons of the two works leave no doubt about their having the same author (*Dvayasampattivārttika*: *jākadeśasamudbhū-*

Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 387-410

tween that of the *Vijñānabhairavatantra* (henceforth VBh; see below) - which, in turn, is not definitely settled (VIII-IX centuries ?) – and that of Abhinavagupta (ca. 975-1050), who refers to the *Dvayasampattivārttika* in his *Parātrimśikāvivaraṇa* (GNOLI ed. p. 253). The very few citations from the SBUM are not of great help as all the works that contain them are later than Abhinavagupta.[5] The only case to remain problematic is that of the *Spandapradīpikā*. Its author, Bhagavad° or Bhāgavata Utpala, well known for resorting to an unusual mixture of Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava authorities in his commentary on the *Spandakārikā,* remained isolated (perhaps precisely owing to his peculiar doctrinal position) and, to the best of my knowledge, has never been quoted in later literature. Of him, we can only say that he came after Utpaladeva, whose *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* he repeatedly quotes. The fact that he does not cite Abhinavagupta has made scholars assume for him an intermediate date between the two great exponents of the Śaivādvaita, who lived between ca. 925-975 and ca. 975-1050 respectively. This, of course, is bound to remain a hypothesis, however plausible.

The connection with the VBh is a major feature of Vāmanadatta's work. If the unmistakable flavour of the doctrines of this tantra appears throughout the SBUM, the *Dvayasampattivārttika* is even openly built around three verses of the VBh, which are textually cited. The renown of Vāmanadatta as an interpreter of the VBh must have been wide and durable if, several centuries later, Śivopādhyāya (XVIII century) still refers to his positions in the *Vijñānabhairavoddyota* and even quotes the *Dvayasampattivārttika* almost in full (pp.78-79).

The SBUM teaches a series of methods for achieving identification with supreme Consciousness (*svabodhodaya*) through de-identification with the mental and psychic dimension of the individual, called indifferently *manas* or *citta*. This overcoming of *manas* is mainly indicated by the terms *nirodha* or *laya* (and their verbal

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to mīmāṃsāvanakeśarī / harṣadattetināmā yas tasya sūnor iyaṃ kṛtiḥ //. SBUM: *mīmāṃsāvanasiṃhasya harṣadattasya sūnunā / kṛtā vāmanadattena svabodhodayamañjarī //*). Moreover, the two works generally follow each other in the MSS. On the possible identity of their author with the Vāmanadatta author of the *Saṃvitprakāśa,* see TORELLA 1994b: 482 fn.4.

[5] Verses from the SBUM are cited by Kṣemarāja (ca.1000-1060), the anonymous *Mahānayaprakāśa* published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series (probably later than Kṣemarāja, and earlier than Maheśvarānanda), Ramyadeva (ca.1100-1150), and Jayaratha (ca.1150-1200); see the notes to the translation for details.

roots), being apparently used as synonyms[6]. Vāmanadatta does not claim to present novelties but merely to illustrate old teachings for fear that their tradition should be lost (v.4cd).These old teachings are clearly those of the VBh. The latter is a tantra of the Trika school[7] which participates in a very peculiar way in its marked tendency to depreciate ritual practices (at least, if taken at their face value), which on the contrary are considered by the Śaivasiddhānta as the only effective means of liberation. While another famous tantra of the Trika, in its *ekavīra* version, the *Parātriṃśikā,* opposes bare knowledge to ritual, the VBh proposes instead a kind of subtle experience and spiritual practice, which may be called, in a very broad sense, yoga. However, Vāmanadatta immediately makes clear that, unlike the yoga tradition of Patañjali or the *Bhagavadgītā,* in his work emphasis is not placed on detachement (*vairāgya*) and repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), but that, on the contrary, the latter are programmatically negated.

Such programmatical negation is expressed in straightforward terms by a passage of Abhinavagupta's *Mālinīvijayavārttika*:

> "Actually, there is no member of yoga that can really serve as a means [to the Anuttara state]. Its [Anuttara's]own form is without form, in that it is devoid of delimitation. The means to it is in fact a 'non-means' [or: 'contains no means'], since there are neither ritual practices nor suppression of [mental] functions. This is a ship designed for a gentle wind - with no expiration and inspiration - which thus carries the self across the sea of duality, though the mind, in the meantime, is immersing itself into the fluid of objective world. Let us consider that the chaff of grain cannot be eliminated unless it is moistened. The same happens to those who want to restrain the natural course of the mind - or, for example, of a horse: owing to the violence of the procedures, the mind - and, likewise, the horse - will start running here and there taking innumerable wrong directions. Why does that happen? It is well-known that the mind may delight even in pain; on the contrary, it may even turn away in disgust from pleasure or knowledge. This is precisely what the Master [Vāmanadatta ?] has taught us in his treatise, in various ways. The drives of the senses can be dissolved solely through a de-

[6] To designate the state thus reached by the adept, the SBUM uses terms such as *kaivalya, śama, śānti*, and finally *jīvanmukta*.

[7] Cf. VBh 1-6.

> tachment brought about in suppleness (*anādaraviraktyā*)[8]. On the contrary, if one pretends to subjugate them, they turn out to be ungovernable".[9]

This is one of the main motifs of Śaivādvaita schools. This consideration, in its turn, is to be included in an overall tendency to favouring the flexibility of practices and the acceptance of the essential features of human behaviour: the ways to liberation are to be adapted to them, rather than viceversa. This cannot but call to mind the *upāyakauśalya* of the Buddhists, which is likely to lie at the very basis of the Śaiva doctrine. A lucid definition of this general principle can be found in a passage of the *Mahānayaprakāśa* (Triv.), which is worthwhile quoting in full:

> "Common experience shows us that all creatures, broadly speaking, are addicted to sex, meat and alcoholic drinks; some are more addicted to one of them, some to another. If, from the very beginning, they are asked immediately to proceed to the abandonment of all this, the teaching will not in the least take root in them. The human mind is turned towards these objects since hundreds of previous existences, and it is hardly possible to turn it away from them, just as it is very difficult to turn an old cow away from the corn fields. There is general agreement on this: the abandoning of such things is hard to obtain, also because men would end up by hating those who put forward such a teaching. If, on the contrary, a teaching is such as to leave their enjoyments intact at first, common men will adhere to it with faith."[10]

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[8] Or, taking the compound as a *samāhāradvandva*: "through [a mixture of] detachment and suppleness".

[9] II.106-112 *vastuto 'sti na kasyāpi yogāṅgasyābhyupāyatā / svarūpaṃ hy asya nīrūpam avacchedavivarjanāt // upāyo 'py anupāyo 'syāyāgavṛttinirodhataḥ / recanāpūraṇair eṣā rahitā tanuvātanauḥ // tārayaty evam ātmānaṃ bhedasāgaragocarāt / nimañjamānam apy etan mano vaiṣayike rase // nāntarārdratvam abhyeti niśchidraṃ tumbakaṃ yathā / svapanthānaṃ hayasyeva manaso ye nirundhate // teṣāṃ tatkhaṇḍanāyogād dhāvaty unmārgakoṭibhiḥ / kiṃsvid etad iti prāyo duḥkhe 'py utkaṇṭhate manaḥ // sukhād api virājyeta jñānād etad idaṃ [tv iti ?] / tathāhi gurur ādikṣad bahudhā svakaśāsane // anādaraviraktyaiva galantīndriyavṛttayaḥ / yāvat tu viniyamyante tāvat tāvad vikurvate //*. It is not to be ruled out that the '*guruḥ*' mentioned by Abhinavagupta might be Vāmanadatta himself.

[10] IX.4-8 *prāyo hi maithune madye māmse ca paridṛśyate / āsaktiḥ sarvajantūnāṃ viśeṣāt kasyacit kvacit // yadi tattyāgasaṃrambhaḥ pūrvaṃ teṣāṃ vidhīyate / upadeśo na sa manāg api citte prarohati // janmāntaraśatābhyastā viṣayeṣu matir nṛṇām / jaradgaur iva sasyebhyaḥ sā hi duḥkhena vāryate // iti saṃvādatas teṣāṃ parityāgo hi duṣkaraḥ / abhyasūyanti te yasmād upadeśakarāya ca // yathāsthitopabhogātma pūrvaṃ yat tūpadiśyate / tatrādhirūdhir lokasya śraddhāpūrvaṃ prajāyate //.*

The exemplariness of this passage, with all its disenchanted straightforwardness, did not escape Maheśvarānanda, who pointed it out by way of conclusion of his comments on v.46 of the *Mahārthamañjarī* (pp.116-117).

At the outset, the SBUM states that the very existence of the universe depends on its perception by the five senses, the functions of the latter depending in turn on the mind. Therefore, it is to the mind that any effort towards emancipation should be directed (v.3cd "Everything is dissolved to him whose mind is dissolved"). The preliminary method aims at undermining the very belief in the existence of the mind by denying it a localization in the human body (vv.6-7). An indirect method to negate the mind is, instead, that of negating the entire sphere of conceptualization and linguistic communication (*vyavahāra*); once the *vyavahāra* has been acknowledged as an illusory construction, also the basis on which it rests, i.e. the mind, looses reality. The central teaching of the SBUM concerns, as already said, how to obtain the dissolving of the mind 'with no effort' - and, in order to illustrate this, motifs belonging to the VBh are taken up again and further developed with new additions. It is possible to act in two distinct moments, that is, prior to and during the perception of objects, respectively (v. 17). The play is always extremely subtle. The mind is never attacked frontally but, as it were, circumvented or taken in the rear, by exploiting its own normal functioning in order to block it - for example, by first tying it with special intensity to an object and then directing upon it the violent or spontaneous annihilation of the object which is currently serving as its support; in other cases, the same result is obtained without the vanishing of the object but by resting on the natural, progressive extinguishing of the sensation itself. To this end, all the possible spheres in which the mind acts (cognitions, sensations, emotions and, finally, sex) are exploited[11]. Some practices also concern *prāṇa* functions, but they too are addressed in the same subtle and elusive way.

It has to be pointed out that the emphasis on "non-effort" is part and parcel of a broader attitude of the Kashmirian Advaita, i.e. the endeavour to escape from the narrow sectarian dimension only accessible to few, so-to-speak, professional ascetics, and to establish itself in the world of common men. The praise of the *gṛhastha*, which is however much more widespread in Indian *śāstra* than commonly believed

[11] The final verses 41-43 even deal with the 'minor' sensorial faculties, i.e. touch, taste and smell, which had been disregarded by the VBh.

(HARA 1997), is indeed one of the leitmotifs of these schools[12] and finds perhaps its most classical formulation in the last verse of the influential *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (IV.18): "In order that the ordinary man too can attain perfection (°*siddhi*°) effortlessly, Utpala, son of Udayākara, has explained with argumentations (*upapāditā*) this Recognition of the Lord". (TORELLA 1994a: 219)

Beside 'non-effort', the other key-word of the SBUM is 'instantly' (*kṣaṇāt, kṣaṇam*). Between the two concepts there is indeed a close link (but not a necessary coincidence[13]). The spiritual practices taught by the SBUM do not require a regular - possibly, also painful - repetition in order to bring about the expected results. On the contrary, here everything happens in one instant, once and for ever (cf. TORELLA 1994a: XXXVII-XXXIX). The tension between graduality and instantaneity (*krama/ akrama*) in the means of liberation runs throughout the Śaiva tradition. A final remark concerns Vāmanadatta's plain acceptance of Buddhist positions and arguments in his criticism of conceptualization and language (vv.5ff) as if they represented the *communis opinio* on the matter, irrespective of the basic religious and philosophical gaps that, in principle, divided Śaivas and Buddhists[14].

The manuscripts

The textual tradition of the SBUM is far from being satisfactory. The extant MSS are not many. To the six used for this edition – all but one photographed by me personally over the past years[15] – at least two more are to be added, both preserved at the

[12] This attitude permeates also another very influential Kashmirian text, with a partly different orientation, the nearly contemporary *Mokṣopāya* (SLAJE 2000: 176-181), later known as *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. Moreover, it is worth noting that the SBUM shows a close affinity to some of the main doctrines found in the *Mokṣopāya,* namely, the central role of *citta* in constructing and projecting an external world and the radical 'falseness' (*mithyātva*) of the latter. This position is not shared by the main stream of Kashmirian Śaiva Advaita. Another important motif shared by the two texts is the emphasis on the role of *vicāra*, as the first step towards liberation (SLAJE 2000:180-182; cf. below 1a, 9a, 25c).

[13] I am thinking of other, harder and more violent means involving a 'forced ripening/digestion/combustion' (*haṭhapāka)* of duality, expounded by the more extremistic schools.

[14] On the complex relationship between Buddhist and Śaiva schools in medieval Kashmir see TORELLA 1992.

[15] I am not able to give the details of the size of the MSS, which, regrettably, I did not record at the time when I photographed them. The MSS from the personal collection of Pandit Dina-

Library of Research and Publication Department of Jammu and Kashmir Government, Srinagar (Nos. 1342.04 and 1804.03), which were not accessible to me. However, all the extant MSS appear to depend on an archetype already fairly distant from the original, as shown by their sharing several evidently corrupt readings.[16] A frequent resort to conjectural emendation is, therefore, absolutely needed, in spite of all the risks involved. Most of the emendations proposed appear (at least to my mind) as virtually certain, some only probable or possible; in one case, on the contrary, the text seems to be corrupt beyond recovery [17]. The MSS are all on paper and not dated. The *śāradā* MSS (i.e. A B C D E) presumably belong to XVIII-earlyXIX centuries; the *kāśmīrī devanāgarī* MS (B^1) belongs to late XIX century, as most of the *devanāgarī* transcripts in Jammu Library. The only genetic connection that can be ascertained beyond doubt is between B (or another faithful apograph from its exemplar, or a faithful apograph of B) and B^1; in fact, B^1, definitely later than B, shares all its lacunas (except for the lacuna vv.9b-25c, found only in B, which is due to B having subsequently lost one folio). The (not many) differences found in the main group of MSS are likely to have originated from either simply reading/writing mistakes or the conscious/unconscious efforts to improve a text deriving from an already corrupt archetype.[18]

The *śāradā* MSS, which form the basis of this edition, show no linguistic or ortographic peculiarities that I deem worth noting, except perhaps for the (sporadic) occurrence of special signs for *jihvāmūlīya* and *upadhmānīya* in C and D (which however is not rare in *śāradā* MSS). The other features are basically the same I have found in hundreds of MSS of this kind. I must confess that I have not found them so interesting as to describe them in detail.

In the edited text the *sandhi* has been standardized.

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nath Shastri are probably no longer extant, having been presumably destroyed during Muslim desorders in Srinagar. I heartily thank the learned Pandit for allowing me free access to his valuable collection of MSS and books.

[16] See 6c, 7a, 9ab, 9d, 18bd, 19, 20c, 24ab, 27d, 31d, 32a, 36a, etc. Moreover, at least one *ardhaśloka* (41ab) is missing in all MSS. It is also likely that one or more *ślokas* are missing between vv.32 and 33.

[17] The three different states of the edited text are indicated by the remarks 'emend.' and 'conj. emend.' in the apparatus, and by a crux in the text, respectively.

[18] It is to be kept in mind that the *śāradā* textual transmission always remained in the hands of (more or less) learned pandits.

MS A

Personal collection of Pandit Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar. It is composed of 9 (bound) folios (pp.16), numbered on the verso 56-63. Marginal title on the verso: *sva bo dho da ya ma*, then: *sva ma*. Each page has 6 lines with approximately 18 *akṣaras*. *Śāradā* script. The text of the SBUM is followed by the *Bodhavilāsa*.

beginning: *śrīgurucaraṇakamalebhyo namoṃ namaḥ // oṃ oṃ*

end: *śrī // gurave // namaḥ iti śrīvāmanadattakṛtaṃ svabodhodayamañjarī samāptā // // // śubham astu lekhakapāṭhakayoḥ śrotṛṇām*

MS B

Benares Hindu University Library, C100 (3F 3240). It is composed of 2 (loose) folios (pp.3), numbered on the verso 39-40; no marginal title. Each page has 15 lines with approximately 20 *akṣaras*. *Śāradā* script. After the first page the hand changes; there are some marginal corrections by a later hand. Two major lacunas: vv.9b-25c (corresponding to one folio) and 35a-41b.

beginning: *oṃ*

end: *iti vāmanadattaviracitā svabodhodayamañjarī*

MS B^1

Shri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute Library, Jammu, No. 623 (20 ka 2).[19] It is composed of 3 (bound) folios (pp.4), with neither numbers nor marginal title. Each page has approximately 20 lines with 21 *akṣaras*. *Kāśmīrī devanāgarī* script. It shares, among other minor omissions, the lacuna 35a-41b found in B, the readings of which it generally follows very closely. The *Stavarāja* of Taṇḍula Ṛṣi precedes, the *Bodhavilāsa* follows.

beginning: *oṃ*

end: *iti vāmanadattakṛtā svabodhodayamañjarī samāptā*

MS C

Benares Hindu University Library, C4255 (3B 2263). It is composed of 5 (loose) folios (pp.10), numbered on the verso 245-249. Marginal title on the verso: *śrī su bo maṃ*. Each page has approximately 9 lines with 22 akṣaras. *Śāradā* script. The *Stava-*

[19] This seems to be the catalogue number of the whole codex to which the MS belongs. I am very grateful to Dr. Jürgen HANNEDER, Halle-Wittenberg, who was so kind as to inform me of the existence of this MS and provide me with a xerocopy. For a description see HANNEDER 1998: 42-43.

rāja of Taṇḍula Ṛṣi precedes, the *Bodhavilāsa* follows.
beginning: *oṃ namo gaṇapataye // atha subodhamañjarī likhyate*
end: *iti vāmanadattaviracitā svabodhodayamañjarī samāptā*

MS D
Personal collection of Pandit Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar. It is composed of 3 (loose) folios (pp.5), numbered on the verso 28-29. Marginal title on the verso: *sva bo maṃ*. Each page has approximately 18 lines with 20 *akṣaras*. *Śāradā* script. The *Bodhavilāsa* precedes.
beginning: *atha subodhamañjarī likhyate*
end: *iti vāmanadattakṛtā svabodhodayamañjarī samāptā*

MS E
Personal collection of Pandit Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar. It is part of a codex composed of loose folios, bearing on the top of each recto the sentence: *śrīdevī jayatitarām*. It is composed of 1 folio (pp.2), with neither numbers nor marginal title . Each page has approximately 28 lines with 32 *akṣaras*. *Śāradā* script. The scribe has not written on a portion of the second page, which has heavy traces of ink (thus, despite the appearance, the text is complete).
beginning: *oṃ*
end: *iti śrīvāmanadattakṛtā svabodhamañjarī samāptā*

Text

samyagbodhavicāreṇa bhāvānām asvabhāvataḥ /
labdhabodhodayānandaṃ vande saṃsthānam ātmanaḥ // 1 //
rūpādi[20]pañcavargo 'yaṃ viśvam etāvad eva hi /
gṛhyate pañcabhis tac ca cakṣurādibhir indriyaiḥ // 2 //
cakṣuḥ sarvāsv avasthāsu dehināṃ manasi sthitam /
tat pralīnaṃ [21]bhaved yasya tasya sarvaṃ pralīyate // 3 //
tasyaiva [22]vilayopāyaḥ [23]pradiṣṭo [24]gurubhiḥ [25]purā /

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[20] *°pañcavargo [...] gṛhyate* omitted in DE

[21] *bhaved yasya tasya* : *bhavet tasya yasya* CB[1]E, *bhavet tasya* B

[22] *vilayo°*: *vinayo°* B B[1], *viniyo°* CDE

[23] *pradiṣṭo*: *ādiṣṭo* A, *pradiṣṭā* B B[1]

tadāgama[26]paribhraṃśabhayāt [27]spaṣṭīkṛto mayā // 4 //
jātyādikalpanā[28]rūpavyavahāro manaḥ[29]sthitaḥ /
vastuto [30]na tu tāḥ santi niścityai[31]tac chamaṃ vrajet // 5 //
śukraṣoṇitasaṃśleṣa[32]kāle nāsti manaḥ kvacit /
[33]na [34]budbude [35]na [36]peṣyāṃ vā na śarīre kvacit sthitaṃ // 6 //
[37]śarīraṃ garbha[38]vāsāntaḥ [39]kaumāre [40]yauvane tathā /
[41]kṣaṇakṣayi vināśāntaṃ tac ca naivopalabhyate // 7 //
[42]pṛthag nāma pṛthag rūpaṃ [43]lomādīnāṃ pṛthaksthitiḥ /
pṛthak [44]sarvaṃ yathā[45]dṛṣṭaṃ kva [46]śarīraṃ tadā sthitam // 8 //
evam eva [47]vicāryoktā jātis [48]tathaiva bādhyate /

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24 *gurubhiḥ*: *guruṇā* B B¹E

25 *purā* (emend.): *parā* B B¹, *puraḥ* A, *paraḥ* CDE

26 *°paribhraṃśa°* : *°bhayād bhraṃśa°* B B¹, *°mayād bhraṃśa°* CE, *°mayād bhraṃbhayād* D

27 *spaṣṭīkṛto* : *spaṣṭīkṛte* BB¹CDE

28 *°rūpa°* : *°rūpī* A

29 *°sthitaḥ* : *°sthitam* CDE

30 *na tu tāḥ* (emend.) : *na ca tāḥ* A, *na tatas* B, *na tataḥ* B¹, *na ta tās* CE, *na ta tā* D

31 *°tac chamaṃ*: *°tat samaṃ* A

32 *°kāle*: *°nāle* D

33 *na*: *nā* CDE

34 *budbude* (emend.): *budbudo* ABB¹CDE

35 *na peṣyāṃ vā* omitted in B B¹

36 *peṣyāṃ* (emend.): *peṣo* A, *peṣaṃ* CDE, lacuna in B B¹ (*budbudo... na śarīre*)

37 *śarīraṃ* (emend.): *śarīre* ABB¹CDE

38 *°vāsāntaḥ* (emend.): *°vāsānte* BB¹CDE, *°bhāvaś ca* A

39 *kaumāre*: *kaumāraṃ* A, *kāmāre* B, *kaumārī* D

40 *yauvane*: *yauvanaṃ* A

41 *kṣaṇa°* : *kṣaya°* C

42 *pṛthag nāma*: *pṛthaj nāma* A, *pṛthaj māsaṃ* B, *pṛthak māṃsaṃ* CDE, *pṛthak māsaṃ* B¹

43 *lomādīnāṃ*: *lomāśīnāṃ* BB¹

44 *sarvaṃ*: *saṃ* D

45 *°dṛṣṭaṃ*: *dṛṣṭāṃ* D

46 *śarīraṃ tadā*: *śarīre manas* BB¹CDE

47 *vicāryoktā* (conj.emend.): *vicāryokte* CDE, *vicāryetthaṃ* ABB¹

na ca sā vastuto yuktā [49]kasyacid vāvabhāsate // 9 //
nāma pitrā kṛtaṃ mithyā kriyā na niyatā yataḥ /
[50]guṇī yadi bhavet kaścid bhavanti bahavo guṇāḥ // 10 //
itthaṃ [51]mithyā[52]vikalpotthavāsanābhir abhiplutam /
[53]cañcalaṃ manaso rūpaṃ niścityaitan [54]nirodhayet // 11 //
pūrvair nirodhaḥ kathito vairāgyābhyāsayogataḥ /
ayatnena nirodho 'yam asmābhir [55]upadiśyate // 12 //
[56]grāhyaṃ yac ca bhavet kiṃcit [57]tat tal līnaṃ [58]tadā bhavet /
anyasyāgrahaṇāc cittaṃ svātmany eva praśāmyati // 13 //
yathā ghanasvane [59]sāndre krameṇa vilayaṃ gate /
tadāśrayavaśāc cittaṃ tasmin kṣīṇe praśāmyati // 14 //
yad yan manoharaṃ kiṃcic chrutigocaram āgatam /
ekāgraṃ bhāvayet tāvad yāval līnaṃ nirodhakṛt // 15 //
rūpādīnāṃ tathaivetthaṃ bhāvayed ramaṇī[60]yatām /
[61]vilīnāni smaret [62]paścād ātmabhāvopabṛṃhi[63]taḥ // 16 //
evaṃ [64]grāhyasamāveśān [65]nirodhaḥ kathito mayā /

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[48] *tathaiva bādhyate* (conj. emend.): *tatraiva badhyate* A, *tatraiva paṭhyate* B[1]CDE; in B lacuna after *jāti*° (it continues with 25d °*dhāre praśāmyati*)

[49] *kasyacid* (emend.): *kasya ced* AB[1]CDE

[50] *guṇī yadi bhavet kaścid*: *guṇī bhavet kaścid yadi* A (unmetrical)

[51] *mithyā*°: *mithyāṃ* A

[52] *vikalpottha*°: *vikalpotthaṃ* CDE

[53] *cañcalaṃ*: *cañcalo* B[1]

[54] *nirodhayet*: *nibodhayet* B[1]CDE

[55] *upadiśyate*: *upadṛśyate* B[1]

[56] *grāhyaṃ*: *grāhya* CD

[57] *tat tal*: *tat tu* A

[58] *tadā*: *yadā* A

[59] *sāndre*: *sārdre* B[1]

[60] °*yatām*: °*yātāṃ* D

[61] *vilīnāni* (conj. emend.): *vilīnān na* AB[1]E, *vilīnān nā* CD [other possible emendation: *vilīnāṃ sa*]

[62] *paścād*: *paścad* D

[63] °*taḥ*: °*tāḥ* CDE

[64] *grāhya*°: *grāhyaṃ* B[1]CDE

grahaṇād eva pūrvo [66]'yam idānīṃ sampradṛśyate // 17 //
grahaṇānīndriyāṇīha samānīti [67] prabodhayet /
[68]samatvaṃ rāgahāneḥ syād dveṣasyopakṣayāt [69]tathā // 18 //
[70]sarvarāgāt sahāniḥ syāt sarvadveṣāt tathaiva [71]ca /
[72]baddhavat sarvarāgī syāt sarva[73]dveṣṭā ca bhairavaḥ // 19 //
agrāhyam indriyaṃ śūnyaṃ svātmany eva pralīyate /
pralīnendriya[74]vṛttes tu [75]kaivalyābhyudayodayaḥ // 20 //
tasmāc cittaṃ samādāya śūnye saṃkalpa[76]varjite /
[77]nistabdhendriyavṛttes tu nirodhaḥ samprajāyate // 21 //
jṛmbhamānasya satataṃ kṣudhāviṣṭasya yoginaḥ /
[78]dhyāyato vā [79]kim apy antaḥ pratyante kevalaṃ bhavet // 22 //

[65] *nirodhaḥ*: *nibodhaḥ* CDE

[66] *'yam idānīṃ*: *yomedānīṃ* B[1]

[67] *samānīti* (conj. emend., suggested by A. Aklujkar) *prabodhayet*: *samāni tu prabodhayet* CDE (unmetrical), *samāni pravirodhayet* AB[1]

[68] *samatvaṃ* (conj. emend.) *rāgahāneḥ syād*: *paratvaṃ rāgahāneḥ syād* AB[1]E; *pararāgātmahāniḥ syād* C, *pararāgāmahāniḥ syād* D (the readings found in CD seem simple mistakes determined by the verse that follows)

[69] *tathā*: *tataḥ* B[1]

[70] *sarvarāgāt sahāniḥ syāt sarvadveṣāt* (conj. emend.): *sarvarāgātmahānis syāt sarvadeśāt* ACDE, *sarvarāgātmanāhānis sarvadeśāt* B[1]

[71] *ca*: *tu* C D

[72] *baddhavat* (conj. emend.): *budhavat* B[1]CDE; *buddhavut* A

[73] *°dveṣṭā ca*: *°duṣṭaś ca* CD, *°duṣyaś ca* E; see below fn. 144 to the translation

[74] *°vṛttes* (emend.): *°vṛttis* AB[1]CDE

[75] *kaivalya°*: *kevala°* CD, *kaivala°* B[1], *kevalābhyudiyodayaḥ* E

[76] *°varjite*: *°valite* E (unmetrical)

[77] *nistabdha°*: *nisstabdha°* A, *nistambhe* B[1]

[78] *dhyāyato*: *dhyāyate* B[1]CDE

[79] *kim apy antaḥ*: *kim asyāntaḥ* B[1]CDE

apralīnamanovṛtter nidrām āśrayataḥ śanaiḥ /
[80]viṣayāgrahaṇāt sarvanirodhaḥ saṃprajāyate // 23 //
[81]dhāvataḥ padavikṣepaprayatnānavadhāraṇāt /
niḥsaṃkalpamanovṛtteḥ paramātmā [82]prakāśate // 24 //
āsane 'py upaviṣṭasya kva me cittam avasthitam /
vicāryaivaṃ prayatnena [83]nirādhāre [84]praśāmyati // 25 //
vayunā spandanādīni śarīrasya karomy aham /
na ca citte sthito vāyur na vāyau cittam āsthitam // 26 //
[85]evaṃ vimṛśato bhāvān na kvacit [86]saṃsthitaṃ manaḥ /
mithyaiva vṛttayas tasya sarvathā [87]kevalaṃ sthitam // 27 //
yatra yatra bhaved vāñchā bhojanādiṣu vastuṣu /
pūrayet [88]tāṃ yathā[89]śakti bhavet pūrṇo nirāśrayaḥ // 28 //
vāñchitaṃ gaditaṃ kiṃcid akasmād [90]yadi vismṛtaṃ /
punas tasyānusandhānāt kṣaṇāt kaivalyam āpnuyāt // 29 //
sthāṇuḥ syāt puruṣo [91]veti dūrād [92]dṛśye vikalpite /
[93]suniścitamateḥ kṣipraṃ nirodhaḥ saṃprajāyate // 30 //

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[80] *viṣayāgrahaṇāt*: *viṣayāgrahaṇā* C (D *id.*, but with *t* added above the line), *viṣayād grahaṇāt* A

[81] *dhāvataḥ padavikṣepa*° (conj. emend.): *yāvataḥ padavikṣepāḥ* B¹DE, *yāvata padavikṣepāḥ* AC

[82] *prakāśate*: *prakāśyate* A

[83] *nirādhāre*: *nirāgāre* B¹DE

[84] *praśāmyati*: *praśāmya* D

[85] v.27 omitted in B B¹

[86] *saṃsthitaṃ*: *saṃsthito* CDE

[87] *kevalaṃ* (emend.): *kevale* ACDE

[88] *tāṃ*: *tā* CDE

[89] °*śakti*: °*śaktir* BB¹CDE

[90] *yadi*: *abhi*° B, *yabhi*°

[91] *veti*: *vetti* BB¹CD

[92] *dṛśye*: *dṛśe* D

[93] *suniścita*°: *aniścita*° A

‡ dṛśyaiḥ padārthair [94]draṣṭāraṃ paśyed buddhyā yato dṛśaḥ ‡ /
taṃ dṛṣṭvā mokṣam āpnoti [95]yo na tadvat sa badhyate // 31 //
ālambya [96]saṃvidaṃ [97]yatnāt saṃvedyaṃ na svabhāvataḥ /
tasmāt [98]saṃviditaṃ sarvam iti saṃvinmayo bhavet // 32 //
punar [99]viśed apānena [100]hṛdayaṃ pravikāsayet /
tathaiva kṣīṇavṛttiḥ syād apāne vilayaṃ gate // 33 //
suṣumṇāpatham āśritya [101]prāsādadhvanibodha[102]taḥ /
binduṣaṭkaparityāgāc chānta[103]bodhaḥ kṣaṇād bhavet // 34 //
[104]vāmadakṣiṇasañcārabindudvayanigharṣaṇāt /
[105]dvādaśānte [106]mahāśāntiḥ siddhair uktā mukhāgame // 35 //
ūrdhvam [107]ākramato [108]vāyor [109]udgatānte śamo bhavet /
puryaṣṭakavibhede 'pi tathaiva manaso layaḥ // 36 //
[110]vivāryāsyaṃ kṣaṇaṃ sthitvā niḥsandigdham anākulam /
stambhitaprāṇa[111]vṛttes tu nirodhaḥ [112]saṃprajāyate // 37 //

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94 *draṣṭāraṃ*: *dvaṣṭāraṃ* C, *dṛṣṭāraṃ* DE

95 *yo* (emend.) *na tadvat sa*: *yena tadvat sa* BB¹CDE, *tadvan na* A

96 *saṃvidaṃ* (conj.): *saṃvido* ABB¹CDE

97 see below fn. 152 to the translation

98 *saṃviditaṃ*: *saṃvidite* BB¹

99 *viśed apānena*: (A has *viśeṣadapānena* with *ṣa* deleted by a vertical stroke placed above the line; the reading comes to be: *viśed apānena), videśapānena* CD, *viśeṣapānena* corrected to *videśapānena* E

100 *hṛdayaṃ pravikāsayet*: *hṛdiye saṃprakāśayet* B, *hṛdiyaṃ pravikāsayet* B¹

101 *prāsāda°* (conj. emend.): *prasāda°* ABCD, *pramāda°* B¹, *praś(?)āda°* E

102 *°taḥ*: *°kaḥ* corrected to *°taḥ* B

103 *°bodhaḥ*: *°bodha* B

104 B B¹ have a lacuna here; they continue with 42a (which is also preceded by *bhavet*)

105 *dvādaśānte*: *dvādaśānta°* A

106 *mahāśāntiḥ*: *mahāśaktiḥ* CDE

107 *ākramato* (emend.): *ākramate* ACDE

108 *vāyor*: *vāyur* C, *vāyu(gadgatāntaḥ)* D

109 *udgatānte* (conj. emend.): *udgatāntaḥ* AC, *gadgatāntaḥ* D, *udgam(?)āntaḥ* E

110 *vivāryāsyaṃ* (conj. emend.): *nidāryāsyaṃ* CDE, *vicāryāsyaṃ* A

111 *°vṛttes*: *°vṛttais* CDE

112 *saṃprajāyate*: *sampravartate* A (=)

nābhimedhrāntare cittaṃ [113]suratānte vinikṣipet /
[114]līyamāne ratānande nistaraṅgaḥ kṣaṇaṃ bhavet // 38 //
dūrāgatasuhṛdbandhu[115]pariṣvaṅganiṣevitam /
ānandanirbharaṃ cittaṃ nivṛttiṃ labhate [116]kṣaṇāt // 39 //
dūrād [117]uccarite śabde śabdārthānavadhāraṇāt /
sāvadhānasya tajjñānaṃ kṣīṇa[118]rodhaḥ prajāyate // 40 //
[119][...]
pādābhyaṅgapariṣvaṅgāc citta[120]rodhaḥ kṣaṇaṃ bhavet // 41//
[121]rucyānāṃ ṣāḍavādīnāṃ sva[122]lolāgre sthitiṃ kuru /
[123]kṣīyamāṇe rasānande kaivalyam upajāyate // 42 //
mālatyādiṣu [124]gandhāṃś ca tathaiva paribhāvayet /
[125]tadāśrayavaśāc cittaṃ teṣu līneṣu līyate // 43 //
itthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ yasya cittam ātmani līyate
[126]sa labdha[127]bodhasadbhāvo jīvanmukto [128]'bhidhīyate // 44 //
mīmāṃsā[129]vanasiṃhasya harṣadattasya sūnunā /
kṛtā [130]vāmanadattena svabodhodayamañjarī // 44 //

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[113] *suratānte*: *suratāntair* CDE

[114] *līyamāne ratānande* (emend.): *līyamāne ratānando* CDE, *līyamānena manasā* A (unmetrical)

[115] *°pariṣvaṅga°*: *pūriṣvaṅga°* A

[116] *kṣaṇāt*: *kṣaṇaṃ* A (=)

[117] all the MSS have *uccarite* instead of the more common *uccārite*

[118] *°rodhaḥ*: *°bodhaḥ* CDE

[119] an *ardhaśloka* is likely to have been dropped here

[120] *°rodhaḥ kṣaṇaṃ*: *°bodhaḥ kṣayaṃ* E

[121] *rucyānāṃ*: *dṛśyānāṃ* CDE (the two words come to be quite similar in *śāradā* script).

[122] *svalolāgre sthitiṃ*: *svalokāgre sthitiṃ* A, *svalolāgro sthitaṃ* E

[123] *kṣīyamāṇe rasānande* (emend.): *kṣīyamāṇarasānandaṃ* ABB[1]CDE

[124] *gandhāṃś ca*: *gandhāś ca* BB[1]

[125] the *ardhaśloka* has been omitted in A

[126] *sa*: *saṃ°* BB[1]

[127] *°bodha°*: *°bodho°* B[1]CDE

[128] *'bhidhīyate*: *vidhīyate* BB[1]CE, *vilīyate* D

[129] *°vanasi°*: *°vasi°* A

[130] *vāmanadattena*: *vāmadattena* B[1]

Translation

1. I bow to the conformation [*saṃsthānam* 'way of manifesting, nature'] of the Self,[131] in which the bliss connected with the emerging of consciousness arises once one has thoroughly examined the nature of consciousness and ascertained, as a consequence, that the objects do not possess a reality of their own.

2. The five groups of form-colour etc. constitute the totality of the world. The world is grasped by the five sensory faculties, the sight and so on.[132]

3. Sight, in all its forms, is based on the mind of men. Everything is dissolved to him whose mind is dissolved.

4. In the past, the Masters have taught the means to dissolve it [the mind]. Being afraid that this authoritative teaching should decay, I will illustrate it.[133]

5. Linguistic communication, formed as it is by the conception of universals and so on,[134] is based on the mind. But such conceptions do not exist in reality: having ascertained this, one attains pacification.

6. At the time when male semen and female blood get mixed, the mind can be found nowhere, nor can it be found in the embryo, nor in the phoetus, nor anywhere in the

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[131] The world is the manifestation of the self, made of its own effulgence. This consideration is made in the *Mahānayaprakāśa*, which quotes and comments upon the first verse of the SBUM while dealing with the Krama practice of *kālagrāsa* 'devourement of time': *samyagvastuvicāreṇa bhāvānām asvabhāvataḥ // labdhabodhodayānandaṃ vande saṃsthānam ātmanaḥ / iti siddhamukhāmnāyayuktyā naivāsti vastutaḥ / vastusvabhāvo yatrāyaṃ kālaḥ syāt kalanātmakaḥ / svavisphāramayaṃ sarvam idaṃ saṃsthānam ātmanaḥ // iti bodhodayānandāt kaḥ kālo grasyate hi yaḥ / tadgrāsasaṃrambhaparā yāś ca dvādaśa kālikāḥ // [...]* (IX.52cd-55; the odd division of the verses is probably caused by an *ardhaśloka* having been previously dropped).

[132] Cf. e.g. VBh 136a *indriyadvārakaṃ sarvaṃ*. The first two *pādas* are quoted by Jayaratha, again in a Krama context, ad *Tantrāloka* IV.149 (vol.III p.159).

[133] Cf. e.g. *Mahānayaprakāśa* VII.168 *tad etat paramaṃ guhyaṃ yoginīnāṃ mukhe sthitam / mukhāgamamlānabhayād udghāṭya pratipāditam //*. Vāmanadatta is referring here to the VBh.

[134] This is an obvious reference to *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.3d *nāmajātyādiyojanā [kalpanā]*. In the next verses Vāmanadatta will mention and briefly criticize *jāti, nāma, kriyā, guṇa* and *guṇin* (*dravya*). Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccayasvavṛtti* (as quoted in *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* p.452) *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti / jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti / guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti / kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti / dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇīti*. On the various possible interpretations of this crucial passage, see HATTORI 1968: 83 ff.; FUNAYAMA 1992:72ff. Cf. also *Mahābhāṣya* vol. I, p. 19, *catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ / jatiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛcchāśabdāś caturthāḥ*.

body.[135]

7. The body, for its part, while being in the embryonic state, in the childhood or in the youth, is decaying instant by instant until complete destruction, and, moreover, it is not perceived [as a unit].

8. In it, name is separate, form is separate, the various parts it is composed of, such as hair and so on, also exist separately. Everything is separate, depending on how each component is grasped by perception. Then, where is the body?

9. Once the same way of reasoning is applied, universal too - already mentioned before - is to be rejected.[136] On the other hand, universal does not in fact logically stand nor does it appear directly to anyone.

10. Name is given by the father; verbal noun is illusory since it is not fixed. If we assume someone as the quality-bearer, qualities [however] are many.[137]

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[135] The mind cannot be located in a definite place, hence it does not exist. Cf. the meditation on the inexistence of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*citta*, etc.) in VBh 94 *cittādyāntaḥkṛtir nāsti mamāntar bhāvayed iti / vikalpānām abhāvena vikalpair ujjhito bhavet //*.

[136] The criticism addressed to the body (individual substance as *avayavin*) can also apply, by analogy, to universal (as extending to different individuals), 'already mentioned earlier' (by tentatively accepting the conjectural emendation *uktā*).

[137] In this way, *nāma* is given the meaning of *yadṛcchāśabda* 'proper noun', just as in the *Pramāṇasamuccayasvavṛtti*. Also the other items are to be taken as linguistic categories. The unreality of verbal noun depends on its not being 'fixed' (*na niyatā*) in the sense that an individual would come to be signified through one of the many actions that occasionally he may bring about. I draw this interpretation from the *Pramāṇasamuccayasvavṛtti* which is apparently taken as the reference point here (in fact, Dignāga gives '*pācaka*' as an example of *kriyā*). Another - but by far less probable, though seemingly plainer - interpretation of this passage could be: "Verbal action is illusory since it is not definite". This would refer to the fact, pointed out by grammatical speculation from Patañjali onwards, that action, e.g. 'cooking', is only apparently something unitary and definite, being instead a series of different segments of 'micro-actions' ('filling the pot', 'kindling the fire' etc.) which follow each other in a temporal chain (*pūrvāparībhūtāvayava*) and are given a sort of artificial unity only by the intervention of the mind. As to *guṇin*, not differently from the *kriyā*-noun, its unreality would consist in the fact that one and the same individual would have multiple designations depending on the various single qualities that, by turns, are related to it. One is reminded of Dignāga's remarks on closely related topics in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (TORELLA 1994a: 165-166, fn.12).

11. If, in this way, one ascertains that the perpetually instable nature of the mind is affected by the latent impressions deriving from illusory mental constructs, he will be able to suppress it.

12. The ancient masters have shown how to suppress it through detachment and repeated practice. [Instead], we will teach how to obtain suppression with no effort.[138]

13. As a consequence, all the various possible objects of perception will be dissolved. Owing to its not perceiving any other thing, the mind becomes extinguished into the Self.

14. This is just like what happens when a rumbling thunder gradually vanishes: once the thunder has completely vanished, the mind too, due to its resting on it, becomes extinguished.[139]

15. The adept should fix his exclusive attention on any pleasant sound coming to his ears, till the moment in which the sound, having disappeared, becomes the cause of the suppression [of the mind].[140]

16. Or similarly, he should in the same way fix his attention on the pleasantness of colours/forms and so on. Once they have dissolved, the adept should meditate on them[141], being supported by the attainment of Self-hood.

17. Thus, I have expounded the suppression obtained through the immersion into the objects of perception. Now, I am going to show the suppression obtained prior to perception.

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[138] The verse is quoted by Jayaratha ad *Tantrāloka* IV.257cd-258ab (vol.III p.289) with a slightly different wording of *pādas* cd: *asmābhis tu nirodho 'yam ayatnenopadiśyate.* A possible allusion to this verse can be found in Abhinavagupta's *Mālinīvijayavārttika* II.111cd-112, quoted above (fn.9). Vāmanadatta is referring to *Yogasūtra* I.12 *abhyāsavairāgyābhyāṃ tannirodhaḥ* and *Bhagavadgītā* VI.36cd *abhyāsenaiva kaunteya vairāgyeṇa ca gṛhyate* (*Bhagavadgītārthasaṃgraha* p.109, *vairāgyeṇa viṣayotsukatā vināśyate / abhyāsena mokṣapakṣaḥ kramāt kramaṃ viṣayīkriyate*). Cf. VBh 129 *yatra yatra mano yāti tat tat tenaiva tatkṣaṇaṃ / parityajyānavasthityā nistaraṅgas tato bhavet //*; according to Śivopādhyāya (pp.112-113), the practice outlined in this verse would refer precisely to the above doctrine.

[139] Cf. VBh 41 *tantryādivādyaśabdeṣu dīrgheṣu kramasaṃsthiteḥ / ananyacetāḥ pratyante paravyomavapur bhavet //* (Śivopādhyāya: *pratyante tacchabdanivṛttau ālambanāntarānudaye*).

[140] The verse is quoted in *Spandapradīpikā* p.56 (with the reading *akṣigocaram* instead of *śrutigocaram).* Cf. VBh 72 *gītādiviṣayāsvādāsamasaukhyaikatātmanaḥ / yoginas tanmayatvena mano-rūḍhes tadātmatā //;* see also *ibid.* v. 41.

[141] That is, 'on their being dissolved'; or, by accepting the emendation *vilīnāṃ sa* instead of *vilīnāni,* 'on their pleasantness being dissolved'.

18. In this practice, the sensorial faculties, which are the instruments of perception, are to be brought to a state of 'equality'. Equality comes from the escaping from attachment, as well as from the extinction of aversion.[142]

19. [143]One should escape from all attachment, and from all aversion as well. Attached to all, just like the fettered man, is Bhairava, and averse to all.[144]

20. Sensorial faculties, when bereft of perceptible objects and void, are dissolved into the Self. The happiness of isolation arises in him, who attains the dissolvement of the sensorial faculties.[145]

21. Therefore, in the adept who has withdrawn the mind into the void[146], free from mental constructs, the activity of sensorial faculties is paralysed, and, consequently, suppression is attained.

22. In the yogin who continuously yawns, being affected by hunger, or who is

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[142] Cf. VBh 126 *na dveṣaṃ bhāvayet kvāpi na rāgaṃ bhāvayet kvacit / rāgadveṣavinirmuktau madhye brahma prasarpati //*; also 101 *kāmakrodhalobhamohamadamātsaryagocare / buddhiṃ nistimitāṃ kṛtvā tat tattvam avaśiṣyate //*.

[143] The verse, which seems bound to remain doubtful in some points, is quoted by Ramyadeva in his *vivaraṇa* on Cakrapāṇi's *Bhāvopahāra* (p.19): *indriyārtheṣu śabdasparśarūparasagandheṣu viṣayabhūteṣu, indriyeṣu rāgalobhānuyāyiṣu satsu iti vyadhikaraṇe saptamyau, niḥsnehatvaṃ prabhutvaṃ cātyantāyuktir anabhiṣvaṅgas tadadhiṣṭhātṛtvena vā sphuraṇaṃ "buddhavat sarvarāgī syāt sarvadveṣyo 'tha bhairava iti" nyāyena udvartanam aśeṣavāsanonmūlanam* (a MS of this work, which I have consulted in Berlin, presents a few significant differences from the edited text. It may be useful to quote it in full: *indriyārtheṣu śabdasparśarūparasagandheṣu indriyeṣu rāgalobhānuyāyiṣu iti vyadhikaraṇe saptamyau niḥsnehatvaṃ vibhutvaṃ cātyantasaktir abhiṣvaṅgas tadadhiṣṭhātṛtvena vā sphuraṇaṃ / buddhavat sarvarāgī syāt sarvadveṣo tha bhairava iti nyāyenodvartanam evāśeṣavāsanonmūlanam*, Staatsbibliothek Berlin, MS HS.OR.12464 (KA 1464), f.7a).

[144] *rāga* and *dveṣa* are a symptom of the limited state precisely in that they introduce a discrimination into reality (one is attached or averse to 'something'). On the contrary, being attached or averse to 'everything' amounts, in a sense, to transcending both *rāga* and *dveṣa*. In the Bhairava state (if the text I have established is correct) there is even the paradoxical coexistence of *sarvarāga*, which is closer to the experience of common man, and *sarvadveṣa*. It is to be noted that Ramyadeva seems instead to take them as alternative; his quotation of the *ardhaśloka,* however corrupt may it be, has *'tha* instead of *ca*, and serves as an illustration of the phrase *anabhiṣvaṅgas tadadhiṣṭhātṛtvena vā sphuraṇam* 'the absence of attachment, *or* the appearing as the one that rules over attachment [i.e. includes it but is not dependent on it].

[145] Cf. VBh 136 *indriyadvārakaṃ sarvaṃ sukhaduḥkhādisaṃgamam / itīndriyāṇi saṃtyajya svasthaḥ svātmani vartate //*.

[146] The relevance of the concept of *śūnya* and its role in spiritual practice as found in the VBh, and in other texts of the Śaivādvaita tradition of Kashmir as well, would deserve a separate study.

internally meditating on something, at the very end isolation arises.

23. When one is slowly falling asleep, having his mental functions not [yet] completely dissolved, a total suppression arises since no perception of objects occurs in him.[147]

24. If one is running without being determinately aware of his own efforts in making steps, and, consequently, has his mental activity free from intentions and constructs, the supreme Self shines in him.

25. If one is sitting on a seat and thinks insistently:"Where is my mind?", he will become extinguished into the plane without support.[148]

26-27. "Through the breath I bring about the movements of the body; however, the breath does not reside in the mind nor does the mind reside in the breath." By considering the various realities from this viewpoint, he comes to realize that the mind does not reside in any place. Therefore, to him the mental functions become illusory and he reaches the full state of isolation.

28. Whatever longing he may experience for any object, like food and so on, he should satisfy it as far as possible. Thus, he will become full and without support.[149]

29. One has been told something that he was longing for, and, without reasons, he has forgotten it. On recollecting it later, he attains isolation in one instant.[150]

30. One has seen something from a distance and wonders whether it is a pillar or a man. When certainty is reached, suppression takes place immediately.

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[147] Cf. VBh 75 *anāgatāyāṃ nidrāyāṃ pranaṣṭe bāhyagocare / sāvasthā manasā gamyā parā devī prakāśate //*. Śivopādhyāya (p.65) quotes a closely related passage from the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (untraced in the edited text): *nidrādau jāgarasyānte yo bhāva upajāyate / taṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayan sākṣād akṣayānandam aśnute //*. Taking into account the close similarity between *a* and *su* in *śāradā* script, one may hypothesize the alternative reading *supralīna*°, which would furnish a different but equally possible meaning.

[148] Cf. VBh 78 *mṛdvāsane sphijaikena hastapādau nirāśrayam / nidhāya tatprasaṅgena parā pūrṇā matir bhavet //;* and 82 *āsane śayane sthitvā nirādhāraṃ vibhāvayan / svadehaṃ manasi kṣīṇe kṣaṇāt kṣīṇāśayo bhavet //*.

[149] Cf. VBh 74 *yatra yatra manastuṣṭir manas tatraiva dhārayet / tatra tatra parānanda-svarūpaṃ sampravartate //;* 72 *jagdhipānakṛtollāsarasānandavijṛmbhaṇāt / bhāvayed bharitāvasthāṃ mahānandas tato bhavet //;* 73 *gītādiviṣayāsvādāsamasaukhyaikatātmānaḥ / yoginas tanmayatvena manorūḍhes tadātmatā //*.

[150] Cf., on partially similar lines, VBh 119 *vastuṣu smaryamāṇeṣu dṛṣṭe deśe manas tyajet / svaśarīraṃ nirādhāraṃ kṛtvā prasarati prabhuḥ //*.

31. Thanks to intellect, in a perception one sees, through the perceptible objects, the perceiver[151]. Having seen it, he attains liberation; those who cannot do the same are bound.

32 Having intensely rested on consciousness, [he realizes that] what is the object of consciousness does not exist [as such] by its own nature; therefore, everything is [solely] object of consciousness. Having realized this, he becomes identified with consciousness.[152]

33. And again (*punaḥ*)[153] he should go within with the *apāna* breath, and, consequently, cause the heart to expand. Similarly, once the *apāna* is dissolved, his mental functions cease.

34. After entering the path of *suṣumṇā* and abandoning the six *bindu*s through the awareness of the resonances of *prāsāda*[*mantra*], his consciousness instantly becomes pacified.[154]

35. The Perfect Ones said in the oral tradition (*mukhāgama)* that the great pacification arises when the two *bindu*s, moving along the left and the right paths, merge in the *dvādaśānta*.[155]

36. At the end of the rise of the up-going breath, pacification arises. Similarly, the

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[151] Tentative translation of a text apparently corrupt.

[152] The verse is cited by Kṣemarāja in the *Spandanirṇaya* (p.48) with *yasmāt* (probably suggested by the following *tasmāt)* instead of *yatnāt*.

[153] The presence of *punaḥ* makes one guess that a verse has been dropped, where the first part of this practice, centred on the *prāṇa*, was presumably treated. The movements of *prāṇa* (directed outwards) and *apāna* (directed inwards) are indicated by *vraj-* e *viś-* respectively; cf. VBh *26 na vrajen na viśec chaktir marudrūpā [...]* and Śivopādhyāya's comments (p.24*): na vrajet - hṛdo dvādaśāntaṃ na yāyāt, na ca viśet - dvādaśāntāt hṛdayaṃ na gacchet.*

[154] Text doubtful. If we tentatively assume the reading *prāsādadhvani* as the correct one, the verse would be alluding to the meditation on the various planes of the *prāsādamantra* (PADOUX 1990: 384 n.26). The six *bindu*s probably represent the two omologous groups of six (*adhvan*, *kāraṇa*): the six 'paths' and the six 'Causal Deities' which are to be transcended (*tyaj-)* by the adept wishing to attain the supreme plane (the 'seventh'); cf. *Netratantra* XXII.15 *ṣaṭprakāraṃ mahādhvānaṃ ṣaṭkāraṇapadasthitam / juhoti vidyayā sarvaṃ juṃkāreṇa pracoditam // [...]; 19-20 udgīthākṣarasaṃbaddhaṃ tattvavarṇapadātmakam / bhuvanāni kalā mantrāḥ kāraṇāni ṣaḍ eva tu // brahmā viṣṇuś ca rudraś cāpīśvaraś ca sadāśivaḥ / śivaś ceti svaśaktyā tu ṣaṭtyāgāt saptame layaḥ //.*

[155] The two bindus correspond to *prāṇa* and *apāna*. Cf. VBh 64 *vāyudvayasya saṃghaṭṭād antar vā bahir antataḥ / yogī samatvavijñānasamudgamanabhājanam //* (Śivopādhyāya p.53: *prāṇāpānasaṃghaṭṭam*)

dissolution of the mind takes place also by breaking asunder [or: 'piercing'] (°*vibhede 'pi*) the octuple body[156].

37. If one has kept his mouth open[157] for an instant, remaining free of doubts and agitation, his *prāṇa* functions are paralysed. [Consequently], suppression takes place in him.

38. At the end of coitus, the adept should project his mind into the place between the navel and the sexual organ. When the love bliss dissolves, he becomes waveless in one instant.

39. The mind, rejoicing at the embrace of a friend or a relative returning from afar, full of bliss, comes to cessation in one instant. [158]

40. When a word is uttered from a distance, at first one cannot grasp its meaning, but after paying attention one can understand it. [In so doing], one becomes free from obstruction.

41. [...] by the anointing and massaging of the feet (*pādābhyaṅgapariṣvaṅgāt*), one gets at the obstruction of his mind.[159]

42. Keep some tasty food - such as pastry - on the tip of your tongue: when the bliss that derives from savouring it is gradually dissolving, isolation will arise.[160]

43. Similarly, one should concentrate on the fragrances of flowers, such as jasmins. Due to having them as its support, the mind also dissolves when they dissolve.[161]

44. If, in the manners outlined so far, instant by instant he brings about the dis-

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[156] Text and translation doubtful ('in spite of the differentiation of the octuple body' ?).

[157] The conjecture *vivārya* is only tentative.

[158] Cf. VBh 71 *ānande mahati prāpte dṛṣṭe vā bāndhave cirāt / ānandam udbhūtaṃ dhyātvā tallayas tanmanā bhavet //*.

[159] See above fn.11. Though the more current meaning of *pariṣvaṅga* is 'embrace' (see also above v.39), here the context would suggest 'massage'. This is confirmed by S. SANDAHL, currently working on related topics as treated in the *Mānasollāsa* (personal communication): "As for *pariṣvaṅga* in the compound below I think that it indeed refers to massage, especially in connection with *abhyaṅga*. [...] foot massage is considered aphrodisiac; it is supposed to enhance sexual endurance and delay ejaculation [...]." The verse apparently lacks the first hemisthic.

[160] Cf. VBh 73 *gītādiviṣayāsvādāsamasaukhyaikatātmanaḥ / yoginas tanmayatvena manorūḍhes tadātmatā //*. See also above v.15.

[161] See also above v.16.

solution of the mind into the Self, he attains the essence of consciousness. He is called 'liberated-while-living'.

45. This "Bundle of Flowers of the Arising of One's Own Consciousness" has been composed by Vāmanadatta, son of Harṣadatta, a lion in the forest of Mīmāṃsā.

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